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The   report   reviewed   existing   policies   and   legal   frameworks   relating   to   land-­‐water-­‐environment  
management  with  a   focus  on  hydropower  development  and   livelihood  options   in  Lao  PDR,  Cambodia,  
and  Vietnam.  It  described  and  analyzed  the  sectoral  decision-­‐making  set  up  at  national  level.  Later,  this  
decision-­‐making  set  up  was  linked  with  operational  rules  and  procedures  of  hydropower  projects  in  each  
of  the  three  countries.    
  
1.1. Objectives	  
The  objectives  of  this  policy  review  and  institutional  analysis  are  as  follow:  
• To   identify   the   obstacles   and   opportunities   which   exist   in   the   current   policy,   legal   and  
organizational   frameworks   that   regulate   hydropower   planning,   development   and  
management,  and  rural  livelihoods  development  from  the  perspective  of  the  project’s  goals.    
• To  be  in  a  position  to  advice  other  project  components  on  how  the  existing  policy,  legal  and  
organizational   frameworks   can   support   or   hinder   the   uptake   of   the   preferred   livelihood  
options  which  the  project  seeks  to  identify,  test  and  promote.    




The   overall   analysis   of   this   report   comprises   of   three   elements:   the   review   of   policy   and   legal  
frameworks;   institutional  mapping;   and   review  of   operational   procedures  with   regard   to   hydropower  
development  and  livelihoods  in  each  of  the  three  countries  (Lao  PDR,  Cambodia,  Vietnam).  This  analysis  
follows  an  iterative  process,  rather  than  a  step-­‐by-­‐step  approach.  
  
First,  we  summarized  and  reviewed  national  policies  and  legal  frameworks  on  land,  water,  environment  
issue  related  to  hydropower  and  livelihoods.  Table  1  gives  an  overview  of  the  reviewed  policies  and  legal  
frameworks.    
Lao  PDR   Cambodia   Vietnam  
The  Seventh  National  Socio-­‐
Economic  Development  Plan  
(2011-­‐2015)	    
The  Rectangular  Strategy  for  





National   Growth   and   Poverty  
Eradication  Strategy  (NGPES)  
National  Strategic  Development  
Plan  (2006-­‐2010)  
Law  on  Electricity  (2007)  
Law  on  Investment  Promotion  
(2009)  
National  Program  for  Sub-­‐
National  Democratic  
Development  (2010-­‐2019)  
National  Energy  Development  
Strategy  up  to  2020  
Tax  Law  (2010)   Power  System  Development  Plan   6th  Power  Development  Plan  
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(2007-­‐2022)   (PDP)  (2006-­‐2015)  
Electricity  Law  (1997,  2010)   Renewable  Energy  Action  Plan  
(2003)  
7th  Power  Development  Plan  
(2012-­‐2017)  
Power  System  Development  Plan  
(2004)  
National  Water  Resources  Policy  
(2004)  
Development  Plan  for  the  
Central  Economic  Focal  Region  
(2010-­‐2020)  
National  Policy  on  Sustainable  
Hydropower  (2006)  
MOWRAM  Strategic  
Development  Plan  (2006-­‐2010)  
River  Basin  Master  Plan  
Renewable  Energy  Development  
Strategy  (2010)  
Law  on  Water  Resources  
Management  (2007)  
Provincial  Master  Plan  
Water  and  Water  Resources  Law  
(1996)  
Land  Law  (2001)   Environment  Protection  Law  
(2005)  
National  Water  Resources  Profile  
(2008)  
Land  Policy  (2009)   Decree  no.  80/2006/ND-­‐CP  on  
Strategic  Environmental  
Assessment  (SEA)  
Draft  National  Water  Resources  
Policy  (2010)  
Master  Plan  for  Fisheries  (2001)   Circular  08/2006/TT-­‐BTNMT  on  
the  required  contents  on  an  SEA  
report  
WREA   organization   and   staff  
arrangements  for  IWRM  
Fisheries  Development  Action  
Plan  (2005-­‐2008)  
National  Hydropower  Plan  
(2007)  
Environment  Protection  Law  
(1999)  
  Law  of  Environment  Protection  
and  Natural  Resources  (1996)  
Decree  no.  197/2004/ND-­‐CP  on  
procedures  for  compensation  
Decree  on  the  agreement  and  
endorsement  of  the  National  
Strategy  on  Environment  years  
2020  and  Action  Plan  for  the  
years  2006-­‐2010  (2004)  
  
Protected  Area  Law  (2008)   Decree  and  Circular  no.  
116/2004TT-­‐BTC  on  the  roles  
and  responsibilities  for  
implementation  of  resettlement  
projects  
Land  Law  (2003)   Sub-­‐decree  on  EIA  process  
(1999)  
  
Decree  on  state  land  lease  or  
concession  (2009)  
Sub-­‐decree  no.  19  on  social  land  
concessions  (2003)  
  
Instruction  as  regards  the  
implementation  of  decree  on  
state  owned  land  approval  for  
lease  or  concession  (NLMA,  
2010)  
Forestry  Law  (2002)  and  National  
Forest  Policy  (2002)  
  
Decree  on  Compensation  and  
Resettlement  of  People  Affected  
by  Development  Projects  (STEA,  
2006)  
Sub-­‐decree  no.  79  on  community  
forestry  management  (2003)  
  
Regulations  for  Implementing  
Decree  on  Compensation  and  
Resettlement  of  People  Affected  
by  Development  Projects  (STEA,  
2006)  
Strategy  for  Agriculture  and  
Water  Resources  (2006-­‐2010)  
  




Table  1:	  Reviewed  policies  and  legal  frameworks  in  land-­‐water-­‐environment  management  with  focus  on  
hydropower  and  livelihoods	  
During  the  review  process  we  discovered  that  land-­‐water-­‐environment  management  is  not  consistently  
defined  legally.  The  existing  legal  frameworks  resemble  both  conceptual  and  operational  gaps  in  terms  
of   land-­‐water-­‐environment  management   policy   both   horizontally   (between   the   different   government  
agencies   at   each   administrative   level)   and   vertically   (between   the   same   government   agencies   at  
different  administrative  levels).  Our  response  to  this  inconsistency  and  policy  gaps  is  that  they  exist  not  
without   reasons.   So,   rather   than   saying   that   there   is   a   gap   that   needs   to   be   filled,   our   approach   is  
focused  on  trying  to  understand  why  this  gap  exists  in  the  first  place.  To  answer  this  question,  we  look  at  
the  rationale  behind  policy  formulation,  key  assumptions  behind  this  rationale,  targeted  policy  outcome,  
and  key  indicators  to  measure  this  outcome.    
  
Our   hypothesis   is   that   policy   gap   exists   because   each   policy   is   defined   and   formulated   based   on   a  
different  set  of  (sectoral)  rationales  and  variables,  not  necessarily  linked  to  each  other.  We  analyzed  this  
policy   gap   and   inconsistency   from   the   perspective   of   legal   pluralisms   (Griffiths,   1986;   Guillet,   1998).  
Moving   beyond   the   normative   approach   towards   policy   making,   policy   recommendations   from   this  
study  is  focused  on  identifying  policy  entry  points  to  improve  existing  linkages  with  regard  to  coexisting  
sectoral   legal   frameworks,   from   the   context   of   hydropower   development   and   livelihoods.   So,   rather  
than   striving   towards   holistic   and   100%   policy   consistency,   which   is   desirable   from   the   planning  
perspective,  we   took   a  more   realistic   approach   to   link   the   different   policy   rationale   concerning   land-­‐
water-­‐environment  management.    
  
Second,   we   brought   to   light   the   sectoral   decision-­‐making   set   up   at   national   level.  We   identified   the  
agency   responsible   for   the   role/task   defined   in   the   legal   frameworks   and   look   for   possible  
complimentary,  overlapping  and/or  gaps  and  how  this  affects  each  agency’s  actual  involvement  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  
their   formal   role   and   decision-­‐making   authority.   This   institutional  mapping   focuses   on   looking   at   the  
organizational  structure  of  the  relevant  sector  ministries,  their  tasks  and  formal  mandate,  and  whether  
the  current  institutional  set-­‐up  is  conducive  in  enabling  them  to  exercise  their  role  effectively  and  how  
these  influence  what  the  project   is  trying  to  achieve.  The  link  to  provincial,  district  down  to  commune  
system  will  form  an  integral  part  of  the  in-­‐depth  field  research  planned  from  June  to  August  2011.  The  
resulting  report  from  this  field  research  will  be  supplementary  to  this  report.  
  
For   Laos,   this   institutional   mapping   includes   Water   Resources   and   Environmental   Administration  
(WREA),  National  Land  Management  Authority  (NLMA),  Ministry  of  Energy  and  Mines  (MEM),  Ministry  
of  Agriculture  and  Forestry  (MAF),  Ministry  of  Planning  and  Investment  (MPI),  Ministry  of  Finance  (MoF),  
Electricité  du  Laos  (EdL),  and  Lao  Holding  State  Enterprise  (LHSE).  For  Cambodia,  it  includes  Ministry  of  
Planning  (MoP),  Ministry  of  Rural  Development  (MRD),  Ministry  of  Industries  Mines  and  Energy  (MIME),  
Ministry  of  Environment  (MoE),  Ministry  of  Agriculture  Forestry  and  Fisheries  (MAFF),  Ministry  of  Water  
Resources   Management   (MoWRAM),   Electricity   Authority   of   Cambodia   (EAC),   and   Electricité   du  
Cambodge   (EdC),   among   other   key   agencies   at   provincial,   district   and   commune   level.   In   Vietnam  
Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  (MARD),  Ministry  of  Natural  Resources  and  Environment  
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(MoNRE),  Ministry  of  Planning  and  Investment  (MPI),  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Trade  (MoIT),  Ministry  of  
Science  and  Technology  (MoST),  Electricity  Regulation  Authority  (ERA),  Vietnam  Electricity  Group  (EVN),  
Institute  of  Energy,  are  included  in  the  mapping  process.    
In  addition  to  the  above  institutional  analysis,  we  looked  at  how  sectoral  ministries  and  private  sector  
actors  are   involved  (directly  and  indirectly)   in  hydropower  development  project  operation,   in  terms  of  
policy   procedures   to   be   followed,   documents   to   be   approved,   agreement   to   be   made,   and   related  
activities  to  be  conducted  in  the  field.    
  
1.3. Methods	  
Our   research   methods   include   secondary   data   analysis   (legal   documents   and   policy   reports);   key  
informant  analysis  and  semi-­‐structured  interviews  with  government  officials  from  relevant  ministries  in  
each   of   the   three   countries   as   well   as   other   relevant   actors   (i.e.   private   sector,   academics,  
international/national  legal  advisors,  NGOs  and  civil  society  groups).  The  subject  matter  covered  by  the  
literature  reviews  and  key-­‐informant  analysis/semi-­‐structured  interviews  addressed  the  two  strands  of  
investigation   of   this   report:   a)   hydropower   development   and   related   decision   making   with   special  
attention  on  social  and  environmental  impacts  assessment,  and  b)  the  management  of  natural  resources  
more  broadly  with  an  emphasis  on  the  linkages  to  support  local  natural  resources  based  livelihoods.    
	  
1.4. Structure	  of	  the	  report	  
The   report   comprised   of   three   individual   country   reports   (Lao   PDR,   Cambodia,   Vietnam).   Following  
detail  policy   review  and   institutional  analysis   in  each  of   the   three  countries,  we  synthesized  our  main  
research  findings  in  the  concluding  section.    
  
  
2.	  LAO	  PDR	  COUNTRY	  REPORT	  
  
2.1.	  Review	  of	  policy	  and	  legal	  frameworks	  	  
We  defined   six  policy   clusters   in   this   review.  The   first   five   clusters   include  general   country   strategies,  
energy   policy,   water   resources   management,   environmental   protection,   and   land   management,  
respectively.   The   last   cluster   is   about   resettlement   and   compensation   in   development   projects   in  
particular.        
  
Policy	  cluster	  1:	  General	  policy	  
The	   Seventh	   National	   Socio-­‐Economic	   Development	   Plan	   (2011-­‐2015)	   Executive	   Summary	   (Ministry	   of	  
Planning	  and	  Investment,	  unofficial	  translation	  from	  original	  Lao	  version)	  
The   plan   highlights   the   GoL’s   objective   to   promote   rapid   economic   growth   (8%   annually)   and  
emphasizes  the  need  to  mobilize  domestic  and  foreign  funding  to  ensure  the  realization  of  the  targeted  
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growth.   Industry   together   with   agriculture-­‐forestry   and   services   sector   are   major   sectors   where   the  
government  withdrawn   its   revenue.   In   the   past   5   years   industry   sector   increased   by   12.5%   annually,  
accounting  for  26%  of  the  gross  domestic  product  (GDP);  agriculture/forestry  sector  increased  by  4.1%,  
accounting   for  30.4%  of   the  GDP;  services  sector   increased  by  8.4%  annually,  accounting   for  37.2%  of  
the  GDP.    
  
In   line  with  this  objective,  development  target   in  the  energy  sector   is  focused  on  the  need  to  proceed  
with   the   implementation   of   hydropower   projects   (through   construction   and   completion   of   important  
energy   infrastructure   such   as   dams   and   transmission   lines)   for   revenue   collection   from   the  
generated/exported   electricity.   The   plan   has   the   tendency   to   favor   private   investors’   involvement   in  
hydropower   development   as   a  means   to   address   the   problem   of   inadequate,   unpredictable   revenue  
collection  and  high  reliance  on  foreign  aid,  which  could  hinder  the  government  to  achieve  its  targeted  
economic  growth.  As  stated  in  the  plan:  “While	  the	  budget	  balance	  appears	  to	  have	  improved,	  reliance	  
on	  foreign	  aid	  is	  still	  high.	  Domestic	  revenue	  collection	  is	  unpredictable	  as	  revenues	  that	  are	  collected	  in	  
some	   fiscal	   years	   are	   not	   as	   adequately	   collected	   in	   other	   fiscal	   years.	   This	   affects	   the	   utilization	   of	  
domestic	  revenues	  for	  public	  spending”  (page  8).    
  
The  plan  highlights  the  need  to  move  toward  quality  and  sustainability  of  development  integrating  the  
three  elements  of   economic   growth,   social   justice   and  modernization,   and   sustainable   environmental  
protection   (page   10).   It   identifies   specific   directions   in   rural   development   and   poverty   reduction  
targeting  poor  villages  all  over  the  country.  These  targets  include  decrease  poverty  to  less  than  19%  of  
the  total  population  and  11%  of  total  households  in  the  country  by  2015;  expand  electricity  and  access  
to   clean  water   in   rural   areas   covering   respectively   60%   and   75%   of   the   rural   population.   It   does   not  
elaborate,   however,   on   the   link   between   revenue   collection   from  hydropower   and  poverty   reduction  
program   financing.   The   plan   defines   public   expenditure   at   a   level   of   20-­‐22%   of   GDP   but   does   not  
elaborate   on   how   the   amount   of   expenditure   will   be   channeled   to   the   relevant   sectors   (health   and  
education).    
  
Similarly,  while  the  plan  target  both  national  economic  growth  and  ensure  the  preservation  of  natural  
resources  and  environmental  protection,   it   does  not   clarify  how   these   two   targets   are   linked   to  each  
other  and  where  the  priority  lies.  In  the  energy  sector,  the  GoL  targets  the  construction  of  10  more  large  
dams   to   produce   5,015   MW   power;   ensures   that   the   number   of   households   who   access   electricity  
increases   to   80%   by   2015;   and   complete   transmission   lines   (115   Kv)   in   the   north,   central   and   south  
regions  to  meet  the  power  demand.  Yet,   it   is  unclear  how  revenue  from  electricity  export   is   linked  to  
rural   electrification   targets.   In   the   environmental   protection   context,   government   targets   are   less  
concrete  (i.e.  the  protection  of  the  quality  of  the  environment  such  as  water,  land,  air).  In  addition,  the  
plan   mentions   the   need   to   develop   spatial   planning   for   land   allocation,   but   not   taking   into   account  
hydropower  and  mines  as  decisive  factors  that  influence  actual  shaping  of  the  plan.    
  
In   summary,   the   plan   shows   how   hydropower   development   has   become   one   of   the   government’s  
development  priorities  to  ensure  economic  growth  and  reduce  poverty.  The  former  is  evident  in  the  way  
the  sector  development  was  able  to  absorb  foreign  investments  to  the  country.  The  latter  has  still  to  be  
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clarified  in  terms  of  how  revenue  collected  from  hydropower  is  redistributed  or  channeled  to  relevant  
poverty  reduction  activities/programs.  
  
National	  Growth	  and	  Poverty	  Eradication	  Strategy	  (NGPES)	  
In   line   with   the   national   socio-­‐economic   development   strategies   (NSEDS),   the   NGPES   has   dual  
objectives:   enhancing   growth   and   development;   and   reducing   poverty.   The   NGPES   defines   economic  
growth,  socio-­‐cultural  development  and  environmental  preservation  as  the  three  pillars  of  the  Lao  PDR’s  
development  policy,  but   implies  strong  emphasis  on  economic  growth,  as  this  becomes  evident   in  the  
GoL’s  dependency  on  private   sector   financing.  As   stated   in   the  NGPES:  “The	  private	   sector,	   trade	  and	  
domestic/foreign	  direct	   investment	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  prime	  factors	   in	  driving	  the	  economy	  and	  every	  
effort	  must	  be	  made	  to	  ensure	  a	  positive	  business	  environment	  for	  them.	  Consultation	  with	  the	  private	  
sector	  will	   be	   enhanced	   and	   licensing	   and	   other	   regulatory	   concerns	   streamlined”   (page   5).   From   the  
gross   investment  of  approximately  26%  of  GDP,  16%  of   it  will  have   to  come   from  private   investment.  
This  highlights  the  government’s  tendency  to  favor  power  company  (i.e.  in  case  of  land  dispute  as  regard  
concession  agreement  shaping)  as  the  main  tax  payer  that  contributes  significantly  to  revenue  collection  
as  well  as   the   important  role  played  by  hydropower  sector  development   in  providing  the  government  
with  the  needed  revenue  to  achieve  the  targeted  economic  growth.  
  
The   NGPES   operational   framework   defines   four  main   sectors   (agriculture/forestry,   education,   health,  
infrastructure  with   focus  on   rural   roads)  which  will  be   the  government’s  main   focus.  For   this   the  GoL  
relies  on  supporting  sectors  or  sectors  with  high  potential  for  growth  to  achieve  industrial  development.  
These   sectors   are:   energy   and   rural   electrification,   agro-­‐forestry,   tourism,   mining,   and   construction  
material  industries.  The  rationale  behind  hydropower  development  in  Laos  is  rooted  in  the  way  the  GoL  
positions  the  sector’s  development  as  a  means  to  promote  economic  growth  through  both  investment  
and  revenue  collection.  As  stated  in  the  NGPES:  “Hydropower	  is	  already	  a	  major	  contributor	  to	  economic	  
output,	  government	  revenues,	  and	  export	  earnings.	  However,	  only	  623	  MW	  of	  an	  estimated	  18,000	  MW	  
of	   hydropower	   potential	   has	   so	   far	   been	   developed.	   The	   Lao	   PDR	   has	   one	   of	   the	   lowest	   levels	   of	  
electrification	   in	  Asia	  as	  only	  20%	  of	  all	   villages	  and	  34%	  of	  households	  have	  access	   to	  electricity.	  The	  
development	   of	   the	   country’s	   hydro-­‐electrical	   potential	   and	   rural	   electrification	   is	   thus	   integral	   to	   the	  
national	  development	  framework”  (page  103).      
  
The  GoL’s  attempt  to  shape  the  revenue  development  sustainably  following  the  logic:  economic  growth  
leads  to  increase  in  revenue  collection  and  poverty  reduction.  This  logic  prompts  the  government  to  be  
very   active   in   building   up   and   strengthening   the   conditions   for   economic   growth.   It   also   determines  
GoL’s  strategy  to  eradicate  poverty  by  ensuring  sufficient  investment  from  the  private  sectors,  assuming  
that  this  investment  will  automatically  ensure  economic  growth  and  reduce  poverty.      
  
The   government   in   discussion   with   provincial   authorities,   line   ministries   and   other   stakeholders   has  
reached  an  agreement  that  poverty  reduction  at  the  district  level  should  be  the  priority  focus.  As  stated  
in  the  NGPES  poverty   is  defined  as:  “the	   lack	  of	  ability	  to	  fulfill	  basic	  human	  needs	  such	  as	  not	  having	  
enough	   food,	   lacking	   adequate	   clothing,	   not	   having	   permanent	   housing	   and	   lacking	   access	   to	   health,	  
education	  and	  transportation	  services”  (Instruction  no.  010/PM,  25  June  2001).  District  level  was  chosen  
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perceiving  it  as  the  most  relevant  and  reliable  level  for  data  collection  on  poverty  monitoring.  As  stated  
in   the   NGPES:   “Districts	   are	   the	   level	   where	   coordination,	   consultation	   and	   participation	   can	   best	   be	  
achieved”  (page  4).  A  core  group  of  the  47  poorest  districts  has  been  selected  for  priority  investments  
between   2003   and   2005.   The   delineation   of   poor   districts   is   conducted   using   six   indicators:   rice  
production   per   person,   large   livestock   per   person,   forested   area   per   family,   use   of   roads,  
maternal/infant   mortality   rates,   and   the   percentage   of   illiteracy.   The   first   four   indicators   relate   to  
income  and   food  production  and  the  remaining  two  relate   to  social  development.  The  GoL   intends   to  
encourage  ‘development  funds’  for  the  poorest  districts  to  enable  them  to  engage  in  income  generating  
activities.  It  is  important  to  know  and  understand  about  how  these  funds  are  channeled  and  managed,  
by  whom,  through  which  mechanisms,  and  referring  to  which  criteria.  
  
The  question  remains,  however,  how  economic  growth,   revenue  collection  and  poverty   reduction  can  
be   optimally   linked.   Like   the   NSEDS,   the   NGPES   does   not   elaborate   on   how   the   targeted   economic  
growth  could  eventually  reduce  poverty  in  terms  of  direct  cash  flow  from  tax/revenue  from  productive  
ministries  such  as  MEM,  MPI,  MAF  to  for  instance  the  Ministry  of  Education  and  the  Ministry  of  Health.  
Within   the   context   of   energy   sector,   the   NGPES   emphasizes   on   targeting   provision   of   domestic  
electricity   supply   and   rural   electrification.   The   question   remains   how   this   target   is   linked   to   revenue  
from  hydropower   plant  which   is   developed  mainly   for   export   to   neighboring   countries   (Thailand   and  
Vietnam).  Currently,  MEM  proceeds  with  rural  electrification  program  supported  mainly  by  funding  from  
international   donors   (Government   of   Finland).   In   addition,   the   NGPES   emphasizes   the   importance   of  
electricity  provision  as  a  means  to  benefit  the  local  population.  Yet,  the  question  remains  whether  EdL  
actually  is  able  to  use  tax  revenue  from  hydropower  export  to  financially  ensure  domestic  hydropower  
supply  provision.  
  
Moreover,   the  poverty  assessment  methods  applied   in  the  NGPES  does  not   include  any  parameter  on  
access   to   natural   resources   as   a   means   to   ensure   food   security   (i.e.   capture   fisheries   resources)   to  
increase   household   income.   Current   evaluation   on   poverty   shows   that   the   vulnerability   index   is  
constructed   using   social   and   economic   indicators   as   the   key   determinants   of   food   insecurity   and  
vulnerability,  rather  than  consumption  as  a  measure  of  poverty.  This  evaluation  includes  risk  factors  at  
the  household  and  village  level  as  well  as  the  coping  responses  to  these  factors.  Qualitative  participatory  
approaches   to  poverty  analysis,  however  confirms  that   in   the  minds  of  villagers  poverty   is  an   issue  of  
livelihood.  As  long  as  they  are  able  to  meet  their  consumption  needs,  they  do  not  consider  themselves  
poor.  Here  poverty  relates  to  people’s   livelihoods  and  their  access  to  natural  resources  as  a  means  to  
ensure  their  food  security  (i.e.  rice  sufficiency,  protein  intake).  This  aspect  of  poverty  analysis  highlights  
the   important   role   of   agro-­‐systems   in   either   accelerating   or   undermining   the   GoL’s   pace   to   reduce  
poverty.   There   is   a   need   to   develop   actual   poverty   indicators   which   reflects   people’s   perception   of  
poverty  within  the  context  of  hydropower  development.  These   indicators  can  be  used  to  measure  the  
role   of   hydropower   in   reducing/increasing   poverty   as   well   as   starting   points   to   improve   rules   and  
procedures  on  resettlement/compensation  issues  within  hydropower  projects.  
  
The  NGPES  also  states  the  need  to  be  fully  responsive  to  the  needs  of  both  public  and  private  enterprise,  
as  well  as  provide  the  policy  and  regulatory  framework  that  conserves  the  environment  and   improves  
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the   livelihoods   of   the   local   population.   The   government’s   policy   on   governance   issues   stressed   four  
priority  areas  regarding  the  consolidation  of  public  sector  management.  These  areas  are:  public  service  
improvement,   central-­‐local   relations,   legal   framework   and   socio-­‐economic  management.   As   stated   in  
the  NGPES:   “The	   government	   is	   committed	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   Lao	   people	   are	   closely	   consulted	   in	   all	  
areas	   of	   decision-­‐making	   and	   that	   they	   participate	   fully	   in	   the	   economic,	   social,	   cultural	   and	   political	  
development	  of	  the	  country.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  government	  is	  redefining	  central-­‐local	  relations”  (page  48).  
According  to   the   Instruction  no.  01/PM  (11/3/2000)   the  provinces  are   the  strategic  units,   the  districts  
are  the  planning  and  fiscal  units,  and  the  villages  are  the  implementation  units.  Within  this  framework,  
each  ministry   is  gradually  defining  the  central,  provincial,  district  and  village   levels  of  responsibility,  as  
part  of  a  fully  integrated  approach  to  improve  the  management  and  delivery  of  public  services.  Similarly,  
it   is   stated   that   the   system   of   decision-­‐making   must   be   more   community-­‐based,   transparent   and  
accountable.   These   can   be   used   as   our   entry   point   to   provide   policy   recommendations   on   how   to  
incorporate   the   chosen  decision-­‐making  principles   as   an   integral   part   of   hydropower  decision  making  
both  at  project  level  (overall  formulation  of  resettlement  plan,  compensation  and  grievance  procedure)  
and  national  policy   formulation  with  regard  to  national  development  plan  such  as   integrated   land  use  
planning  and  management.      
  
In   addition,   the  NGPES   shows   that   government  has   adopted  an  area   focused  development   approach,  
which  places  a  high  priority  on  more  sustainable  land  use  and  the  identification  and  designation  of  agro-­‐
ecological   classifications.   Similarly,   the   NGPES   mentioned   the   Agriculture   Promotion   Bank   which  
function   is   to   structure   loans   to   meet   farmers’   needs   and   facilitate   micro   finance   (page   59).  
Theoretically,  these  can  be  used  as  entry  points  for  MK1’s  recommendations  on  the  livelihoods  options.    
  
Law	  on	  Investment	  Promotion	  (National	  Assembly,	  2009)	  
The  law  has  the  main  objective  to  sustainably  enhance  the  roles  and  benefits  of  investments  for  optimal  
contribution  of  the  national  socio-­‐economic  growth.    
  
The  law  assumes  both  the  existence  of  sectoral  development  plans  as  well  as  the  incorporation  of  these  
plans   as   integrated   parts   of   the   overall   existing   national   policy,   strategy   and   other   related   socio-­‐
economic  development  plan.  As  stated  in  the  law:  “The	  investment	  promotion	  shall	  be	   in	   line	  with	  the	  
national	  policy,	   strategy,	   socio-­‐economic	  development	  plan,	   the	   sectoral	  development	  plan,	  areas	  and	  
the	  periodic	   socio-­‐economic	  growth,	   the	   improvement	  of	   the	   living	   conditions	  of	  people	   in	   compliance	  
with	  laws	  and	  regulations”  (article  5).  In  practice,  when  (cross-­‐)  sectoral  development  plans  are  absent,  
investment   rules   and   procedures   become   the   ad-­‐hoc   mechanisms   that   shape   (cross-­‐)   sectoral  
development/management.   Furthermore,   in   the   absence   of   cross-­‐sectoral   coordination   and   a   fine-­‐
tuned   sectoral   development  master  plan(s),   the   law   indirectly  delegates   the   responsibility   to  monitor  
and  evaluate   investment   to   sector  ministries,   provincial   authorities,  without  emphasizing   the  need   to  
coordinate  each  investment  activities  as  part  of  the  national  development  master  plan.        
  
The  law  assigns  the  MPI  and  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Commerce  (MIC)  as  the  investment  administration  
authorities  which  have   the   rights   to  propose   solutions   to   relevant   authorities   (sectoral  ministries)   for  
their  consideration  if  they  find  any  violations  of  the  laws  and  regulations  related  to  investment  (article  
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93).   This   assignment   brings   to   light   how   cross-­‐sectoral   development   is   regulated   from   different  
perspective   by   different   government   agencies   (WREA   in   charge   for   regulating   water   resources  
management,   NLMA   assigned  with   the   task   to   formulate   integrated   land   use   planning,  MPI   and  MIC  
with  the  task  to  regulate  investment).  The  law  states  that  all  activities  of  enterprises  shall  be  managed,  
monitored  and  inspected  by  relevant  sectors  (Article  93).  This  inspection  includes  the  inspection  on  the  
environmental  protection  based  on  the  EIA.  Theoretically,  this   inspection  can  act  as  an  entry  point  for  
the  local  community  to  address  their  concerns  about  project  development  impacts.  
  
The  law  defines  three  types  of  investment:  general  business,  concession,  and  activities  for  development  
of   special   and   specific   economic   zones.   In   the   context   of   hydropower   development   (concession  
business),  investors  shall  submit  the  application  to  the  one-­‐stop-­‐service  of  the  Planning  and  Investment  
authority  for  consideration  and  then  the  application  will  be  proposed  to  the  government  or  provincial  
authorities  for  further  consideration  (article  21).  This  procedure  brings  to  light  the  important  role  of  the  
planning   and   investment   authority   (MPI)   in   shaping   the   overall   pattern   of   investments.   Later,   this  
selection   is   channeled   to   relevant   sectoral   ministries   and   provincial   authorities   for   consideration.   In  
theory  both   the   investor   and   government   authorities  will   formulate   the   concession   agreement  which  
shall  define   the  objective,  value,   terms,   conditions,   rights  and  obligations  of   contracting  parties.  After  
agreement   from   both   parties,   and   approval   of   the   agreement   from   all   government   authorities  
(provincial,   sectoral  ministries),  MPI  will   issue   a   concession   registration   certificate   to   the   investors   as  
formal   approval   of   the   investors’   concession   rights.   The   law   also  mentions   the   role   of   National   Land  
Management   Authority   (NLMA)   in   the   calculation   of   compensation   costs   of   land   use,   but   does   not  
specify  on  NLMA’s  involvement  in  the  overall  negotiation  processes.  
  
The   law   mentions   the   investment   calling   list   as   a   list   of   projects   and   activities   that   are   considered  
important   for   national   economy   and   have   been   officially   approved   by   the   government   or   provincial  
authorities,  but  still  needed  the  capital  to  develop  it  (Article  29).  The  presence  of  this  investment  calling  
list  in  the  absence  of  national  master  plan  incorporating  (cross-­‐)  sectoral  development  plans  implies  the  
government’s   tendency   to  pull   in   investment  as  a  means   to  promote  economic  growth.  The  question  
remains  whether  the  listed  projects  and  activities  are  fine-­‐tuned  to  each  other,  rather  than  being  listed  
separately  by  different  sectoral  ministries/provincial  authorities.    
  
The   law   defines   promoted   zones   for   investment   into   three   categories:   zone   1   where   there   are  
insufficient   socio-­‐economic   infrastructures   favorable   to   facilitate   investment;   zone   2  where   there   are  
some   infrastructures   that   are   partially   able   to   facilitate   investment;   zone   3   where   there   are   good  
infrastructures  available  to  support  investment  (article  50).  Incentives  related  to  profit  taxes  are  defined  
in  accordance  with   the   zones  categories   (article  51).   In   the  context  of  hydropower,  power  companies  
will  have  better  incentives  related  to  profit  taxes  as  hydropower  dams/infrastructures  are  usually  built  
in  areas  classified  under  zone  1.        
  
With   regard   to   environmental   protection,   the   law   states:   “The	   investors	   are	   obliged	   to	   protect	  
environment;	   investors	  must	   ensure	   that	   their	   business	   activities	   do	   not	   cause	   severe	   impacts	   to	   the	  
public,	  national	  security,	  public	  order	  or	  health	  of	  employees.	  In	  the	  event	  of	  causing	  any	  environmental	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problems,	   the	   investors	   have	   to	   undertake	   necessary	  measures	   to	   address	   these	   problems	   in	   a	   timely	  
manner	   and	   in	   accordance	   with	   laws”   (article   70:   page   26).   Like   any   other   government   regulations,  
decree,  and  technical  guidelines  on   issues  relevant   for   the  environment   (see  policy  cluster  5),   the   law  
formally  states  the  investors’  duties  and  obligations  to  protect  the  environment  but  does  not  elaborate  
on  how  the  government  should/could  control,  monitor,  and  evaluate  investors’  code  of  conducts  in  this  
regard.  As   stated   in   the   law:  “The	   sector	  or	   level	   that	   issues	   the	   registration	   certificate	   shall	  manage,	  
monitor,	   inspect	   and	   evaluate	   the	   investment	   in	   collaboration	   with	   other	   relevant	   sectors	   and	   local	  
authorities,	  and	  regularly	  report	  to	  higher	  levels”  (article  83,  page  30).    
  
In   line  with  the  NGPES,   the   law   incorporates  the  principle  of  decentralization  and  gives  provincial  and  
local  authorities  greater  role  in  shaping  the  overall  investment  activities  (article  84).  As  stated  in  the  law:  
“Local	   administrative	   authorities	   are	   responsible	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   management	   of	   investments	  
according	  to	  their	  own	  roles,	  of	  which	  the	  registration	  certificates	  were	  issued	  by	  the	  central	  authority,	  
but	  operated	  in	  their	  locals”  (page  31).  Local  authorities’  decision-­‐making  power  is  limited,  however,  in  
terms   of   suspending,   changing,   canceling   and   terminating   investment   activities   as   these   can   only   be  
done  by  those  who  issue  the  registration  certificates.    
  
Tax	  Law	  (2010)	  
The   law  defines   the  different   types  of   tax,   but  does  not   link   tax   collection  procedures   and  objectives  
with  government’s  revenue  management.  It  does  not  elaborate  on  how  tax  collection  from  each  sector  
development   is   related   to   government’s   expenditure   for   each   particular   sector,   and   thus   how   the  
Ministry   of   Finance  manage   the   overall   process   of   revenue   redistribution,   and  whether   this   is   in   line  
with  the  principles/approaches  outlined  in  the  NGPES.   In  the  context  of  hydropower  development  the  
law  does  not  clarify  how  revenue  from  electricity  export  could  eventually  be  rechanneled  to  support  the  
affected  population  in  terms  of  health/education  improvement,  beyond  the  standard  resettlement  and  
compensation  cost  covered  by  the  private  investors.    
  
Policy	  cluster	  2:	  Energy-­related	  policies	  
Law	  on	  Electricity	  (Ministry	  of	  Industry	  and	  Handicrafts,	  1997)	  
The   Law   on   Electricity   highlights   the   role   of   power   generation   as   an   integral   part   of   the   country’s  
national   socio-­‐economic   development   plan   (Article   1).   It   promotes   (foreign)   investment   in   power  
generation  and  derives  on  the  principle  of  economic  efficiency  as  the  basic   foundation   in  hydropower  
development,  as  means  to  generate  state  revenues  (Article  4  and  6).    
  
In   accordance   with   the   rationale   of   hydropower   development,   the   law   places   the   responsibility   to  
protect  the  environment  in  the  hand  of  private  developers  operating  the  power  plants.  How  does  this  
responsibility   link   to   different   ministries’   (WREA   and   MEM)   tasks   and   roles   in   environmental  
management   remains  unclear,  as   currently   the  GoL   still   lacks  any   strategic  plan   to   regulate  electricity  
enterprises  or  the  so-­‐called  Independent  Power  Producers  (IPP).  It   includes  feasibility  study  and  EIA  as  
two  separate  components  in  hydropower  development  stages.  The  former  concerns  mainly  with  project  
socio-­‐economic  value,  while  the  latter  with  potential  social  and  environmental  impacts.  Thus  EIA  is  not  
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incorporated  as   an   integral   part   in   the   feasibility   study,  but   rather   as   a   side  element  upon  which   the  
project’s  feasibility  is  not  referred  to  or  based  (Article  14).  This  separation/isolation  is  evident  from  the  
defined  criteria  for  concession  approval,  which  focuses  mainly  on  the  company’s  financial  and  technical  
capacity  and  their  economic  trustworthiness  (Article  15).    
  
With   regard   to   poverty   reduction,   the   law   does   not   specify   on   how   the   revenue   collected   from  
hydropower  will   be   channeled   to   the   state’s   treasury   and   how   this  will   be   later   redistributed   by   the  
Ministry   of   Planning   and   Investment   (MPI)   and  Ministry   of   Finance   (MoF)   into   development   funding  
allocation  for  different  sector  ministries  and  government  agencies.    
  
Law	  on	  Electricity	  (Ministry	  of	  Energy	  and	  Mines,	  2010)	  
In   line   with   the   focus   of   the   previous   law   on   the   role   of   private/foreign   investment   in   Laos’   energy  
sector,   the   new   Law   on   Electricity   focuses   on   the   formulation   of   rules   and   procedures   for   electricity  
enterprise   and   electricity   business.   As   stated   in   the   law,   the   operation   of   electricity   enterprise   and  
business  must  follow  the  principle  of  efficient,  economic  and  sustainable  development  in  line  with  the  
GoL’s   socio-­‐economic   development   plan;   the   need   to   protect   the   environment   (forest   and   water  
resources)   in  accordance  with   security  assurance.  The  way   the   law   refers   to   the  GoL’s  national   socio-­‐
economic  development  plan  indicates  the  sector’s  importance  for  the  government  to  achieve  its  defined  
goal  towards  poverty  reduction  and  the  country’s  removal  from  the  list  of  the  least  developed  country  
by  2015.  Achieving  the  latter  objective  will  be  indicated  by  the  country’s  increased  GDP.  In  line  with  this  
objective,  GoL  uses  hydropower  sector  as  one  of  its  means  to  attract  foreign/private  sector  investment  
to   increase   the   country’s   economic   growth,   as   this   is   crucial   for   achieving  GoL’s   development   target.  
Again,  the  question  remains,  how  the  GoL  would  link  economic  growth  with  poverty  reduction,  through  
for  instance  optimization  of  revenue  collection.    
  
The  law  states  the  need  to  formulate  electricity  development  plan  which  includes  strategic  plan,   long-­‐
term,   intermediate,  and   short-­‐term  work  plan   (see  also  PSDP,  2004).   It   assigns  MEM  with   the   task   to  
prepare  strategic  master  plan,  electricity  development  plan  and  to  disseminate  the  plan.  In  contrast  with  
NGPES  and  NSEDS  which  encourage  decentralized  decision  making,  the  law  promotes  the  establishment  
of  centralized  planning  in  electricity  development  (Article  65).  It  assigns  the  MEM  with  the  leadership  in  
electricity   development   planning   including   coordination   and   cooperation   with   NLMA   and   other  
government  agencies  with   regard   to   land  use  planning   in   the  concession   zone.   In  practice,  MEM   is   in  
charge  for  hydropower  development  from  its  early  stage  (feasibility  study)  up  to  power  generation  (see  
decision-­‐making   flowchart   and   procedure   in   hydropower   development   in   section   2).   The   question  
remains  whether  centralized  planning  can  be  materialized  within  the  context  of  erratic  financial  supply  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis  GoL’s  lack  of  financial  sources  to  conduct  hydropower  development  (see  also  PSDP  2004).    
  
The   law   divides   electricity   business   into   2   categories:   1)   general   electric   business   which   includes  
planning,   survey  and  date  gathering,  design,   construction,   installation,   supply  and  general   services;  2)  
electric  business  by  concession  which  includes  production  and  electricity  distribution  by  private  sector.  
This  distinction  assumes  that  electric  business  by  concession  was  conducted  and  regulated  based  on  the  
existing  master  plan.  Hence,  it  can  focus  mainly  on  electricity  production  and  distribution,  without  much  
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emphasis  on  planning,   survey,  data  gathering  as   such.   In  practice,   the  absence  of   such  a  master  plan  
raise  question  whether  current  rapid  hydropower  development  by  private  sector  financing  is  conducted  
in   the  most   strategic  way   (economically,   socially,  and  environmentally)   for  optimal  benefit  of   the  GoL  
and  its  population.    
  
The   tasks   and   responsibilities   in   hydropower   development   are   divided   referring   to   the   size   of   each  
project’s  installation  capacity  as  follow:  
• Electricity  project  with  installation  capacity  less  than  100  KW  is  approved  by  the  Office  of  Planning  
and  Investment  with  agreement  of  major  of  district  or  head  of  municipality.  
• Electricity  project  with  installation  capacity  from  100  KW  to  5  MW  is  approved  by  the  provincial  
Service  of  Planning  and  Investment  with  agreement  of  governor  of  the  province.  
• Electricity  project  with  installation  capacity  from  5  to  100  MW  is  approved  by  government  with  
suggestion  of  the  MPI.  
• Electricity  project  with  installation  capacity  over  100  MW  or  with  reservoir  covering  more  than  
10,000  ha  or  with  so  much  impact  on  environment,  society  and  nature,  the  government  suggests  to  
National  Assembly  standing  committee  for  agreement.    
Referring  to  the  above  distinction,  the  spatial  distribution  of  existing,  planned  hydropower  projects  can  
be   identified   (see   BDP1   data   base   report).   Consequently,   this   spatial   distribution   will   determine   key  
actors/decision  makers  in  hydropower  development  landscape  in  Laos.    
  
Rights,  duties,  obligations  of  producer,  supplier  and  consumer  of  electricity  are  defined  referring  mainly  
to   electricity   service   provision,   not   directly   linked   to   how   the   construction   of   service   provision  
infrastructure  could  potentially  impact  the  environment.  Similarly,  conflicting  parties  are  defined  limited  
to   electricity   business,   and   local   government,   not   necessarily   involved   the   local   population   and  
potentially   affected   people.   In   addition,   the   law   mentions   external   inspection   as   one   of   the   control  
mechanisms   in   hydropower   development.   Yet,   it   does   not   clarify/identify   issues/factors   which   can  
precede  this  inspection  in  the  first  place.  How  can  one  initiate  such  inspection?  How  is  it   linked  to  the  
issue  of  public  participation  in  for  instance  resettlement/compensation/EIA?  
  
In   summary   the   new   law   on   electricity   continues   to   promote   private/foreign   investment   in   the  
hydropower  sector  as  well  as  MEM’s  leadership  in  shaping  hydropower  development.    
  
Issues  need  to  be  addressed  in  the  formulation  of  the  master  plan  (but  not  mentioned  in  the  law)  are  
the  following:  
• How  should  electricity  use  for  domestic  and  export  purposes  be  determined  and  regulated  in  line  
with  purchase/selling  cost  for  oversea  and  domestic  electricity  use  (see  Article  49)?  See  also  the  
need  to  regulate  electricity  tariff  for  export  as  stated  in  the  PSDP  2004.  
• How  can  the  balance  between  economic  development  and  environmental  protection  be  pursued  in  
hydropower  development,  through  what  policy  measures  and  how  these  measures  can  be  
incorporated  as  part  of  hydropower  project  management  procedure?  
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• How  should  the  plan  take  into  account  the  issue  of  revenue  collection  from  the  different  land  use  
types  (individual  land  tax,  concession  fee,  environmental  services)  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  GoL’s  interest  to  
promote  economic  growth?  
• The  law  mentions  rural  electrification  but  does  not  link  it  with  power  export  in  terms  of  revenue  
redistribution  from  generated  power  for  export.    
Power	   System	  Development	   Plan	   for	   Lao	   PDR	   (Final	   report,	   August	   2004),	   prepared	   by	  Maunsell	   and	  
Lahmeyer	  International	  
Laos  power  system  development  plan  is  based  on  the  country’s  overall  objective  to  bring  electricity  to  
90%  of  households  in  20201.  Lacking  the  financial  source  to  build  the  power  system,  Electricite  du  Laos’  
(EdL)  strategy  is  to  earn  its  revenue  from  electricity  exports  to  neighboring  countries  (mainly  Thailand)  
and  use  this  revenue  to  increase  its  financial  capacity  to  pursue  the  defined  development  target  (both  
through  off  grid  electrification  and  grid  extension  program)2.  Hence,  the  power  sector  serves  two  vital  
national  priorities:  1)  promote  economic  and  social  advancement  by  providing  a  reliable  and  affordable  
domestic  power  supply;  2)  earn  foreign  exchange  from  electricity  exports.    
  
Both  EdL  and  the  MEM  depend  on   Independent  Power  Producers   (IPP)  or  private   investors  to   finance  
hydropower   development   in   the   country.   This   dependency   reduces   EdL’s   ability   to   formulate   power  
system  development  plan  as   to  balance  energy   supply  and  demand.   In   theory,  EdL  can   formulate   the  
plan.  In  practice,  lacking  the  financial  means  EdL  could  hardly  control  the  plan’s  progress  both  in  terms  
of   timing   and   sites   selection.   Within   the   Ministry   of   Energy   and   Mines   (MEM),   the   Department   of  
Electricity  (DoE)  is  responsible  for  the  formulation  of  such  plan  as  part  of  the  country’s  energy  policy.  In  
practice,   the   policy   formulation   process   was   halted   in   2003.   Referring   to   both   EdL’s   and   MEM’s  
dependency  towards  IPP,  there  is  little  relevance  to  formulate  such  a  plan.  At  the  moment,  hydropower  
development   planning   is   limited   to   identification   of   potential   sites   and   the   updates   of   selected   sites,  
conducted  annually  by  the  DoE.    
  
GoL’s  financial  dependency  towards  IPP  brings  to  light  the  important  role  played  by  private  investors  as  
the  backbone  of  hydropower  development   in  the  country,  their  role   in  shaping  the  overall   investment  
climate  and  its  consequences  for  the  formulation  and  application  of  government  rules  and  regulations  in  
the  sector  development.  The  rationale  to  either  regulate  or  plan  is  side  lined  by  the  need  to  encourage  
private   sector   investment   in   hydropower   development   to   promote   economic   growth   and   increase  
export   revenue.   Government   rules   and   regulations   have   the   tendency   to   facilitate   private   investors’  
interests   rather   than   to   strictly   regulate   and   control   their   conducts,   as   government   depends   on   the  
incoming   financial   sources   to   generate   export   revenue.   It   is   in   EdL’s   and   MEM’s   interest   that   the  
planned   dam   can   be   constructed   and   commissioned   according   to   the   defined   schedule,   and   thus   to  
facilitate   and   ensure   that   private   investors   (IPP)   can   proceed   with   each   stage   in   hydropower  
development  (from  the  signing  of  the  MoU  to  power  generation)  smoothly,  as  to  ensure  direct  revenue  
                                                                                                                        
1  Later  this  objective  is  incorporated  into  the  GoL’s  national  socio-­‐economic  development  plan  and  hydropower  
sector  development  becomes  one  of  the  government’s  financial  sources  not  only  to  earn  foreign  revenue  but  also  
to  promote  rapid  economic  growth.  
2  Economically  it  is  not  feasible  to  connect  all  households  to  the  grid  system  due  to  potential  technical  complexity  
and  low  potential  economic  return.    
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flows  from  export.  In  this  context,  government’s  approval  with  regard  to  land  concession,  EIA  and  others  
can  mean  two  things:  1)that  EdL  and  MEM  ensure  IPP  to  follow  the  criteria  for  approval  or  2)that  land  
concession  and  EIA  become  more  of  a  formality  with  the  outcome  already  defined  beforehand.    
  
Government’s   inability   to   finance   hydropower   development   without   substantial   back   up   from   the  
private   investors   and   the   absence   of   consistent   power   system   development   plan   reduce   the   GoL’s  
bargaining  position  to  negotiate  electricity  tariff  with  the  neighboring  countries  power  purchasers,  such  
as   Electricity   Generation   Authority   of   Thailand   (EGAT)   and   Electricity   Vietnam   (EVN).   At   present  
electricity  tariff  is  negotiated  between  EGAT/EVN  with  the  project  investors,  on  project-­‐by-­‐project  basis.  
EGAT  and  EVN  have  the  advantage  in  such  negotiations  because  they  do  not  depend  on  a  single  project.  
Unlike  project   investors  who  can  only   sell   the  generated  power   to  EGAT/EVN,  EGAT/EVN  can  buy   the  
generated   power   from   different   private   investors   working   on   different   hydropower   projects.  
Consequently,   compromises   by   private   developers   on   tariff   issue   reduce   tax   and   royalty   fee   to   the  
government   of   Lao   PDR   (GoL).   This   situation   highlights   the   need   to   have   a   regulator   to   not   only   set  
domestic   retail   tariff   but   also   to   negotiate  wholesale   export   tariff,   so   that   these   tariff   can   be   pre-­‐set  
before  bidding  power  generation  concessions  as  such  that  bidding  would  be  based  on  criteria  which  are  
more  beneficial  to  the  GoL,  such  as  which  developers  are  able  to  pay  the  highest  royalty  fees.  
  
Private  developers  have  the  tendency  to  invest  in  hydropower  projects  larger  than  100  MW  (rather  than  
the  smaller  ones)  as  the  actual  profit  that  can  be  gained  from  projects  under  100  MW  does  not  justify  
the  time  and  resources  they  have  to  spend  on  negotiating  the  power  purchase  agreement,  completing  
the   transmission   interconnections,   and   administering   the   ongoing   commercial   arrangements.   The  
current   lack  of  whole-­‐sale  electricity   tariff  obliges  private  developer   to  negotiate  about   the  tariff  with  
EGAT  or  EVN  on   individual  project  basis,  and   indirectly  creates  administrative  burdens   if   they  have   to  
negotiate  for  each  small  project  they  have.  Private  developers’  tendency  to  invest  in  projects  larger  than  
100  MW  brings   to   light   the   fact   that   the   development   of   domestic   small-­‐scale   power   plants   depend  
primarily  on  EdL’s  ability  to  use  the  earned  export  revenue  to  finance  these  small  projects.  Crucial  in  this  
regard   is   how   EdL   formally   and   actually   links   revenue   from   power   export   with   domestic   power  
generation  so  that  the  former  becomes  the  means  to  promote  the  latter,  and  not  becoming  a  goal  of  its  
own.    
  
GoL’s   inability   to   finance   its   hydropower   development   transforms   its   position   as   a   country  with   high  
potential  of  hydropower  into  a  disadvantageous  position  as  its  dependency  on  IPP  handicaps  it  to  direct  
hydropower   development   strategically   to   promote   the   country’s   economic   and   social   advancement.  
From  the  macro-­‐  economic  perspective,  GoL’s  dependency  to  IPP  reduces  its  ability  to  negotiate  about  
electricity   tariff,   tax   and   royalty   fee   as   it   has   the   tendency   to   accept   any   term   proposed   in   the  
agreement,   seeing   it   merely   as   the   only   way   to   proceed   with   hydropower   development.   From   the  
governance  perspective,  this  dependency  reduces  GoL’s  ability  to  regulate  hydropower  development  in  
terms  of   formulating,   implementing  and  enforcing  policy  measures   to  ensure   sustainable  hydropower  
development.  As  stated  in  the  report:  “Transparency	  in	  concession	  negotiations	  is	  lacking	  and	  leaves	  GoL	  
vulnerable	   to	   unreasonable	   risks	   and	   harsh	   commercial	   terms.	  GoL	   is	   particularly	   vulnerable	   to	   unfair	  




Besides,  potential  competition  from  Myanmar  and  China  as  power  suppliers   in   the  region  adds  to  the  
current  rationale  of  hydropower  development  in  Laos,  and  the  GoL’s  strategy  to  get  as  many  projects  as  
possible  financed  by  private  investors.  This  competition,  the  dependency  on  IPP,  project-­‐by-­‐project  tariff  
negotiations   partially   contribute   to   GoL’s   strategy   to   promote   rapid   hydropower   development.   Put  
differently,  from  the  GoL’s  point  of  view,  the  long  term  strategy  on  hydropower  development  might  not  
even  be  realistic  in  five  years  from  now,  if  private  investors  decide  to  change  their  investment  strategies.      
  
The  current  situation  highlights  the  need  to  focus  on  policy  reform  as  means  to  monitor  and  guide  IPP  
conducts  both  at  policy  and  project  level.  Parallel  to  this,  there  is  a  need  to  provide  incentives  for  GoL  to  
formulate  power  system  development  plan,  in  which  IPP  conducts  can  be  governed  more  strategically  as  
to   ensure   that   GoL   receives   optimal   benefits   from   hydropower.   The   report   attempts   to   address   the  
problem  of   uncertainty   of   IPP   through   identification   of   fall-­‐back   projects   and   the   specification   of   the  
substitution  procedures  such  as  penalty-­‐based  system.  We  doubt  whether  these  measures  will  work  as  
it   does   not   follow   the   principle   of   profit   generation   and   economic   gains   governing   private   sector  
involvement   in   hydropower.   For   instance,   why   would   private   investor   agree   to   invest   in   something  
which   realization   is   unclear/uncertain   as   it   is   classified   as   fall-­‐back  project?   Similarly,   the   substitution  
procedures  can  discourage  private  sector  to  invest,  fearing  the  penalty.  What  would  be  the  incentives  of  
private  developer  to  invest  in  fall-­‐back  project  and  agree  on  substitution  procedures?    
	  
National	  Policy	  on	  Sustainable	  Hydropower	  (STEA,	  2006)	  
The   national   policy   on   sustainable   hydropower   (NPSH)   formulation   originates   from   the  World   Bank’s  
objective  to  translate   lessons  from  Nam  Theun  2  project  as  part  of  national  policies  that  can  promote  
and   guide   sustainable   hydropower   development   in   Laos.   The   policy   implies   a   close   linkage   between  
government  agencies  and  private  investors  in  hydropower  development.  It  formally  presents  the  role  of  
hydropower   to  generate  government’s   revenue,  promote  economic  growth  and  alleviate  poverty   (see  
first  paragraph  in  the  background  section).  It  is  founded  on  three  principles  of  sustainability  (economic,  
social  and  ecological).    
  
The  NPSH  highlights  the  need  for  information  disclosure  for  any  project  reports,  assessments,  mitigation  
plan   and  monitoring   reports;   to   include  environmental   assessment   as   an   integral   part   in   hydropower  
development;   to   recognize   the   rights   of   project   affected   people;   as   well   as   project’s   compliance   to  
existing  policy  frameworks  as  to  ensure  sustainable  hydropower  development.   In  addition,   it  proposes  
the  creation  of  Environment  Protection  Fund  (EPF)  to  tap  a  certain  portion  from  hydropower  revenue.    
  
The  NPSH  lacks  the  institutional  framework  on  task/responsibility  division,  potential  joint  collaboration  
and  necessary  coordination  between  different  relevant  government  agencies.  For  instance,  with  regard  
to  project  affected  people,  the  policy  is  unclear  about  who  will  define  the  resettlement  plan,  approve  or  
monitor  the  plan.  Surprisingly,  NPSH  is   formulated  and  supposed  to  be   implemented  by  STEA  through  
LEnS  (Lao  Environment  and  Social)  project   funded  by  the  World  Bank  and  not  by  the  MEM  as  the  key  





Renewable	  energy	  development	  strategy	  of	  the	  Lao	  PDR	  (MEM,	  2010)	  
The  draft  renewable  energy  development  strategy  highlights  the  need  to  regulate  current  practices  on  
renewable  energy.   It  argues   that  commercial   small  hydropower  development  has  been   limited  due  to  
the   lack  of  clear  policy  and  sound  regulatory   framework,  as  well  as  detailed   implementation  strategy.  
Policy  and  regulation  can  be  formulated  to  promote  renewable  energy  development  (small  scale  hydro),  
but   they   cannot   sideline   the   dominant   economic   rationale   that   guides   private   investor’s   decision   to  
invest   in   large-­‐scale  hydropower  projects   (above  100  MW)   (see   review  on  Law  on  Electricity  2010   for  
elaborate  discussion).    
  
Policy	  cluster	  3:	  	  Water	  resources	  management	  
Law	  on	  Water	  and	  Water	  Resources	  (National	  Assembly	  1996)	  
The   Law   on   Water   and   Water   Resources   places   the   duty   and   responsibility   to   use   available   water  
resources  and  inspect  this  use  to  relevant  sectoral  ministries  assigned  with  the  task  to  plan  and  conduct  
sectoral  development  activities  (Article  22  and  37).    
  
The   issue  of  potential  conflict  of   interest  and  the  vicious  cycle  of  coordination-­‐regulation-­‐bureaucratic  
competition   highlight   the   dilemma   in  water   resources   policy   planning.   Possibly,   assigning  WREA  with  
coordination/regulatory  role  could  result  in  the  formulation  of  good  policies  that  are  unimplementable.    
  
In  addition,  the  law  distinct  small-­‐scale/medium  from  large-­‐scale  use  of  water  resources  with  the  former  
can  be  done  without  formal/legal  approval,  as  required  for  the  latter  (Article  14  and  15).  In  the  context  
of  hydropower  development,  the  flexibility  in  the  former  use  can  result  in  community’s  water  use  rights  
not  being  acknowledged  and  recognized  within  the  project  setting.    
  
National	  Water	  Resources	  Profile	  (WREA,	  2008)	  
The  National  Water  Resources  Profile  reflects  the  rationale  and  reasoning  behind  the  formulation  of  the  
Draft  National  Water  Resources  Policy  (August  2010  version).  The  draft  NWRP  is  formulated  to  address  
the  existing  policy  gaps   in   the  Prime  Minister’s  Decree  on   Implementation  of   Land,  Water  and  Water  
Resources  (2001),  which  was  promulgated  to  implement  the  Law  on  Water  and  Water  Resources  (1996).  
As  stated  in  the  profile:  “One	  of	  the	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  LWWR	  is	  its	  delegation	  of	  water	  resource	  policy	  
and	  regulatory	  functions	  to	  water	  development	  ministries.	  These	  functions	  may	  conflict	  with	  the	  water	  
development	  and	  service	  delivery	  roles	  of	  these	  ministries	  and	  their	  agencies.	  The	  LWWR	  also	  appears	  to	  
have	  gaps	  with	  respect	  to	  such	  things	  as	  information	  management,	  the	  coordination	  of	  water	  resource	  
and	  environment	  management”.  
  
Responding   to   this  weakness,   the   profile   proposed   the   full   establishment   of  WREA   (at   provincial   and  
river  basin   level)   as   to   strengthen   it   to   lead   IWRM  activities   in   the   country.   The  profile  highlights   the  
potential  role  of  WREA  in  addressing  the  existing  policy  gaps  in  water  resources  management,  its  role  in  
data   and   information   management,   and   in   planning   water   resources   management   system.   WREA’s  
potential   role   is   projected   following   IWRM   principles   imposing   cross-­‐sectoral   coordination   in   water  
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resources  planning  on   sectoral  ministries,  without   linking   the  need   to   integrate  with   these  ministries’  
development  perspectives.  This  imposition  became  evident  in  the  way  the  draft  NWRP  hardly  deals  with  
task  division,  role  sharing  between  WREA  and  sector  ministries.    
  
WREA   full   establishment   would   not   address   the   problem   of   water   resources   management   and  
coordination   as   long   as   the   vicious   cycle  of   coordination-­‐regulation-­‐bureaucratic   competition   remains  
unaddressed.  Put  differently,  WREA  would  not  be  able  to  fulfill  its  regulatory/coordination  role  if  a  well  
functioning   inter-­‐ministerial/cross-­‐sectoral   platform   remains   absent.   WREA   cannot   enforce   sector  
ministries  to  follow  the  defined  regulatory  coordination  rules  if  these  ministries  do  not  see  any  benefit  
to   comply   with   the   rules,   not   to   mention   if   these   rules   conflict   with   their   sectoral   development  
perspectives,   and   thus   how   such   compliance   could   potentially   reduce   sectoral’s   ministries’   decision-­‐
making  authority.    
  
Current   problem   of   lack   inter-­‐ministerial/cross-­‐sectoral   coordination   and   the   absence   of   a   well-­‐
functioning  regulatory  body  cannot  be  addressed  simply  through  the  creation  or  establishment  of  a  new  
government  agency  assigned  with  the  tasks,  without  support  and  commitment  from  sectoral  ministries.    
The  profile  states:  WREA  water  resources  data  and  information  strategy  is  needed  to  guide  the  functions  
of  the  various  agencies  involved  in  water  resources  (page  ix).  The  question  remains  on  how  WREA  can  
guide   the   agencies   that   are   not   waiting   for   any   (external)   guidance   in   their   sectoral   development  
performance   especially   when   this   guidance   does   not   necessarily   take   into   account   their   sectoral  
development  interest.    
  
At  the  moment,  attempt  to  address  existing  policy  gaps  and   inconsistencies  result  primarily   in  parallel  
institutions  in  charge  for  the  implementation  of  parallel  development  programs  without  any  connection  
to  each  other.  The  full  establishment  of  WREA  would  only  add  a  new  line  of  command/authority  next  to  
those  of   sectoral  ministries  and   their   representatives  at  provincial   and  district   level.   Linking  access   to  
development  funds  with  access  to  decision  making  authority  and  to  a  certain  extent  bureaucratic  power,  
parallel   program   implementation   highlights   the   need   to   create   parallel   access   to   development   funds  
(EPF,  PRF,  WRPF,  REF).  Moreover,   the  profile  mentions   that   the   lack  of  water   resources  planning  and  
strategy   is   linked   to   the   way   water   resources   are  managed   on   a   project   by   project   basis   (similar   to  
hydropower  development).    
	  
Draft	  National	  Water	  Resources	  Policy	  (WREA,	  2010)	  
The  draft  National  Water  Resources  Policy  attempts  to  guide  relevant  government  agencies  as  well  as  
private  investors  in  the  water  sector  to  carry  out  appropriate  and  well-­‐coordinated  water  management  
activities.   The   NWRP   views   water   resources   management   mainly   as   a   neutral   issue.   It   assumes   that  
coordination  can  be  achieved  on   technical/managerial  basis   regardless  of  how  sector  ministries   could  
actually   benefit   from   such   coordination.   NWRP’s   objective   to   define   directions   for   coordinated  
development,  develop  mechanisms  for  effective  and  efficient  water  resources  management  can  only  be  
achieved   if   it   can   synergize   the  need  of   this   coordination   (from   IWRM  planning  perspective)  with   the  
overall  rationale  of  sectoral  development  and  thus  create  alternative  ways  on  how  sector  ministries  can  




The  NWRP  assigns  LNMC,  WREA  and  RBC  as  the  responsible  government  agencies  for  water  resources  
coordination.   It  does  not  elaborate  on  how  these  agencies  could  ensure  sector  ministries’  compliance  
and   how   it   could   enforce   its   coordination.      Similarly,   the   NWRP   states   major   mission   to   strengthen  
participation   in   water   resources   management,   including   the   role   of   local   population   in   the   overall  
decision  making  process.  However,  it  does  not  elaborate  on  how  this  inclusion  can  be  achieved,  through  
for  instance  linking  it  with  rules  and  mechanisms  in  hydropower  development  at  the  project  level.    
	  
WREA	  organization	  and	  staff	  arrangements	  for	  IWRM	  
The  way  WREA  organizational   role  and   structure   is   set  up   to   formulate  policies,   strategies,   legislation  
and  coordinate,  advise  other  government  agencies  on  water  resources  management  reflects  the  strong  
attempt  of  the  leadership  within  WREA  to  push  it  to  become  the  coordination/regulatory  body  in  water  
resources  management.  While   such  an  attempt   is   legitimate   from   the  perspective  of  water   resources  
planning,  the  way  WREA  leadership  projected  its  role  in  water  resources  management  does  not  comply  
with   the   existing   decision-­‐making   landscape   and   sectoral   fragmentation   at   the   national   level.   Put  
differently,   how   would   WREA   plan,   coordinate   and   regulate   water   resources   management   planning  
when  sector  ministries  are  either  not  convinced  or  do  not  comply  to  the  plan/regulation?    
  
WREA   organizational   structure   reflects   the   disconnection   between  WREA’s   projected   role   and   sector  
ministries’  development  perception.  DWR  within  WREA  does  not  include  DoI  (MAF)  and  DoE  (MEM)  (see  
section  2  for  elaborate  explanation).    
  
Policy	  cluster	  4:	  Environmental	  protection	  
Environmental	  Protection	  Law	  (1999)	  
Like  the  NPSH,  the  Law  on  Environmental  Protection  highlights  important  issues  that  need  to  be  taken  
into   account   to   protect   the   environment   in   relation   to   development   projects.   It   lacks,   however,   the  
rationale   to   protect   the   environment   from   the   livelihoods   perspective.   No   connection   was   made  
between  the  need  to  protect  the  environment  with  local  people’s  access  to  natural  resources  and  how  
such  an  access  is  crucial  as  part  of  people’s  livelihoods  options  (poverty  status  of  their  households).  Put  
differently,  the  law  positions  environment  as  its  starting  point  to  achieve  the  targeted  objective  that  is  
environmental  protection.  It  does  not  argue  the  need  to  protect  the  environment  from  the  perspective  
of   people’s   livelihoods   and   poverty   reduction.   The   concept   of   environmental   protection   is   not  
mainstreamed   as   part   of   government’s   high   priority   policy   issues   such   as   for   instance   poverty  
alleviation.    
  
This  strong  focus  on  environment  could  isolate  the  agency  assigned  with  the  mandate  to  implement  the  
law,  if  not  hinder  it  altogether  from  actually  applying  and  enforcing  the  law.  The  law  lacks  a  convincing  
argument  on  why  sector  ministries  should  collaborate  with  STEA/WREA  on  this,  or  how  they  can  benefit  
from  such  a   collaboration.   It   lacks  any   synthesis  on  how   to   link   the  need   to  protect   the  environment  




With   regard   to   Article   25,   the   law   provides   a   potential   entry   point   and   legal   foundation   to   promote  
public   participation   in   land-­‐water-­‐environment   management   by   outlining   the   procedure   to   deliver  
request   or   claim.   Its   application,   however,   would   need   vertical   institutional   back   up   at   national,  
provincial   and   district   level   as   well   as   horizontally   through   inter-­‐ministerial   collaboration.   As   such  
institutional   set  up   is   currently   lacking,   the  procedure   to  deliver   request/claim  can  only  be  channeled  
through  hydropower  project  and  power  companies.  This  highlights  the  dilemmatic  presentation  of  the  
role   of   the   private   investor   in   hydropower   development   both   as   potential   polluter   and   as   potential  
controller.   The   issue   is   how   to   convince   private   investor   to   foresee   and   monitor   the   given  
claims/requests   to   protect   the   environment   and   people’s   livelihoods   in   relation   to   their   economic  
interest  from  power  generation.    
  
Decree	   on	   the	   agreement	   and	   endorsement	   of	   the	  National	   Strategy	   on	   Environment	   years	   2020	   and	  
Action	  Plan	  for	  the	  years	  2006-­‐2010	  (2004)	  
The  decree  identifies  6  focused  priority  programs  to  promote  and  improve  environmental  management  
and  protection.  These  programs  are:  
1)  The  management  of  natural  resources  (land,  water,  forest,  mineral,  biodiversity).  
2)  Management   of   environment   of   urban,   infrastructure,   industrial   and   handicraft,   special   zone   free  
trade  area,  tourist  development  project  and  operations  including  national,  cultural  and  historical  sites.  
3)  Institutional  reform  and  capacity  building  for  environment  management  and  monitoring.  
4)   Participation   of   the   business   sector   on   environment   protection   and   sustainable   use   of   water  
resources.  
5)  Promotion  investment  and  establishment  of  financial  mechanisms  for  the  environment.  
6)  Strengthening  regional  and  international  cooperation.  
  
Some   of   the   programs   identify   the   need   to   develop   a   Master   Plan   which   is   still   lacking   until   now.  
Currently,  policy  efforts  to  improve  environmental  protection  and  management  are  focused  on  impacts  
from  development  project   to   the  environment,   rather   than  putting  environmental  management  as  an  
integral  part  of  development.  The  focus  has  been  given  mainly  to  incorporate  EIA  as  part  of  the  formal  
procedure   in   hydropower   development   and   less   on   the   formulation   of   environment   management  
monitoring  plan  both  at  national  and  project  level.  This  absence  of  monitoring  plan  might  relate  to  the  
fact  that  STEA  lacks  institutional  set  up  to  carry  out  the  monitoring  tasks.  Hence,  the  proposal  to  form  
Environmental  Management  Monitoring  Unit  (EMMU)  at  different  administrative  level.  
  
While   promoting   public   participation   in   environmental   protection   has   been   identified   as   one   of   the  
priority  programs  (among  others  to  create  and  formulate  policy  and  legal  frameworks  for  environment  
management;   reform   institutions   to   ensure   effective   environment   management;   develop   and  
standardize   EIA;   promote   environmental   aspect   in   education;   and   strengthen   international  
cooperation),  so  far  public  participation  remains   limited.  Public  participation  needs  to  be  incorporated  
into  the  EIA  process.  Efforts  should  be  made  to  develop  mechanisms  which  can  ensure  and  effectively  





Decree	  on	  Environmental	  Impact	  Assessment	  (unofficial	  translation,	  WREA,	  2010)	  
The  decree  on  EIA   focuses  mainly  on  outlining   the  procedural  aspect  of  EIA   (like   the  different  project  
classifications  and  types  of  assessment  required:  IEE,  EIA,  EMMP,  SMMP).  It  centers  on  the  legal  status  
of  the  environment  compliance  certificate.   It  touches  the   issue  of  management  and  monitoring  of  the  
EMMP   and   SMMP   but   does   not   elaborate   on   the   required   institutional   set   up   to   ensure  
effective/meaningful  management  and  monitoring.  For   instance,   rather   than  coming  with  string   fining  
regulation   targeted   the   developers  who   fail   to  meet   the   required   participatory   approach,   the   decree  
focuses   mainly   on   step-­‐by-­‐step   procedural   approach   that   developers   have   to   follow   to   obtain   the  
environment  compliance  certificate.  
  
The   decree   does   not   elaborate   on   criteria   to   evaluate   the   quality   of   the   submitted   EIA.   Rather,   it  
highlights  the  need  to  officially  register  EIA  consultant  within  WREA  registration  system.  This  registration  
alone  cannot  be  viewed  as  the  most  effective  form  of  quality  control.  In  addition,  the  decree  mentions  
about  the  formation  of  National  Environment  Committee.    
  
Policy	  cluster	  5:	  Land	  management	  
Land	  Law	  (National	  Assembly,	  2003)	  
The  law  combines  both  an  integrated  and  sectoral  approach  towards  land  management.  It  assigns  NLMA  
with  the  task  to  plan   land  management.  At  the  same  time   it  categorizes  different  types  of   land  use   in  
line  with  sectoral  ministries’  areas  of  development   (such  as  use  of   industrial   land   is  under  MIH  or   the  
former  MEM).   It  assigns  NLMA  with   the   role  and   responsibility   for  overall   land  management  planning  
(through  land  zoning)  but  gives  sector  ministries  the  responsibility  to  regulate  land  use  in  accordance  to  
their   sectoral   development   activities   (through   land   categorization).   This   combination  becomes  utterly  
problematic  in  the  issue  of  land  concession.    
  
The   law   does   not   oblige   land   registration   for   small-­‐scale   land   use   (article   45).   While   this   rule   was  
formulated  with  the  rationale  to  grant  access  to  land  use  more  flexibly  to  farmers  and  other  small-­‐scale  
users,   it  could  potentially  disadvantage  these  small-­‐scale  users   if  their   land  location  coincides  with  the  
location  where  development  projects  are  planned.  Being  not   formally  registered  as  official   land  users,  
they   might   receive   lower   compensation   and   lack   any   legal   back   up   to   negotiate   about   their   lost  
opportunities  in  land  use  with  the  respective  project  staff.    
  
As   land   concession   is   driven   by   the   economic   rationale   to   turn   land   into   capital,   boost   land  
development,   it  does   take   into  account   the  potential  agricultural   land.  Obviously,  hydropower  project  
cannot  be  proposed  on  behalf  of  irrigated  rice  agriculture.  In  most  cases,  hydropower  project  proceeds  
in  places  which  government  perceives  to  lack  any  economic  value/potential.  Yet,  this  perception  might  
not  be  valid  entirely  if  we  take  into  account  the  role  of  low  economic  value  land  (embankment  gardens)  






Decree	  on	  State	  Land	  Lease	  or	  Concession	  (2009)	  
The  decree  highlights  the  economic  rationale  behind  the  idea  of   land  lease  of  concession.  As  stated  in  
the  decree:  “land	  concession	  aims	  to	  boost	  the	  development	  of	  state	   land,	  to	  turn	  land	  into	  capital,	  to	  
promote	   the	   investment	   for	   cash-­‐crops	   production	   and	   services,	   and	   to	   build	   income	   for	   the	   state	  
budget”  (2009:  1).  This  economic  rationale  fits  with  the  rationale  of  hydropower  development  which  is  
very  much  driven  by  private  investors’  interest  to  gain  as  much  as  possible  economic  benefits  from  the  
power  generation.    
  
The   decree   assigns   NLMA   with   the   power   to   authorize   land   concession   presumably   involving   the  
relevant  sector  ministries.  
	  
Instruction	   as	   regards	   the	   implementation	   of	   decree	   on	   State	   Owned	   Land	   Approval	   for	   Lease	   or	  
Concession	  (NLMA,	  2010)	  
Like  WREA,  NLMA’s  role  is  projected  to  be  government’s  coordinating  and  regulatory  body  in  the  field  of  
land   management,   focusing   on   the   need   to   have   a   holistic   land   management   planning,   through  
incorporation  of  different   types  of   land  use   (agriculture,   industry,   forestry,   etc.).   The   same  discussion  
applies   with   regard   to   NLMA’s   relationship   with   sector   ministries,   the   proposed   land   management  
planning  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  sectoral  fragmentation.  
  
Policy	  cluster	  6:	  Resettlement	  and	  compensation	  in	  development	  projects	  	  
Decree	  on	  Compensation	  and	  Resettlement	  of	  People	  Affected	  by	  Development	  Projects	  (STEA,	  2006)	  
The   decree   defines   principles,   rules,   and   measures   to   mitigate   adverse   social   impacts   and   to  
compensate   damages   that   result   from   involuntary   acquisition   or   repossession   of   land   and   fixed   or  
moveable  assets,  including  change  in  land  use,  restriction  of  access  to  community  or  natural  resources  
affecting  community  livelihood  and  income  sources  (Article  1).    
  
The  decree  obliges  project  owners  to  address  adverse  social  impacts  (Article  4)  but  does  not  clarify  on  
the   procedure/rule   to   monitor   and   evaluate   project   owners’   conducts   as   to   determine   whether   the  
measures   taken   met   the   defined   obligations.   As   stated   in   the   article:   “In	   collaboration	   with	   the	  
concerned	   local	   governmental	   authorities	   and	   concerned	   organizations,	   project	   owners	   have	   the	  
responsibility	   to	   carry	   out	   necessary	   surveys	   and	   field	   inventory	   of	   impacts	   by	   types	   and	   degree,	  
determine	   entitlement	   to	   mitigation	   measures	   including	   compensation	   for	   affected	   assets.	   Project	  
owners	  must	  provide	  appropriate	  funding	  to	  assist,	  support,	  relocate	  affected	  people	  and	  to	  implement	  
income	   rehabilitation	  measures	  and	   to	  prepare	  necessary	  plans	   in	  an	  efficient	  and	   timely	  manner	  and	  
approved	  by	  the	  concerned	  agencies	  to	  ensure	  the	  improvement	  of	  their	  socio-­‐economic	  situation”  (page  
5).  How  project  owners’  conduct  could  eventually  be  monitored  and  evaluated,  by  whom,  through  what  
means,  remains  unclear.    
  
The  decree  states  that  “project	  owners	  shall	  make	  concerted	  efforts	  for	  an	  effective	  public	  dissemination	  
of	   information	   about	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   project,	   the	   compensatory	   package	   that	   is	   part	   of	   the	  
resettlement	   process,	   through	   the	  mass	  media	   such	   as	   newspapers,	   radio,	   TV	   or	   public	   meeting	   and	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other	  means	  to	  inform	  local	  authorities	  at	  provincial,	  district	  and	  village	  levels	  and	  mass	  organizations,	  
affected	  people	  and	  wider	  public”  (article  12:  13).  It  brings  to  light  the  legal  foundation  for  wider  public  
involvement   in   hydropower   decision-­‐making   processes.   Furthermore,   the   decree   includes   grievance  
redress  mechanisms  and  the  establishment  of  grievance  redress  committee  to  address  complaints  and  
grievances  pertaining  to  land  acquisition,  compensation  and  resettlement  due  to  the  project  (Article  13).  
From  the  perspective  of  public  participation,  the  formation  of  the  grievance  redress  committee  could  be  
viewed  as  a  potential  entry  point  to  promote  wider  public  participation  and  channel  public  opinion  to  
project  management.    
  
The  decree  obliges  project  owners  to  prepare  Initial  Social  Assessment  (ISA)/land  and  assets  acquisition  
assessment;  Social  Impact  Assessment  (SIA);  Land  Acquisition  and  Compensation  Report;  Resettlement  
Plan;   and   Ethnic   Minority   Development   Plan,   submit   them   to   the   government   agency   (STEA)   for  
approval   (article   15).   It   does   not   elaborate   the   process   of   approval   in   terms   of   criteria/guideline   for  
approval,  regular  monitoring,  and  inspection  of  conducted  activities.  In  addition,  the  decree’s  definition  
of  those  eligible  for  compensation  does  not  include  community  lives  downstream  of  the  reservoir/dam  
in  terms  of  potential  project  impacts  to  downstream  area.    
  
In  summary,  the  decree  gives  the  project  owners  all  the  responsibility  with  regard  to  compensation  and  
resettlement   issues,  without   exercising   sufficient   control   as   to  monitor   and   evaluate   project   owners’  
conducts   at   project   level.   Field   research   should   be   focused   on   looking   at   institutional   arrangements,  
mechanisms  and  potential  entry  points   for   the  community  and   local  population  to  communicate  their  
opinions  and  concerns   to  project  management,  and  vice  versa.   It   should  also   look  at   the   role  of   local  
authorities   (provincial,   district   and   village   government)   in   shaping   the   relationship   between   project  
management  and  local  population,  in  terms  of  information  dissemination  as  well  as  providing  a  strategic  
entry   point   to   negotiate   and   to   promote   space   to   discuss   project   activities/management   involving  
affected  people  and  wider  public.    
  
Regulations	   for	   Implementing	   Decree	   on	   Compensation	   and	   Resettlement	   of	   People	   Affected	   by	  
Development	  Projects	  (STEA,	  2006)	  
In   line  with  the  decree  on  compensation  and  resettlement  of  people  affected  by  development  project  
the  regulations  link  resettlement  procedures  with  the  project  cycle  (Article  3).    
  
Project  cycle   Resettlement  process  
Identification   Screening/Initial  Social  Assessment(ISA)/ToR  for  Social  Impact  Assessment  
(SIA)  
Pre-­‐feasibility  study   Redefine  ToR/assess  options  for  minimizing  adverse  impacts/selection  of  
suitable  design  option  
Feasibility  study   SIA/Socio-­‐Economic   Survey   (SES)/Inventory   of   Losses   (IOL)/Resettlement  
Plan  (RP)/  Ethnic  Minority  Development  Plan  (EMDP)  
Detailed  study   Updated/final  RP/EMDP  




The   regulations   outline   the   procedure   for   resettlement   and   compensation   and   what   project   owners  
have  to  do  to  ensure  that  they  comply  with  the  existing  regulations  and  procedures,  during  each  stage  
of   project   development   (from   identification,   pre-­‐feasibility,   feasibility   study,   detailed   design,  
construction  and  operation).  As  stated  in  the  regulations:  “To	  implement	  each	  step	  of	  the	  project	  cycle	  
and	   resettlement	   process,	   the	   project	   owner	   will	   properly	   and	   strictly	   comply	   with	   the	   provisions	  
determined	  in	  the	  Technical	  Guidelines	  on	  Compensation	  and	  Resettlement”  (page  3).    
  
It  gives  the  project  owner  the  central  role  in  the  formulation  and  implementation  of  resettlement  plan.  
It   highlights   how   the   government   perceives   project   owner   as   ad-­‐hoc   decision   maker   in   hydropower  
project.   Giving   the   project   owner   the   full   responsibility   to   conduct   the   overall   resettlement   process  
brings  to  light  the  potential  conflict  of  interest  that  might  occur  in  identifying  potential  negative  impacts,  
formulating   mitigation/resettlement   plan,   implementing   it,   and   in   monitoring   the   plan’s  
implementation.  Given  the  fact  that  project  owner  is  interested  to  develop  the  hydropower  dam,  there  
is   a   tendency   to   downplay   the   potential   negative   impacts   from   the   start.   Similarly,   given   the   project  
owner’s   interest   to  make  economic  profits   from  the  planned  project,   there   is  a   tendency   to  minimize  
cost  for  resettlement  plan.  In  addition,  given  the  project  owners’  main  interest  to  generate  power  rather  
than   to  sustain   the  existing   livelihoods,   there   is  a   tendency   to  overlook  operation   impacts  on  existing  
ecosystems.    
  
Other   issue   involves   how   project   owners   include   public   participation,   information   disclosure,   and  
consultation  into  shaping  the  overall  resettlement  process.  The  regulations  highlight  the  potential  role  
of   local   authorities   to   encourage   more   transparent   and   deliberative   decision   making   through  
participation  and  community’s  taking  an  active  role  in  the  resettlement  planning  and  implementation.    
  
2.2.	  Institutional	  analysis	  and	  the	  mapping	  of	  sectoral	  decision-­making	  set	  up	  	  
This   section   analyzes   the   overall   decision-­‐making   set   up   and   processes   with   regard   to   hydropower  
development   and   livelihood   options.   It   gives   an   overview   of   decision-­‐making   landscapes   in   the   Lao  
power  sector   (see   figure  1)  and   identifies   the  relevant  government  agencies   in  charge   for   land-­‐water-­‐
environment   management   in   Lao   PDR.   The   overall   analysis   includes   each   agency’s   formal   mandate,  
responsibility,  tasks  and  actual  role  in  shaping  hydropower  development  and  livehoods  options.    
  
Hydropower  decision-­‐making  landscapes  in  Lao  PDR  include  inter-­‐ministerial/cross-­‐sectoral  government  
agencies,   such   as   Water   Resources   and   Environment   Administration   (WREA),   National   Land  
Management  Agency  (NLMA),  as  well  as  sectoral  ministries  (Ministry  of  Energy  and  Mines  or  MEM  and  
Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry  or  MAF)   in  charge   for   land-­‐water-­‐environment  management.  The  
figure   shows   direct   connection   between   the   MEM   and   the   commercial   entity   in   hydropower  
development  represented  by  Electricité  du  Laos  (EdL)  and  the  Lao  State  Holding  Enterprise  (LSHE).  This  
connection   reflects   the   characteristics   of   hydropower   development   in   Laos   as   part   of   the   state’s  
enterprise  and  the  importance  of  private  sector  financing  in  shaping  the  sector  development.  Together  
with   the  Ministry  of  Planning  and   Investment   (MPI)  and   the  Ministry  of   Finance   (MoF),  EdL  and  LSHE  
form   the   financial   decision-­‐making   set   up   in   hydropower   development.   The   role   of   private   sector  
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financing   in   hydropower   development,   especially   in   relation   to   the   formulation   of   energy   policy   and  
hydropower  master  plan  is  mentioned  in  the  previous  section  on  policy  review.  
  
  
Figure  1:  Lao  power  sector  organizational  chart  
Source:  MPI  (2011)  
  
Water	  Resources	  and	  Environment	  Administration	  (WREA)	  
The  Water  Resources  and  Environment  Administration  (WREA)  is  an  authority  under  the  structure  of  the  
Prime   Minister’s   office.   WREA   is   formed   and   established   in   2007   to   replace   the   former   Science,  





WREA   has   a   mandate   to   act   as   advisory   body   to   the   government   for   macro  management   on   water  
resources,  environment,  meteorology,  and  hydrology  activities  throughout  the  country  (Prime  Minister  
Decree  no.  149/PMO  of  2007).      
	  
Tasks	  and	  responsibilities	  
Formally,  WREA  is  responsible  for  the  formulation  of  policies  and  legal  frameworks  on  water  resources,  
environment,   meteorology   and   hydrology,   their   implementation   and   monitoring.   Besides,   WREA   is  
responsible  in  collecting,  auditing,  and  certifying  relevant  data  and  information.  As  stated  in  the  Prime  
Minister  Decree  no.  149/PMO  of  2007,  WREA’s  duties  include  the  following:  
• Research,  disseminate  and  implement  policies,  strategic  plans,  rule  and  other  legislations  of  the  
party   and   state   issued   which   are   related   to   water   resources,   environment,   meteorology   and  
hydrology.  
• Draft  and  propose  to  government  for  consideration  and  approval  the  policies,  plans,  strategies,  
master  plans,  long-­‐term  plans,  laws,  presidential  decrees,  decrees  as  well  as  lead  and  advice  on  
implementing  the  legislation  after  approval.  
• Develop  and  propose  to  improve  the  legislations  and  other  regulations  which  are  insufficient  or  
inconsistent  to  the  socio-­‐economic  development  circumstance  in  each  period.  
• Develop  plans   for   sustainable  water   resources  and  environment  management,  protection  and  
rehabilitation  and  propose  to  government  for  approval;  promote  education,  scientific  research  
and  awareness  rising  on  water  resources  and  environment  conservation  throughout  the  society;  
audit,   certify   and   adopt   report   on   the   social   and   environmental   impact   assessment   before  
approval  for  development  projects;  coordinate  with  sectors  and  local  authorities  to  ensure  that  
the   development   is   parallel  with  water   resources   and   environmental   protection   in   the  whole  
country.  
• Manage,  monitor,  collect  and  provide  data  and   information  on  water  resources,  environment,  
meteorology  and  hydrology  nationwide.    
• Advise   and   follow   up   the   implementation   for   environmental   protection  measures,   protection  
projects,  anti-­‐degradation,  arising  of  air  pollution  and  environmental  accidents.  
• Collect  water  resource  and  environment  fees  according  to  legal  provisions,  establish  protection  
fund,   rehabilitation   and   support   for   water   resource   and   environment   management   activities  
according  to  government  approval.    
• Lead  and  implement  basic  surveys  for  collecting,  evaluating,  forecasting  and  providing  data  and  
information;  audit  and  certify  data  information  and  techniques.  
• Coordinate  with   concerned   parties   to   consider   proposals,   complaints   of   the   public   and   other  
sectors.  
• Coordinate  and  cooperate  with  other  countries  and  international  organizations.  
  
WREA   organizational   structure   comprises   of   the   so-­‐called   central   and   local   structure.   The   former  
includes   a   cabinet,   four   technical   departments,   one   research   institute   and   a   Lao   National   Mekong  
Committee   Secretariat.   The   latter   includes   the   Provincial   Water   Resources   and   Environment   Office  





Figure  2:  WREA  organizational  structure    
Source:  WREA  Organization  and  Staff  Arrangements  for  IWRM  (2008)  
  
Historically,   Department   of   Water   Resources   (DWR)   was   newly   formed   together   with   WREA;  
Department   of   Meteorology   and   Hydrology   (DMH)   was   added   from   the   Ministry   of   Agriculture   and  
Forestry   (MAF);   Department   of   Environment   (DoE)   and  Water   Resources   and   Environment   Research  
Institute   (WRERI)   were   added   from   STEA;   and   Department   of   Environmental   and   Social   Impact  
Assessment  (DESIA)  was  newly  formed  from  DoE.    
  
National	  Land	  Management	  Agency	  (NLMA)	  
The  National   Land  Management  Agency   (NLMA)  was   formed  and  established   in  2004   (Prime  Minister  
Decree  no.  67/PM  of  2004).    
	  
Formal	  mandate	  
NLMA  is  a  central  state  organization  within  the  organizational  structure  of  Prime  Minister’s  Office  and  
has  the  role  of  ensuring  the  management  of  land  throughout  the  country.  
	  
Tasks	  and	  responsibilities	  
As  stated  in  the  Decree  (article  2  and  3),  the  NLMA  has  the  following  tasks  and  responsibilities:  
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• To   issue   regulations,   notifications,   orders,   decisions   and   instructions   relating   to   land  
management  and  administration  for  the  whole  country.  
• To   issue   the   certificate  of   the   change  of   purpose  of   the   land  use   from  one   category   to  other  
categories,   land   lease   or   land   concession   for   each   category   of   land   after   the   approval   of   the  
government.  
• To   submit   proposals   to   the   government   or   the   Prime  Minister   concerning   the   termination   or  
suspension   of   the   implementation   of   the   decision   and   other   regulatory   documents   issued   by  
ministers,   which   are   found   to   be   in   contradiction   with   the   law   and   regulations   on   land  
management  and  administration  which  are  officially  issued.  
• To  undertake  research,  develop  and   implement  the  guideline  policies,  strategic  plan,   laws  and  
regulations,   resolutions,   decrees,   orders,   instructions   and   notifications   of   the   party   and  
government  relating  to  land  management.  
• To   conduct   research   on   policy,   draft   law   to   formulate   the   strategic   plan   and  Master   Plan   for  
effective   land   use   and   land   development,   which   are   to   be   submitted   to   the   government   for  
consideration.  
• To  undertake  land  survey,   land  classification,   land  boundaries  and  to  formulate  protecting  and  
developing   land  mapping   for   local,   regional   and   national   levels  which   are   to   be   submitted   to  
government  for  consideration.    
• To  coordinate  with  concerned  agencies  and  local  authorities  in  planning  and  managing  land  use,  
environmental  protection  and  land  development.  
• To   review  and  submit  proposal   to   the  government   for  approval   concerning   the  assignment  of  
land  use  right  or   land  renting  or   land  concession  for   local  and  foreign   investors,  as  well  as  the  
change  of  purpose  of  the  land  use  from  one  category  to  another  categories.  
• To  make   and  manage   land   records;   to   collect   land   data   and   land   valuation,   land   registration,  
land  titling  for  the  purpose  of  land  fee  collection.  
• To  study  and  solve   land  problems  and  disputes  based  on  requests  made  by  agencies  and  local  
authorities.  
  
At   the   national   level   NLMA   comprises   of   a   cabinet   unit,   three   technical   departments   and   one  
information   centre   (see   figure   3).   NLMA   is   equipped   with   Land  Management   Agency   at   respectively  
provincial,  district,  and  village  level.  Currently,  provincial  and  district  LMA  are  incorporated  as  provincial  





Figure  3:  NLMA  organizational  structure  
Source:  Prime  Minister  Decree  no.  67/PM  of  2004  on  the  National  Land  Management  Agency.  
  
Ministry	  of	  Energy	  and	  Mines	  (MEM)	  
Ministry  of  Energy  and  Mines  (MEM)  was  formed  in  2006.  Prior  to  this  formation,  most  of  its  activities  
were  covered  under  the  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Handicraft  (MIH).  Under  MIH  there  are  Department  of  
Electricity   (DoE);   Department   of   Mines   (DoM);   Department   of   Industry;   Department   of   Handicraft;  
Administrative  unit;  Department  of  evaluation;  and  cabinet  office.  With  the  formation  of  MEM,  DoE  and  
DoM   were   transferred   to   MEM.   In   addition,   MEM   is   equipped   with   two   additional   departments  
(Department  of  Energy  Promotion  and  Development  or  DEPD;  Department  of  Geology).  Department  of  
Industry  and  Department  of  Handicraft,  on  the  other  hand  were  incorporated  into  the  new  Ministry  of  
Industry  and  Trade  (MIT).    
  
Formal	  mandate	  
MEM   is   responsible   for   the   formulation   and   implementation   of   policies   with   regard   to   the   overall  
development  of  both   the  energy   (which  covers   lignite,  gas,  hydropower  and  other   renewable  energy)  
and  the  mining  sector.      
  
Tasks	  and	  responsibilities	  
The  Department  of  Electricity  (DoE)  is  responsible  for  the  overall  formulation  of  energy  policy  strategy  
and  master  plan.  Theoretically,  the  defined  strategy  and  master  plan  should  function  as  reference  point  
and   guideline   for   the   Department   of   Energy   Promotion   and   Development   (DEPD)   in   promoting   the  
sector  development.  Currently,  the  master  plan  is  undergoing  its  3rd  technical  update.  As  with  regard  to  
the  energy  policy  formulation,  this  process  was  halted  in  2002.  There  is  a  general  belief  within  the  DoE  
staff  that  once  formulated  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  conduct  the  sector  development  in  line  with  the  
defined   master   plan   and   energy   policy   due   to   Government   of   Lao’s   (GoL)   financial   condition.   For  
instance,   if   GoL  wants   to   develop   site   A   for   hydropower,   it   has   to   acquire   the   financial   source   from  
International  Financial  Institutions  (IFIs)  such  as  ADB  and  WB.  This  acquisition  process  involves  long  and  
tiresome  procedures.  At  the  same  time,  private  developers  are  interested  to  develop  site  B.  GoL  will  also  
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accommodate   this   because  private  developers   have   the  money   ready   (through   commercial   loan)   and  
they  can  proceed  with  the  development  immediately.  In  short,  hydropower  development  is  conducted  
based  on  financial  flow  from  developers  (private  or  IFIs).  This  highlights  the  business-­‐oriented  aspect  in  
hydropower   logic,   and   thus   the   role   of   financial   sources   to   determine   the   actual   proceeding  
(implementation)  of  hydropower  project  development  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  the  defined  master  plan.  
  
The  DEPD   is   responsible   in   promoting   overall   development   of   the   energy   sector.   DEPD  works   closely  
with  private   investors   through   the  different   stages   in  hydropower  development  procedures,   from   the  
signing   of   the   Memorandum   of   Understanding   (MoU)   between   the   investors   and   the   GoL   up   to  
construction   and  power   generation.   The  different   stages   in   hydropower  development  procedures   are  
described  and  discussed  in  section  3  on  the  operational  decision-­‐making  set-­‐up  and  procedures.  
  
  
Figure  4:  MEM  organizational  structure    
Source:  Ministry  of  Energy  and  Mines  2009.  
  
Ministry	  of	  Agriculture	  and	  Forestry	  (MAF)	  
Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry  (MAF)  is  one  of  the  oldest  and  most  established  sectoral  ministries  
in  Lao  PDR.    
  
Formal	  mandate  
MAF  is  in  charge  for  policy  formulation  in  agriculture,  irrigation,  forestry,  livestock  and  fisheries  as  well  
as  their  implementation,  monitoring  and  evaluation.    
  
Tasks	  and	  responsibilities	  




• To   serve   as   the   secretariat   for   the   government   in   elaborating   the   agricultural   production  
strategy   and   in   transforming   such   strategy   into   a   plan,   a   detailed   project,   and   into   rules   for  
administration  and  inspection  of  agricultural  activities.  
• To  draft  a  master  plan,  a  long,  medium  and  short-­‐term  plan,  and  project  documents  related  to  
agricultural  production  development. 
• To   issue   rules   and   regulations   for   production,   environmental   protection   and   agricultural  
development  activities  throughout  the  country. 
• To   study   and   review   applications   seeking   to   conduct   large   scale   or   significant   agricultural  
business. 
• To  undertake   technical   and   scientific   agricultural   research,   to   establish   a  network  of   research  
centres  and  experimental  stations,  and  agricultural  promotion  units  throughout  the  country;  to  
provide  statistical  agricultural  information. 
• To   coordinate   with   local   administration   and   relevant   parties   to   survey   potential   natural  
resources  and  areas  suitable  for  intensive  agriculture. 
• To  inspect  agricultural  activities  to  ensure  the  implementation  of  regulations,  laws,  and  
technical  standards  for  productive  production. 
In  conducting  these  tasks  (like  in  the  overall  implementation  of  the  master  plan),  MAF  is  equipped  with  
its   Provincial   Agriculture   Forestry   Office   (PAFO)   and   District   Agriculture   Forestry   Office   (DAFO)   at  
respectively  provincial  and  district  level.  For  instance,  PAFO  is  in  charge  to  elaborate  the  defined  master  
plan  and  transform  it   into  detailed  projects  to  facilitate  implementation  (Article  71).  Similarly,  DAFO  is  
responsible  for  the  plan  implementation  (Article  72).      
At  national   level  MAF  comprises  of  an  office  of  permanent  secretary,  one  planning  unit,  four  technical  
departments,   one   research   institute,   one   agriculture   extension   body,   two   inspection   unit,   and   one  
administrative   unit.   Department   of   Irrigation   (DoI)   is   responsible   for   irrigation   development;  
Department   of   Agriculture   (DoA)   is   in   charge   for   agriculture   development   (rice   cultivation   and   other  
crops);   Department   of   Forestry   is   assigned   with   the   task   to   conserve   and   manage   the   forests;  
Department   of   Livestock   and   Fisheries   is   focusing   on   livestock   (poultry,   pork,   beef)   and   aquaculture  
activities.   The   National   Agriculture   Forestry   Research   Institute   (NAFRI)   has   the   task   to   conduct  
agriculture   research   and   channel   the   research   result   to   policy   makers   within   MAF.   The   National  
Agriculture  Forestry  Extension  Services  (NAFES)  is  responsible  in  providing  extension  services  to  support  
farmers’   agricultural   practices.   MAF   is   represented   in   both   provincial   and   district   level   through   its  





Figure  5:  MAF  organizational  structure  
Source:  NAFRI  (2011)  
  
Ministry	  of	  Planning	  and	  Investment	  (MPI)	  	  
Formal	  mandate	  
The  Ministry  of  Planning  and  Investment  (MPI)  is  responsible  for  the  formulation  of  country’s  strategic  
development  plan  and  promoting  investment  to  finance  the  formulated  plan.    
  
Tasks	  and	  responsibilities	  
• To   develop,   implement   strategic   plans,   policies,   laws   and   regulations   related   to   investment  
promotion  and  formulate  projects  or  the  investment  calling  list  within  their  locals.    
• To  promote  and  disseminate  policies,  laws  and  regulations  on  investment,  provide  information  
including   projects   or   the   investment   calling   list,   and   facilitate   investors   according   to   their  
responsibilities  
• To   provide   instructions   and   coordinate   with   other   relevant   sectors   within   their   locals   in  
implementing  laws  and  regulations  related  to  investment  promotion  
• To  examine  and  consider  issuing,  suspending,  withdrawing,  terminating  a  registration  certificate  
or  agreement  according  to  their  roles  and  by  the  agreement  of  the  government  
• To  implement  the  one-­‐stop-­‐service  operation  within  the  scope  of  its  own  responsibilities  
• To  coordinate  and  cooperate  with  international  organizations  on  the  investment  as  assigned  by  
the  higher  levels  
• To  coordinate  with  other  relevant  sectors  within  the  district  and  municipality   in   implementing  
laws  and  regulations  on  investment  promotions  
• To  implement  the  one-­‐stop-­‐service  operation  within  the  scope  of  responsibilities  of  the  offices  
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• To   formulate   projects   or   the   investment   calling   list   within   the   scope   of   responsibilities   and  
propose  to  higher  authority  for  consideration  
• To  collect  information  on  investment  including  investment  activities  within  their  locals  
• To  support,  promote  and  resolve  problems  occurring  within  their  responsibilities  
• To  regularly  summarize  and  report  on  investment  to  the  higher  levels  
• To  perform  other  rights  and  duties  as  set  forth  in  the  laws  and  regulations  
Ministry	  of	  Finance	  (MoF)	  
Ministry  of  Finance  (MoF)  is  responsible  for  putting  GoL’s  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  into  effect,  either  
by  direct  control  or  through  the  Central  Bank  of  Lao  PDR.  In  this  capacity,  MoF  approves  loans  and  issues  
sovereign  guarantee  on  behalf  of  GoL  and  in  compliance  with  GoL’s  international  covenants.  MoF  holds  
accounts  at  Central  Bank  that  receive  soft   loans  that  are  on-­‐lent  to  power  sector  projects.  Where  GoL  
equity   in   IPP  projects   is  financed  by  IFIs   loans,  the   loans  are  channeled  through  the  MoF  before  being  
on-­‐lent  to  the  agency  designated  as  the  GoL  shareholder.    
  
  
Figure  6:  MoF  organizational  structure  
Source:  MoF  (2011)  
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Electricité	  du	  Laos	  (EdL)	  
Electricité  du  Laos   (EdL)   is   a   state-­‐owned  corporation  under   the  Ministry  of  Energy  and  Mines,  which  
owns  and  operates  the  country’s  main  generation,  transmission  and  distribution  assets  in  Lao  PDR  and  
manages  electricity   imports   into  its  grids  and  exports  from  its  stations.  EdL  has  a  project  development  
role   and   has   been   the   implementing   agency   for   government   hydropower   projects.   In   the   case   of  
Independent  Power  Producer  (IPP),  EdL  is  the  government’s  shareholder.  In  the  past  EdL  took  over  the  
project  responsibility  from  MEM  once  a  shareholder’s  agreement  is  executed  and  the  project  loans  are  
closed.    
  
EdL’s   vision   is   to   be   the   leading   state   enterprise   in   promoting   the   country’s   socio-­‐economic  
development  through  the  provision  of  reliable  power  supply  throughout  the  country  and  transforming  
Lao  PDR  into  one  of  the  major  sources  of  power  supply  in  the  ASEAN  power  grid.  
  
As  an  autonomous  and  commercially  mandated  state  enterprise,  EdL  has  the  following  mission:  
• Ensure   sufficient  and  consistently   reliable  power   to   consumers   throughout   the   country  at   the  
most  economical  cost.  
• Promote  and  develop  sources  of  power   supply  giving  utmost  consideration   to  preservation  of  
environment  and  welfare  of  society.  
• Support  the  Party  and  government  policies  on  industrialization  and  modernization  by  becoming  






Figure  7:  EdL  organizational  structure  





Lao	  Holding	  State	  Enterprise	  (LHSE)	  
Lao  Holding   State  Enterprise   (LHSE)   is   established   in  2005  by   the  Ministry  of   Finance   (MoF)   (Decision  
0453/MF  of  2005).  In  the  same  year  MoF  nominated  the  Board  of  Directors  of  LHSE  (Decision  0454/MF  
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of  2005).  It  is  a  100%  state-­‐owned  enterprise  established  as  a  business  company  in  conformity  with  the  
Business  Law  and  the  Prime  Minister’s  Decree.  LHSE   is   invested  solely  by  the  Government  of  Lao  PDR  
(GoL)  represented  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance  (MoF).    
  
LHSE’s   vision   is   to   promote   efficient   investment,   profit   generation,   credibility,   capacity   building   and  
transparency  in  the  management  of  revenue  and  expenditure.    
  
LHSE’s  primary  function   is  to  hold,  manage  and  maintain  on  behalf  of  the  GoL  shares   in  Nam  Theun  2  
Power   Company   (NTPC)   and   any   other   power   project   companies   which   are   acquired   by   LHSE   or  
transferred  to  it  by  the  GoL  in  an  efficient  and  business-­‐like  manner.      
  
  
Figure  8:  LHSE  organizational  chart  
Source:  LHSE  website  (http://www.laoholding.com/structure.htm)  
  
Mapping	  of	  the	  decision-­making	  landscapes	  
Linking  the   institutional  analysis  with  the  policy  review,  we  discovered  some  overlapping  between  the  
different   government   agencies   in   terms   of   their   decision-­‐making   role   as   well   as   their   tasks   and  
responsibilities.    
  
The   Lao   power   sector   organizational   chart   highlights   the   important   role   of   both  WREA   and  NLMA   in  
shaping   the   overall   land-­‐water-­‐environment   management   within   the   context   of   hydropower  
development   and   livelihood   options.   Referring   to   policy   cluster   3   on   water   resources   management,  
policy  cluster  4  on  environmental  protection,  and  policy  cluster  6  on  resettlement  and  compensation,  
GoL   assigned   WREA   as   the   responsible   government   agency   in   these   three   policy   areas.   Similarly,  
referring   to   the   policy   cluster   5   on   land   management   and   policy   cluster   6   (with   regard   to   land  
concession),  NLMA  is  responsible  for  the  overall   land  management  beyond  the  context  of  hydropower  
development.   In  practice,  however,  both  WREA  and  NLMA  lack  decision-­‐making  authority  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  the  
more  prominent  sector  ministries  in  charge  in  directing  the  sector’s  development.  The  way  WREA’s  and  
NLMA’s  organizational  roles  are  formally  set  up  to  formulate  policies,  strategies,  legislations  as  well  as  to  
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coordinate,   advise   other   government   agencies   on   land-­‐water-­‐environment   management   reflects   the  
overall  attempt  to  promote   integrated   land-­‐water-­‐environment  management.  Yet,   the  way  WREA  and  
NLMA  are  positioned  as  a  regulatory  body  does  not  comply  with  the  existing  sectoral  decision-­‐making  
landscapes  in  hydropower  development.  At  present  hydropower  development  is  governed  primarily  by  
the  MEM  in  close  connection  with  those  representing  the  financial  decision-­‐making  set  up  like  EdL,  MoF,  
and   MPI.   As   part   of   the   country’s   development   strategy   to   increase   economic   growth   and   reduce  
poverty,  hydropower  development  is  directed  following  mainly  its  sectoral  development  perspective  to  
promote  energy  supply  for  both  domestic  use  and  as  a  means  for  export  revenue,  rather  than  from  the  
broader   perspective   of   land-­‐water-­‐environment   management.   Hence,   while   NLMA   was   formally  
responsible   to   issue   land   concession,   land   concession   agreement   in   hydropower   development   was  
negotiated  and  arranged  primarily  through  MEM  with  direct  connection  to  private  sector  actors.    
  
In  the  context  of  hydropower  development,  inter-­‐ministerial  or  cross-­‐sectoral  coordination  is  limited  to  
formal   incorporation  of  WREA  and  NLMA   into  hydropower  decision-­‐making  processes   concerning   the  
approval  of   individual  hydropower  project.  The  different  stages   in  hydropower  development  project   is  
described  and  discussed  in  the  next  section.    
  
2.3.	   Operational	   decision-­making	   set-­up	   and	   procedure	   of	   hydropower	  
development	  projects	  	  	  
This   section   describes   and   discusses   the   operational   decision-­‐making   set   up   and   procedures   of  
hydropower  projects  in  Lao  PDR.    
  
The  procedures  can  be  summarized  as  follow:  
• The  signing  of  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  (MoU)  between  private  investor  and  the  MPI  
to  conduct  feasibility  study.  
• Proceed  with  feasibility  study  with  private  investor  as  the  lead  actor.  
• Presentation  of  feasibility  study  results  to  DEPD  at  MEM.  
• Negotiation  of  Concession  Agreement  (CA)  between  private  investor  and  the  GoL  led  by  MEM.  
• Parallel   to   this   private   investor   submit   Environmental   Impact   Assessment   (EIA)   report   for  
approval  to  WREA.  
• Negotiation  of  Power  Purchase  Agreement  (PPA)  between  private  investor  and  power  purchaser  
(following  the  signing  of  the  CA  and  EIA  approval).  
• After   the   signing   of   PPA,   private   investor   will   start   with   necessary   preparation   for   dam  
construction  both  technically  and  socially  (regarding  resettlement,  compensation).  
  
Following  the  signing  of  the  MoU,  private  investor  will  proceed  with  feasibility  study.  The  investor  had  
all  the  freedom  to  select  people  to  be  part  of   its  team  to  conduct  the  feasibility  study.  Once  finalized,  
the   investor  would  present   the   study’s   results   to  DEPD/MEM  and   inform   them  about  whether  or  not  
they  would  like  to  proceed  with  the  project.  In  the  case  of  THXP,  the  company  signed  the  MoU  with  MPI.  





The   investor’s   decision   to   proceed   with   hydropower   development   project   is   based   on   the   predicted  
economic  costs  and  benefits  of  the  project.  This  highlights  the  economic  rationale  behind  hydropower  
development  that  is  strongly  rooted  in  the  company’s  interest  to  generate  profits.  In  this  context  project  
feasibility  means  economic   feasibility.   This   is   unlike  how  general   public   perceive   feasibility   study   as   a  
general   overview   of   the   proposed   development   not   only   in   terms   of   its   economic   benefits,   but   also  
linked  to  its  environmental/social  impacts.    
  
Once  the  company  decided  to  invest  and  proceed  with  hydropower  project,  the  next  step  is  to  negotiate  
the  Concession  Agreement  (CA)  often  called  Project  Development  Agreement  (PDA)  in  hydropower  with  
the   GoL,   which   is   usually   represented   by   different   national   ministries   led   by   the   DEPD/MEM.   This  
negotiation  concerns  mainly  commercial  issue  such  as  percentage  of  tax  that  the  company  is  expected  
to  pay  to  the  government  and  royalty  fee.  Once  finalized,  the  CA  will  be  signed  by  the  power  company  
and   DEPD/MEM.   Important   to   note   here   is   the   way   the   government   shaped   the   CA   negotiation   on  
project-­‐by-­‐project  basis.   In  other  words,   there   is  no  standard  percentage  applied.   Ideally,  government  
should   set   a   standard   range   with   regard   to   percentage   of   tax   that   a   company   is   expected   to   pay.  
Similarly,   the   content   of   the   CA   is   not   standardized,   depending   mainly   on   the   private   company’s  
negotiation  skills.  This  situation  highlights  how  the  CA  negotiation  can  be  used  by  private  company  as  its  
entry  point  in  (re)shaping  rules  and  procedures  in  hydropower  project  development.      
  
Parallel  with   the   CA   negotiation,   the   company   had   to   submit   an   EIA   for   approval   by  WREA   before   it  
could  proceed  with  hydropower  development.  DESIA/WREA  would  review  the  submitted  EIA.  Based  on  
this   review  WREA  would   decide   to   either   approve   it   or   requesting   the   company   to   come  with  more  
information  and  explanation.  In  theory,  WREA’s  authority  to  approve  the  EIA  could  be  used  as  a  means  
to  balance  the  environmental  and  economic  aspects  in  hydropower  development.  In  practice,  however,    
WREA   has   far   less   bureaucratic   power   than  MEM.   Hence,  WREA   could   not   openly   challenge  MEM’s  
development   interests   in   terms   of   rejecting   or   even   critically   reviewing   the   submitted   EIA,   not   to  
mention  the  issue  of  lack  of  capacity  that  is  prominent  within  WREA.  
  
After   the  CA   is   signed  and   the  EIA   is   approved,   the  company  will   start  with   the  negotiation  of  power  
purchase  agreement  (PPA)  with  the  power  purchaser  (EGAT  or  EVN).  As  DEPD/MEM  does  not  facilitate  
this   negotiation   the   current   situation   to   have   project-­‐by-­‐project   based   PPA   negotiation  works   in   the  
power  purchaser’s  advantage.  For  instance,  EGAT  will  look  at  company  that  can  sell  the  electricity  with  
the   cheapest   price   and   it  will   use   this   price   as   its   point   of   reference   to   bargain/negotiate  with   other  
companies   as   regard   the   cost   of   their   electricity   sale.   Currently,   the   situation   is   slightly   improved  
because   the   Thai   Ministry   of   Energy   starts   to   formulate   and   apply   regulation   that   define   standard  
electricity  tariff  to  be  followed  by  EGAT.  The  way  PPA  is  negotiated  on  project-­‐by-­‐project  basis  does  not  
only  put  the  power  companies  in  disadvantaged  position,  but  it  also  highlights  DEPD/MEM’s  inability  to  
set  up  a   floor  price   for  electricity  export.  Possibly,  DEPD’s   lack  of   interest   to  mediate  with  EGAT  as  to  
ensure  better   tariff  price   for   the  power  company   relate   to   its   inability   to  access  government   revenue  
from  hydropower  generation   (in   the   form  of   state   tax)  as   this   revenue   is  managed  by   the  Ministry  of  
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Finance   (MoF).  Hypothetically,  DEPD  would  not  be   interested   to   increase   state   revenue   if   it   lacks   the  
authority  to  manage  the  revenue  redistribution.  
  
Following   the   PPA,   the   company   will   proceed   with   hydropower   project   construction   and   make   the  
necessary  preparations   (both  technically  and  socially)   to  meet   the  defined  commercial  operation  date  
(COD).  During  project  implementation,  the  company  will  interact  with  provincial  and  district  authorities,  
especially  concerning  resettlement.  In  THXP,  the  Social  and  Environmental  Division  (SED)  deals  with  the  
issue   of   resettlement   such   as   formulating   resettlement   plan,   setting   up   grievance   procedure   and  
compensation  mechanism  as  well  as  monitoring  the  overall  progress  of   the  resettlement  process.  The  
project  would  have   to  conduct   stakeholder  consultation   to   inform  all   stakeholders  about   the  planned  
hydropower   development.   Theoretically,   provincial   and   district   authorities   should   be   part   of   this  
consultation  process.  In  practice,  provincial/district  government  would  mainly  send  their  junior  staff  at  
this   stage.   This   staff   cannot  make   any  decision  on  behalf   of   their   government,   so   in  most   cases   they  
would  remain  silent  during  consultation.  In  turn,  the  company  does  not  have  any  choice  except  to  view  
this  silence  as  a  sign  of  acceptance/agreement.  This  situation  could   lead  to  potential  conflict  once  the  
company   started   with   the   dam   construction.   When   concrete   activity   took   place   on   the   ground,  
provincial  government  will  try  to  address  people’s  concerns  by  reinitiating  the  negotiation  process  with  
the   power   company.   For   THXP,   for   instance,   they   have   to   adjust   their   resettlement   plan   because   a  
special   district  was   just   created  and   the  district   government  prefers   to   keep   the  existing   four   villages  
that  were  supposed  to  be  resettled  elsewhere  intact.  
  
When  everything  is  approved  at  the  national  level,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  national  ministries  will  
automatically   endorse   their   decision   to   provincial/district   level   government.   Even   when   everything  
seems  to  be  agreed  beforehand,  at  the  implementation  phase,  the  power  company  still  has  to  negotiate  
with  provincial  and  district  government  about  the  whole  issue  concerning  resettlement,  compensation,  
and   other   thing   before   they   can   actually   start   with   dam   construction.   In   the   context   of   hydropower  
development,  the  power  company  (private  investor)  becomes  the  medium  that  links  but  not  necessarily  
fine   tune   the   policy/regulatory   discrepancy   between   national   and   provincial   level.   Private  
investor/power   company   becomes   fully   entitled   to   shape   the   actual   implementation   of   hydropower  
project  in  accordance  to  their  economic  interests,  as  long  as  it  can  suffice  national  and  provincial/district  
governments’  request/procedure.  	  
  
The   inconsistency   between   national   and   provincial/district   government’s   position   on   hydropower  
development  procedure  occur  due  to  the  absence  of  a  connected  multi-­‐level  regulatory  system  in  the  
sector   development.   This   highlights   the   state   of   legal   pluralism   in   the   overall   shaping   of   hydropower  
development   (decision   making),   not   only   in   the   formulation   of   its   legal   frameworks,   but   also   in   the  
application  of  project  procedures  (negotiation  on  CA,  EIA).    
  









Figure  9:  Overview  of  hydropower  decision-­‐making  procedures  
Source:  MEM  (2009)  
  
  
3. CAMBODIA	  COUNTRY	  REPORT	  	  
  
3.1.Review	  of	  policy	  and	  legal	  frameworks	  
Several   policies   and   strategies   which   are   described   in   this   section   contribute   to   the   overall  
developmental   framework   in   Cambodia.   These   are   essentially   multi-­‐sectoral   and   cross-­‐sectoral   in  
nature.  These  together  then  form  the  framework  within  which  sectoral  ministries/departments  develop  




General	  policy	    
The	  Rectangular	  Strategy	  for	  Growth,	  Employment,	  Equity	  and	  Efficiency	  2003-­‐2008	  
The  Rectangular   Strategy   for  Growth,   Employment,   Equity   and  Efficiency  was   adopted   in   2004  as   the  
overall   framework   for   Cambodia's   socio-­‐economic   development.   Founded   on   principles   of   good  
governance,  peace,  political  stability,  social  order,  macroeconomic  stability,  partnership  and  economic  
integration,  the  Rectangular  Strategy  focuses  on  critical  development  issues  such  as  the  enhancement  of  
the   agricultural   sector,   rehabilitation   and   construction   of   physical   infrastructure,   private   sector  
development   and   employment   generation   and   capacity   and   human   resource   development.  
  
  
Figure  10:  Rectangular  Strategy  for  Growth,  Employment,  Equity  and  Efficiency  
Source:  Rectangular  Strategy  for  Growth,  Employment,  Equity  and  Efficiency.  Phase  II.  
  
As  suggested  in  Figure  10  above  that  sets  out  diagrammatically  the  Rectangular  Strategy,  achieving  good  
governance   is   at   the   core   of   the   strategy,   as   a   prerequisite   to   sustainable   development.   Good  
governance  covers  four  cross-­‐cutting  areas  of  reform:  1)  anti-­‐corruption,  2)  legal  and  judicial  reform,  3)  
public   administration   reform   including   decentralization   and   deconcentration,   and   4)   reform   of   the  
armed  forces,  especially  demobilization.  	  
The  Strategy  also  revolves  around  four  priority  programme  areas  based  on  this  foundation:  
• Enhancement  of  the  agriculture  sector;  
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• Further  rehabilitation  and  construction  of  physical  infrastructure;  
• Private  sector  development  and  employment  generation;  and  
• Capacity  building  and  human  resource  development.  
 
	  
The	  National	  Strategic	  Development	  Plan	  2006-­‐2010	  
The  Rectangular  Strategy  is  operationalized  by  the  National  Strategic  Development  Plan  (NSDP)  which  is  
also  the  country’s  poverty  reduction  strategy.  The  NSDP  was  initially  designed  for  the  period  2006-­‐2010,  
but  has  now  been  updated  to  2013  to  align  with  the  term  of  the  Fourth  Legislature  and  to  deal  more  
explicitly   with   the   impacts   of   the   global   economic   crisis.   The   NSDP   is   subtitled:   “For   Growth,  
Employment,   Equity   and  Efficiency   to  Reach  Cambodia  Millennium  Development  Goals”.  As   such,   the  
NSDP  is  entirely  focused  on  achieving  the  Cambodian  Millennium  Development  Goals  (CMDGs),  and  30  
out  of  its  46  key  targets  are  CMDG  key  targets,  addressing  each  of  the  nine  goals.  The  NSDP  states  that  
poverty   reduction   “in   the   fastest   possible   manner”   is   the   Government’s   foremost   priority.   It   does,  
however,  also  note   that   the  achievement  of  poverty   reduction  targets  and  other  CMDG  targets   is  not  
possible   without   addressing   other   goals   and   processes   that   are   not   explicitly   part   of   the   CMDG  
framework.   These   include   political   and   social   stability,   rule   of   law,   critical   reforms   in   public  
administration,   infrastructure  development,  and  balanced  and  equitable  macro-­‐economic  growth.  The  
existing  three-­‐year  rolling  Public  Investment  Programme  (PIP)  mechanism  will  be  used  to  identify,  plan,  
phase  and  cost  estimate  specific  activities  every  year   for   the  next   three  years.  PIPs   therefore   form  an  
integral   part   of   the   NSDP.   The   National   Development   Plans   (NDPs)   developed   under   the   NSDP   have  
been  criticized   for  having   too  great  a  preoccupation  with  economic  growth,  with   little  opportunity   to  
integrate  the  environmental  action  plans  into  the  NDP  process  (SEI,  2002).    
  
The	  National	  Program	  for	  Sub-­‐National	  Democratic	  Development	  2010-­‐2019	  (NP-­‐SNDD)	  	  
This  National  Program  is  the  government’s  agenda  for  the  next  10  years   in  the  comprehensive  and  in-­‐
depth   governance   reform   process   with   respect   to   the   sub-­‐national   administrational   framework.   The  
formulation  of  the  NP-­‐SNDD  reflects  the  vision,  policies  and  strategies  outlined  in  the  Decentralization  
and  Deconcentration  Strategic  Framework  and  the  Law  on  the  Administrative  Management  of  Capital,  
Provinces,  Municipalities,  Districts  and  Khans  (Organic  Law)  of  2008.    
  
The  NP-­‐SNDD  also  links  into  the  Rectangular  Strategy  whose  core  focus  is  good  governance.  The  strategy  
aims  to  create  a  governance  system  at  sub-­‐national  levels  based  on  the  principles  of  strengthening  local  
democracy,   promoting   community   development,   and   reducing   poverty.   The   government’s   longterm  
decentralization  and  deconcentration  reform  objective  is  to  broaden  sustainable  development  and  lay  a  
strong  foundation  for  economic  growth,  provide  equitable  opportunity   for  all  citizens  to  participate   in  
community   development,   promote   sustainable   environmental   and   natural   resource   management,  
improve   public   service   delivery   in   response   to   people’s   needs   and   alleviate   poverty   with   a   special  
emphasis  on  vulnerable  groups  such  as  ethnic  minorities,  women  and  children.  Consequent  to  its  link  to  
the   Rectangular   Strategy,   the   NP-­‐SNDD   also   contributes   to   the   NSDP   given   that   good   governance   is  
identified  as  a  core  pillar  of  the  NSDP  in  respect  to  the  MDGs  and  poverty  alleviation.  
  
The  government’s  goals  for  sub-­‐national  democratic  development  are  to:  
• Create  a  culture  of  local  participatory  democracy,  accountable  to  the  citizens;  
• Improve  public  services  and  infrastructures;  
• Bring  about  social  and  economic  development,  and  




The  reform  of  the  sub-­‐national  governance  system  shall  aim  to:  1)  consolidate  and  deepen  the  process  
of  democratization  at   the  grass   roots,   and  2)  promote   local   development  and  poverty   reduction.   The  
reform  shall  be  guided  by  the  following  principles:3    
• Democratic	  Representation:   Strengthen   local   councils  which  are  democratically  elected   (either  
directly  or  indirectly)  and  expand  their  powers,  responsibilities  and  resources.    
• Popular	  Participation:   Introduce  systems  and  procedures  for  people’s  participation  in  decision-­‐
making  at  all  levels  of  the  sub-­‐national  governance  system.  
• Public	  Sector	  Accountability:  Strengthen  the  accountability  of  public  administration  at  all   levels  
and  facilitate  people’s  oversight  of  the  administrative  and  financial  performance.  
• Effectiveness:  Bring  providers  of  services  closer  to  the  users  and  allow  users  to  participate  in  the  
planning   and   monitoring   of   public   services   delivery   in   order   to   make   availability   of   public  
services  responsive  to  local  needs  and  priorities.    
• Efficiency:   Improve   the   administrative   system,   coordination,   and  management   capacity   of   the  
sub-­‐national  governance  system  to  improve  quality  and  access  to  public  services  at  all  levels.    
• Poverty	   Focus:   Enhance   the   capacity   of   integrated   territorial   authorities   at   all   levels   to   better  
target  public  expenditures  to  eradicate  poverty  by  focusing  on  vulnerable  groups  and  to  achieve  
Cambodia's  Millennium  Development  Goals.  
  
Energy	  
Cambodia’s  energy  needs  were  met  primarily  through  diesel  and  heavy  fuels  which  kept  tariffs  high  and  
stifled  economic  progress,  and  despite  the  relative  normalisation  of  the  security  situation  and  entry  of  
many  donors,  Cambodia  continues   to  experience  a  severe  energy  supply  deficit.  The  country’s  energy  
supply  system  is  characterized  as  a  highly  fragmented  electric  power  network  supplied  mainly  by  diesel  
generators.   The   system  provides  power   to  only   about   15%  of   households   of  which   about   75%   live   in  
Phnom   Penh   and   other   provincial   towns,   leaving      the   vast   majority   of   Cambodia’s   rural   population  
unserved  by  a  grid.  There  is  no  national  grid  linking  the  cities  and  secondary  towns  and  the  high  cost  of  
imported  diesel  makes  the  cost  of  electricity  in  Cambodia  the  highest  in  the  GMS  (King  et  al.  2007).  In  
areas  where  there  is  no  grid,  small-­‐scale  rural  electricity  enterprises  provide  electricity  to  between  400  
and  600  rural  communities  (Ryder.  2009).  
  
By  2020  it  is  estimated  that  Cambodia’s  peak  electricity  demand  will  increase  almost  five-­‐fold  from  212  
MW  in  2002  to  991  MW,  and  total  demand  will   increase  from  an  estimated  808  MW  in  2008  to  3,867  
MW.   Cambodia’s   existing   electricity   generation,   transmission   and   distribution   system   is   incapable   of  
meeting   this   demand.   Currently,   diesel   generators   using   imported   fuel   oil   meet   the   peak   electricity  
demand   of   approximately   400   MW,   with   only   three   per   cent   generated   by   hydropower   facilities.   A  
review  of   the  hydropower   sector   in  2003  by   the  Ministry  of  Mines  and  Energy   (MIME)  estimated   the  
total  hydropower  potential  in  Cambodia  to  be  around  10,000  MW,  of  which  50%  to  be  on  the  Mekong  
mainstream.   The   study   also   identified   fourteen   priority   projects   (Middleton   2008).   In   addition   to   the  
deficit   in  power  distribution  and  lack  of  a  national  grid  system  for  distribution,  the  costs  of  generating  
and  supplying  electricity  are  among  the  highest   in  the  world,  while  the  rate  of  electrification   is  one  of  
the  lowest  in  Asia.  The  high  costs  are  attributed  to  the  heavy  reliance  on  imported  fuels  which  exposes  
the  sector  to  the  fluctuations  in  international  fuel  prices  (Middleton  2008,  Ministry  of  Planning  2011).  
  
At  policy   level,  rapid  hydropower  development   is  seen  as  having  the  potential   to  promote  sustainable  
development  and  poverty   reduction  by  providing   renewable  power  as  well  as  potentially   contributing  
                                                                                                                        
3  NCDD  website:  http://www.ncdd.gov.kh/en/dnd-­‐basic-­‐principles-­‐menu  
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greatly   to   revenue  streams   for   the  government   (King  et  al.  2007,  Middleton  2008).  The  energy  sector  
and  electricity  network  constitutes  one  dimension  of  the  Rectangular  Strategy  for  Growth  Phase  II  which  
promotes   private   sector   participation   in   electricity   production   and   distribution.   However,   securing  
access  to  reliable,  cheap  electricity  to  supply  Cambodia’s  expanding  economy  remains  a  key  challenge  
faced   by   the   Cambodian   Government.   Thus   Cambodiaʼs   National   Development   Policy   (2003   to   2008)  
stresses  the  need  for  low-­‐cost  electricity  to  attract  investment  and  reduce  poverty  in  rural  areas,  where  
the  vast  majority  of  Cambodians  live,  and    the  Power  System  Development  Plan  (2007-­‐  2022)  identifies  a  
three-­‐pronged  strategy:  
  
• Working  towards  reduced  reliance  on  costly  diesel-­‐fueled  electricity  generation    
• Importation  of  low-­‐cost  electricity  from  Thailand,  Vietnam,  and  Laos  
• Extensive  development  of  Cambodia’s  domestic  hydropower  generation  capacity,  together  with  
a  thermal  generation  plant  (coal  or  gas)  to  be  located  in  Sihanoukville    
  
More   than   half   the   planned   new  energy   capacity   is   to   be   obtained   from   large   hydropower   dams,   by  
tripling  hydropower  output  over  the  next  several  years.  MIME  has  prioritized  between  14  and  17  large  
hydropower   projects   for   development   between   2010   and   2020   to   produce   1,850   megawatts   at   an  
estimated  cost  of  $3.2  billion  dollars.4  The  second  largest  proposed  hydro  project  is  the  Lower  Sesan  2  
project  with  an  installed  capacity  of  420  MW  (Ryder.  2009).  The  focus  on  domestic  hydropower  is  also  
attributed  to  the  uncertainty  linked  to  dependence  on  power  supplies  from  Thailand  and  Vietnam  and  
the   cost   of   other   sources   such   as   diesel   (Mr.Theng   Tara,5   personal   communication,   2011).   Rural  
electricity  coverage  is  to  increase  to  70  per  cent  by  2030  via  Rural  Electricity  Enterprises.  
  
This   proposed   large-­‐scale   hydropower   development   program,   is   likely   to   be   implemented   mainly   in  
cooperation  with  Chinese  construction  companies  funded  by  Chinese  banks  as  the  Government  intends  
to   accord   high   priority   to   encourage   the   private   sector   to   invest   in   energy   infrastructure,   including  
generation,   transmission   and   distribution.6   Concurrently,   the   regional   integration   of   power   is   also  
envisioned  through  a  network  of  high  voltage  transmission  lines  through  the  Asian  Development  Bank’s  
Greater   Mekong   Subregion   (GMS)   program.   Regional   transmission   lines   will   at   first   enable   power  
imports   into   Cambodia   from   Vietnam,   Laos   and   Thailand.   As   Cambodia   develops   its   hydropower  
potential  it  is  envisioned  that  Cambodia  will  become  a  net  exporter  of  electricity.    
  
Parallel   to   the   government’s   emphasis   on   large   scale   domestic   hydropower   dams,   it   also   adopted   a  
Renewable   Energy  Action  Plan   (REAP)   in   2003  with   support   from   the  World  Bank.   The  Plan  proposes  
small-­‐scale,   decentralized   generation   of   electricity   for   rural   communities,   advocating   the   use   of  
renewable   technologies   including   solar,   micro-­‐hydro   and   biomass   for   more   remote   villages,   and  
promoting   the   role   of   private   sector   Rural   Electricity   Enterprises   to   catalyze   the   spread   of   electricity  
generation  technologies.  Whilst  the  REAP  faces  some  challenges  such  as  a  limited  number  of  bankable  
projects  under  Cambodia’s  current  financial  sector  conditions,  overall  the  plan  offers  a  more  sustainable  
approach   to   providing   electric   services.   Cambodia’s   limited   investment   to   date   in   expensive  
                                                                                                                        
4  The  NGO  Forum  website:  http://www.ngoforum.org.kh/eng/core/hcrp_background.php  
5  Deputy  Director,  General  Technical  Affairs,  Department  of  Water  Resources  Management  and  Conservation,  MOWRAM.  
Interviewed  on  14th  February,  2011,  Phnom  Penh.  
6 Hun  Sen    Address   by   on  “Rectangular  Strategy”  for  Growth,  Employment,  Equity  and  Efficiency  Phase  II  First  Cabinet  




transmission   infrastructure   and   associated   equipment   offers   an   opportunity   to   pursue   innovative  
electrification  options  that  are  not  available  to  other  countries  that  have  already  invested  in  a  grid.    
  
The   apparent  move   away   by   the   Cambodian   government   from  multilateral   donors   such   as   the   Asian  
Development  Bank  and  the  World  Bank  as  sources  of  funding  for  hydropower  projects,  to  the  Chinese  
and  Vietnamese  government-­‐backed  investors  appears  to  present  some  concerns  from  the  perspective  
of  social,  environmental  and  developmental  consequences  of  large  scale  hydropower  development.  This  
is   despite   the   fact   that   the   rectangular   Strategy  Phase   II   recognizes   the   importance  of   evaluating   the  
economic   benefits   of   hydropower   in   light   of   environmental   and   social   impacts.   While   the   internal  
policies  of  the  multilateral  banks  have  evolved  to  take  serious  stock  of  social  and  environmental  costs,  
the   degree   to  which   these   issues  will   be   evaluated   and   addressed   in   the   government’s   dealings  with  
private   companies   remains   an   open   question   at   best   given   the   adverse   views   already   arising   from  
especially  the  non-­‐governmental  observers  (Baird  2009,  interviews  with  The  NGO  Forum  on  Cambodia,  
CEPA,  WWF).  As  noted  by  Hirsch   (2010),  China’s  dam  building  activities  are   commercial,  but   it   is   also  
part  of  that  country’s  rapidly  growing  political  influence  and  developmental  role  through  investment,  aid  
and  trade  relationships  with  Lao  PDR  and  Cambodia  in  particular.  The  fact  that  these  corporate  investors  
are  state-­‐owned,  with  politically  well-­‐connected  leadership  within  China,  links  the  commercial  aspect  of  
hydropower   investment   even   more   closely   to   China’s   geopolitical   role.   From   the   point   of   view   of  
regional   governments,   the   reduced   need   to   go   through   the   hoops   of   safeguard   policies   of   the  
multilateral  lenders  is  experienced  as  a  greater  independence,  but  one  that  partly  reverses  the  hitherto  
increasingly  process-­‐oriented  post-­‐World  Commission  on  Dams  (WSD)  approach  to  planning.    
  
Water	  resources	  management	  	  	  
Another   side   of   the   second   Growth   Rectangle   addresses   Water   Resources   and   Irrigation   System  
Management.   It   commits   the  government   to   “protect,  manage  and  assure   sustainable  exploitation  of  
both   fresh   water   and  marine   resources   while   enhancing   biodiversity   and   sustainability   for   equitable  
benefit  to  the  public.”  Water  is  also  given  high  priority  as  a  means  to  achieve  development  goals  whilst  
also   ensuring   its   sustainable   use   under   the   Strategy   for   Agriculture   and  Water   Resources   2006–2010  
(SAW),  the  overarching  framework  for  government  and  development  partner  efforts  in  agriculture  and  
rural  development  adopted  by  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Forests  and  Fisheries  (MAFF)  and  the  Ministry  
of  Water  Resources  and  Meteorology  (MOWRAM).  
  
Since  MOWRAM’s  establishment  in  1999,  a  number  of  policies  on  water  management  have  been  issued.  
Notably,  Prakas	  Declaration  306   in  2000  which  provides  a   framework   for   the  development  of   Farmer  
Water   User   Committees   (FWUC);  National	  Water	   Resources	   Policy	   (2004);  MOWRAM	   Strategy	   2006–
2010;  and  the  Law	  on	  Water	  Resources	  (2007).  These  policies  have  been  guided  by  and  are  meant  to  be  
implemented   according   to   national   development   plans   including   the   Government’s   Rectangular  
Strategy,   2003–2008;   the   National   Strategic   Development   Plan   (NSDP),   2006–2010;   the   Poverty  
Reduction  Strategy;  the  Strategic  Plan  on  Water  Resources  Management  and  Development,  2005–2008;  
the  National  Biodiversity  Strategy  and  Action;  and  the  Water  Law,  approved  by  the  National  Assembly  in  
2007.   These   policy   documents   stress   irrigation   development   and   extend   water   management   to   also  
include   promotion   of   agricultural   production   and   rural   economy   to   achieve   government   targets   of  







The	  National	  Water	  Resources	  Policy,	  2004	  
This  policy  calls  for  river  basin  management  and  development,  including  river  basin  plans,  and  a  focus  on  
priority  river  basins  and  aquifers,  although   it  does  not   indicate  an   institutional  structure  to  do  so.  The  
policy  also  calls  for  a  “national  water  resources  plan”  which  so  far  has  not  been  prepared.  
  
The	  MOWRAM	  Strategic	  Development	  Plan	  2006-­‐2010	  
MOWRAM  has  formulated  its  own,  related   'Rectangular	  strategy	  on	  water	  resources	  and	  meteorology'	  
in  support  of  the  national  Rectangular  Strategy.  This   is  basically  a  plan  for  MOWRAM,  with  a  focus  on  
irrigation  and  flood  and  drought  control,  rather  than  a  multi-­‐sector  management  framework  that  deals  
with   broader   IWRM   issues.   However,   it   does   endorse   the   IWRM   in   principle.   An   updated   version   for  
2009-­‐2013  is  being  finalized.  
	  
The	  Law	  on	  Water	  Resources	  Management,	  2007	  
Article  4  of  the  Law  states  that:  “Water	  and	  water	  resources	  shall	  be	  managed	  and	  developed	  based	  on	  
an	  integrated	  water	  resources	  management	  (IWRM)	  approach.	  The	  IWRM	  shall	  take	  into	  account	  (1)	  all	  
aspects	  of	  water	  resources,	  (2)	  linkages	  between	  water	  resources	  and	  other	  components	  of	  the	  natural	  
environment,	   and	   (3)	   requirements	   for	   an	   effective	   and	   sustainable	   water	   use	   for	   human	   beings,	  
environment	  and	  other	  sectors.	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  IWRM	  shall	  be	  carried	  out	  jointly	  and	  within	  a	  
cooperation	   framework	   of	   all	   relevant	   agencies”.	   However,   the   Law   is   not   explicit   on   river   basin  
management,  or  on  river  basin  organizations/committees,  as  an   integral  part  of   IWRM.  Consequently,  
the  Law  falls  short  of  establishing  an  institutional  framework  capable  of  operationalising  IWRM.  
  
A  challenge  of  very  significant  proportions  recognised  in  the  NSDP  is  the  country's  capacities  to  adapt  to  
the   reduction   in   the   fluctuations  of  water   levels   in   the  major   rivers  between  wet  and  dry   seasons,  as  
well  as  possible  increases  in  water  pollution,  that  are  likely  to  result  from  upstream  countries  controlling  
the   flow   through   hydroelectric   dams   and   diversions   for   irrigation.   The  NSDP   acknowledges   that   such  
changes   will   “alter   and   adversely   affect   the   entire   eco-­‐system   in   Cambodia   and   will   have   serious  
implications  for  its  crops  and  fisheries”.  
  
Environmental	  protection	  	  
Approximately   three-­‐quarters   of   the   population   are   directly   engaged   in   agriculture   and  depend  upon  
the   land   for   their   daily   subsistence.   Agriculture   and   forestry   contribute   nearly   40  percent  of   the  
country’s  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP).7  Tourism,  which  is  based  on  the  country’s  cultural  and  natural  
features,   also   contributes   significantly   to   economic   development.   Reliance  on   these   industries  means  
that   sustainable  management  of  natural   resources  and  other  aspects  of   the  environment  are  vital   for  
improving  rural   livelihoods  and   for  economic  growth.  Ensuring  environmental   sustainability,  especially  
through  sustainable  management  and  use  of  natural  resources  is  one  of  four  fundamental  principles  of  
the  Rectangular   Strategy   (Phase   II).   This   is   reiterated   in   the  NSDP  which   calls   for   the   “protection  and  
conservation   of   the   unique   bio-­‐diversity   and   eco-­‐system   that   Cambodia   is   blessed   with   and   the  
sustainable  use  of  this  natural  resource  for  the  benefit  of  all  Cambodians  and  for  the  response  to  climate  
change  is  a  high  priority.”    
  
The  government’s  environmental  protection  and  natural   resources  management  efforts  are  guided  by  
the  following  principles:    





• Recognition   of   the   link   between   poverty   alleviation   and   the   environment.   To   safeguard   the  
environment  the  Government  must  increase  economic  opportunities  to  the  rural  poor.  Natural  
resource  degradation   is   in  part  due  to  exploitation  of  basic  needs  by   the  rural  poor.  Reducing  
rural  poverty  is  essential  to  achieving  sustainable  management  of  Cambodia‘s  environment.    
• Recognition   of   the   importance   of   communities   Structured   intervention   to   provided   local  
communities  with   the   skills   to  manage   the   natural   resources   base   on  which   their   livelihoods  
depend  is  the  most  effective  way  of  achieving  sustainable  management  of  these  resources.    
• Recognition   of   the   need   for   institutional   capacity-­‐building.   The   Ministry   of   Environment   and  
other  organizations  lack  the  technical  specialization  to  effectively  protect,  preserve  and  manage  
Cambodia’s  environment.    
• Recognition   of   the   importance   of   an   integrated   approach   to   environmental   planning.  
Environmental   issue   is   cross-­‐sectoral   and   different   institutions   have   responsibility   and  
implement  activities  that  concern  the  environment.  The  Ministry  of  Environment  promotes  an  
integrated   and   multi-­‐disciplinary   approach   to   environmental   management.   These   principles  
serve   as   the   framework   for   addressing   environmental   priorities   identified   by   the  Ministry   of  
Environment.    
  
These   principles   serve   as   the   framework   for   addressing   environmental   priorities   identified   by   the  
Ministry  of  Environment.    
  
Many  of  the  actions  taken  by  the  government  to  protect  the  environment  and  manage  environmental  
impacts   are   to   be   integrated  with   investment   and   policy   priorities   in   other   sectors.   The   government  
intends,  over  the  medium  term,  to  prepare  and  implement  routine  monitoring  of  the  implementation  of  
all  public  investment  projects  in  order  to  ensure  that  their  implementation  is  environmentally  sound  and  
with  a  view  to  strengthening  the  link  between  development  planning  and  environmental  protection.  
  
Forestry	  	  
The   set   of   national   goals   of   environmental   protection,   biodiversity   conservation,   poverty   reduction,  
socio-­‐economic  development,  and  good  governance  provide  the  overall  development  framework  for  the  
conservation  and  management  of  the  country’s  forest  resources.  As  such,  the  government  considers  the  
ecologically,   socially   and   economically   viable   conservation   and  management   of   forest   resources   as   a  
major  pillar  of  public  welfare  directly  contributing  to  environmental  protection,  poverty  reduction  and  
socio-­‐economic  development.8  The  Forestry  Law  of  2002  followed  soon  after  the  Statement  of  the  Royal  
Government  on  National  Forest  Policy  of  the  same  year,  which  designated  Cambodia’s  remaining  forest  
resources  as  a  Permanent  Forest  Estate  to  be  maintained  in  perpetuity.  The  Permanent  Forest  Estate  is  
to   be  managed  with   a   view   to   “maximise   the   social,   economic,   environmental,   and   cultural   heritage  
benefits  for  Cambodia  and  its  people  according  to  the  principle  of  sustainable  forest  management”.9  
  
An   issue   impeding   the   implementation  of   this   vision   is   the   lack  of   a   clear  national   land-­‐use  plan   that  
includes   forests,   all   types   of   concessions,   protected   areas,   community  managed   resources,   and   state  
public   land,   and   clear   boundary   demarcations.   This   currently   leads   to   continual   boundary   conflict  
between  competing   claims   for   the   same  piece  of   land  as   there   is   a   lack  of   coordination  between   the  
various  government  ministries  involved.  (The  NGO  Forum  on  Cambodia.  2010)  
  
                                                                                                                        
8  Preamble,  Statement  of  the  Royal  Government  on  the  National  Forest  Sector  Policy,  2002  




Cambodia’s  inland  fisheries  is  one  of  the  most  productive  on  Earth,  and  supplies  its  people  with  75%  of  
the   animal   protein   in   their   diet.   Cambodia's   Master   Plan   for   Fisheries   2001   to   2011   calls   for   the  
development  of  sustainable  fisheries,  and  for  the  supply  of  fish  and  fishery  products  to  keep  pace  with  
growing  demand.10  The  reduction  of  poverty  among  fishing  communities  is  another  important  priority,  
given   the   large   proportion   of   the   population   engaged   in   fisheries   related   activities.   Therefore   the  
fisheries  sector  has  undergone  major  reforms  towards  a  more  poverty-­‐focused  approach,  expressed  in  
fisheries  policy  statements  and  the  Fisheries  Development  Action  Plan,  2005-­‐2008.  Up  to  2005,  56.46%  
of  fishing  lots  have  been  released  to  communities,  and  more  than  440  community  fisheries  management  
mechanisms  are  in  place  throughout  the  country  (University  of  Gothenburg.  2009).  
  
According   to   the   Fisheries   Sector   Policy   and   Action   Plan,   the   strategic   goals   and   objectives   for   the  
fisheries  sector  are:  
• All  fish  harvests  must  be  sustainable  by  2010  
• Establish  governance  systems  for  sustainable  use  
• Expansion  of  aquaculture  to  ensure  supply  of  fisheries  products  meets  demand  
• Critical  habitats  are  conserved  
  
The  organization  of  fishery  activities  however  does  not  reflect  the   links  between  fisheries  and  poverty  
reduction.   The   fishery   sector   is   organised   around   a   privatised   fishing   lot   system.   Access   to   fishing  
grounds   as   open   access   systems   has   been   restricted,  most   directly   affecting   those  with   the   greatest  
dependency  of  the  fishery  resources  –  the  rural  poor.  The  system  of  commercial  fishing  lots  has  failed  to  
reflect  the  true  value  of  the  fishery  and  consistently  delivered  a  shortfall  in  revenue  to  the  treasury.  The  
lot-­‐system   has   encouraged   short-­‐term   overexploitation   and   created   an   inequitable   division   of   the  
resource,   as   a   handful   of   lot   owners   have   monopolised   the   best   fishing   areas,   excluding   local  
communities.   Weak   governance   has   resulted   in   inefficiency.   Corruption,   illegal   practices   and   lack   of  




Land  reform  in  Cambodia  is  seen  as  key  to  attempts  to  reduce  poverty  in  the  Kingdom.    The  population  
is  predominantly   rural   and  expanding.  Creating  and   safeguarding   secure   livelihoods   for   the   rural  poor  
will   depend   greatly   on   how   key   natural   resources   –   forestry,   fisheries   and   agricultural   land   –   are  
managed.  Thus  the  NSDP  recognises   land  as  the  most  precious  resource  of  Cambodia,  and  states  that  
the   government’s   overarching   policy   is   to   ensure   that   all   land   is   managed,   arranged,   used,   and  
distributed   in   an   equitable,   transparent,   effective,   and   sustainable  manner   in   order   to   contribute   to  
poverty  alleviation,  ensure  food  security,  national  defence,  and  social-­‐economic  development  within  the  
context  of  a  marketing  economy.    
  
In  reality  however,  the  concentration  of  land  ownership  is  prevalent,  adversely  impacting  on  the  equity  
and  efficiency  of   land  use,  while   large  areas  under  economic   land  concessions  have  not  been  utilized  
efficiently.11	   The   Land   policy   of   2009   thus   recognises   the   necessity   of   administering   land   and   natural  
                                                                                                                        
10  The  Strategic  Plan  for  2010–19  has  just  been  approved,  but  no  copy  was  available  at  the  time  of  writing.    




resources   in   a   way   that   is   effective,   productive   and   environmentally   sustainable,   and,   can   alleviate  
poverty.   The   Policy’s   vision   is   “to   administer,   manage,   use   and   distribute   land   in   an   equitable,  
transparent,   efficient,   and   sustainable   manner   in   order   to   contribute   to   achieving   national   goals   of  
poverty   alleviation,   ensuring   food   security,   natural   resources   and   environmental   protection,   national  
defence  and  socio-­‐economic  development  in  the  context  of  market  economy”.  
  
One   of   the   primary   obstacles   to   realizing   these   policy   objectives   is   the   existence   of   several   million  
private  lands  with  unregistered  titles.  This  makes  them  vulnerable  to  social  concessions  and  hydropower  
dams  and  other   large   scale   infrastructure  projects,   and  undermines   their   eligibility   for   compensation.  
The  number  in  2001  was  estimated  at  6-­‐7  million,  and  the  government  has  set  a  period  of  15  years  to  
conduct   land   registration   under   a   land   reform   programme   focusing   on   the   strengthening   of   land  
administration,   land  management,  and  land  distribution.  Significant  progress  has  been  made  in  issuing  
land  titles  with  1,664,297   land  titles   issued  thus   far.  Nevertheless,  sometimes  the  central  government  
agencies  do  not  even  know  the  existence  of  communities  as  they  are  not  represented   in  the   land  use  
maps  which   are   used   for   decision  making   and   allocation   of   land   to   concessions   (Mr.  Mith   Samonn,12  
personal   communication,   2011).   The   granting   of   social   concessions   as   a  means   of   redistributing   land  
ownership   in  fact  has   little  social  content,  and  has  the  opposite  effect  as  they  pass  all  rights  of  access  
and  use   to  private   companies.   In  Stung  Trang  Province   for   instance,   social   concessions  are  mainly   for  
cassava  and  rubber.  A  large  amount  of  timber  also  remains  on  these  lands  which  is  the  real  attraction  
for  the  concession  awardees  (Mr.  Mith  Samonn,13  personal  communication,  2011).  
  
Resettlement	  and	  compensation	  in	  development	  projects	  
Cambodia   does   not   have   a   comprehensive   policy   on   resettlement   and   compensation,   although   some  
policy  statements  have  been  made  in  the  context  of  the  construction  of  roads.  These  do  not  however  
bear   relevance   to  hydroelectricity  projects.  As  a   result,   the  only  direction  on   this   issue   is  provided  by  
Cambodia’s  Constitution  and  the  Land  law  of  2001.  Article  44  of  the  Constitution  provides  that  the  state  
may   expropriate   private   property   “only   in   the   public   interest,   while   the   Land   Law   reiterates   this  
requirement:  “No  person  shall  be  deprived  of  his  ownership,  unless   it   is   in   the  public   interest”(Article  
15).   With   regard   to   when   compensation   should   be   paid,   the   Constitution   and   Land   Law   require  
compensation  be  made  before  people  are  displaced.  Although  the  Constitution  requires  “fair  and   just  
compensation”  for  land  taken  for  public  interests,  this  standard  is  not  defined  either  in  law  or  in  policy.  
  
Direction   on   who   is   entitled   to   compensation   is   clearer,   though   narrowly   defined.   The   determining  
factor  is  the  legality  of  possession  of  the  land  in  question,  and  these  rules  are  set  out  in  the  Land  Law  
which  contains  several  categories  of  possession  that  do  not  amount  to  legal  ownership:    
• Entering  into  possession  of  state  public  land  at  any  time;    
• (ii)  entering  into  possession  of  state  private  land  after  the  cutoff  date,  30  August  2001  when  the  
2001  Land  Law  took  effect;    
• transformation   of   possessory   rights   to   state   private   land   into   ownership   not   pursuant   to  
relevant  rules  effective  at  the  time  of  transformation;    
• transformation  of  a   land  concession   into  ownership  before  or  after  the  cutoff  date,  except  for  
concessions  in  response  to  social  needs;  
• any  land  concession  not  in  conformity  with  rules  governing  such  concessions;  and    
                                                                                                                        
12  Project  Coordinator,  WorldFish  Center.  Interviewed  on  15th  February,  2011,  Phnom  Penh.  
13  Project  Coordinator,  WorldFish  Center.  Interviewed  on  15th  February,  2011,  Phnom  Penh.  
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• any  occupation  of  privately  owned  land  without  a  title  after  the  cutoff  date.    
  
Because  these  acts  are  categorized  as  illegal,  those  people  whose  occupation  is  deemed  to  be  of  such  a  
nature  are  not  entitled  to  any  compensation  or  reimbursement.  In  addition  to  these  categories  of  illegal  
occupation,   a   large   number   of   (especially   rural)   people   with   lawful   title   remain   vulnerable   to  
resettlement   without   compensation   given   the   overhauling   of   the      land   tenure   system   following   the  
demise  of  the  Khmer  Rouge  regime,  and  the  pending  registrations  of  title  this  has  resulted  in.  
  
The  absence  of  a  resettlement  policy  and  framework  of  rules  has  also  meant    that  affected  people  have  
no  opportunity   to  participate   in  decision  making  processes   that  determine   their  eligibility   for  and   the  
quantity  and  content  of  compensation.  There  are  also  no  provisions  for  recourse  to  a  court  of  law  where  
a  person  feels  the  decision  taken  is  incorrect.  The  paucity  of  rules  relating  to  rights  to  be  consulted  and  
to   have   access   to   information   in   resettlement   is   compounded   by   the   absence   of   an   overall   national  
policy  and  rules  on  access  to  information.  The  Access  to  Information  Policy  remains  as  a  draft  prepared  
by  the  Ministry  of  National  Assembly-­‐Senate  Relations  and  Inspections  (MoNASRI).  
  
The   lack  of  clear  policy  and  rules   is  also  reflected   in  the   implementation  of   the  Constitution  and  Land  
Law.  The  lack  of  a  legal  definition  or  guiding  rules  on  the  “fair  and  just  compensation”  standard  has  led  
to   arbitrary   determination   of   compensation   (ADB   2007).   The   lack   of   affected   people’s   meaningful  
participation  in  the  process  grants  the  implementing  agencies  with  unchecked  power  to  force  people  to  
accept  their  determinations  on  eligibility,  quantity,  and  how  and  when  it  is  paid.  In  practice,  the  nature  
of  resettlement  and  compensation  will  depend  on  the  policy  and  guidelines  of  the  donor,  in  the  case  of  
donor-­‐funded  projects.  This  will  not  be  the  case  for  government  funded  projects.  From  an  institutional  
standpoint,   the   issue   of   resettlement   and   compensation   is   addressed   by   the   Inter-­‐ministerial  
Resettlement   Committee   (IRC)   under   the  Ministry   of   Economy   and   Finance   (MEF).   Its   responsibilities  
include  resettlement,  approving  the  compensation  rate,  and  practically  all  other  relevant  issues.  The  fact  
that   MEF   is   a   key   agency   for   promoting   economic   development   (including   hydropower),   the   IRC’s  
residence  in  this  Ministry  raises  questions  on  the  impartiality  of  its  decisions.  
  
Discussion	  
The   foremost   driver   in   Cambodia’s   approach   to   development   and   poverty   reduction   is   the   need   to  
maintain  a  high  rate  of  economic  growth  that  will  expand  its  economic  base  and  generate  employment  
opportunities.   Currently   the   economy   is   narrowly   based   and   driven   by   four  main   sectors:   garments,  
tourism,   construction  and  agriculture.14   Thus   the   challenge   for   the   government   is   to  promote   growth  
that   is   broader   based,   more   sustainable,   more   diversified   and   more   equitable.   Consequently,   the  
Government   has   doubled   its   budget   allocation   to   priority   ministries,   which   include   Justice,   Health,  
Education,   Women,   Agriculture,   Forestry   and   Fisheries,   Rural   Development   and   Urbanization   and  
Construction.15   This   is   in   the   light  of   chronic   shortage  of   investment   funds   to  meet   the   government's  
priority  requirements  experienced   in  past  years  that  have  raised  questions  as  to  Cambodia’s  ability   to  
meet  its  CMDGs  (UNESCO  2007).  
  
                                                                                                                        
14  Achieving  Cambodia’s  Millennium  Development  Goals.  Update  2010,  Ministry  of  Planning,  Royal  Government  of  Cambodia  
http://www.un.org.kh/undp/media/files/CMDG%20Report%202010.pdf  




The  role  of  energy   is  central  to  the  government’s  vision  for  development  as  made  clear   in  the  various  
overall   development   frameworks   in   place.   Energy   policy   is   thus   geared   to   addressing   the   significant  
energy  deficiency  and  high   tariffs  as  well  as   the  need   for  a  comprehensive  distribution   infrastructure.  
The   high   costs   of   energy   compared   to   neighboring   countries,   are   a   big   obstacle   in   strengthening  
Cambodian   competitiveness   as   well   as   attracting   investments   and   improving   livelihoods.   While  
electricity   imports   from  neighboring  countries  combined  with  small-­‐scale  private  suppliers   in  the  rural  
areas   are   short   term   strategies,   the   exploitation   of   the   country’s   hydropower   potential   is   seen   as  
providing  the  real  impetus  for  powering  growth  in  the  long  term.  
  
From   the   perspective   of   environmental   sustainability   and   social   equity,   the   planned   hydropower  
developments  over  the  next  decade  present  serious  challenges  which  may  also  ironically  undermine  the  
very  developmental  objective  of  poverty   reduction  espoused  by   the  government.  While  Cambodia  on  
paper  has  a  number  of  laws  that  should  safeguard  the  environment  and  ensure  adequate  protection  for  
affected   communities,   the   endorsement   by   senior   Cambodian   politicians   of   extensive   hydropower  
development  plans  has  signalled  to  the  government’s  bureaucracy  that  these  projects  should  be  pushed  
through  (Middleton  2008),  despite  their  impact  on  Cambodia’s  free-­‐flowing,  the  health  of  which  are  vital  
to  the  well-­‐being  of  Cambodia’s  rural  population.  This  paradox  presents  a  critical  policy  challenge  that  is  
central   to   Cambodia’s   future   developmental   performance  when  measured   against   its   own   targets   as  
articulated  in  the  CMDGs  and  NSDP.    
  
In  view  of  its  central  role  in  development,  the  power  sector  is  being  restructured  and  the  national  power  
planning  system  is  thus  in  transition.  Because  the  reforms  are  predicated  on  market  mechanisms,  they  
must  be  complemented  by  progress  in  other  governance  reforms  such  as  more  clearly  specified  regimes  
of   rights   and   entitlements,   greater   transparency   and   information   access,   new   legal   protections   and  
rights  of  grievance,  which  will  shape  overall  decision-­‐making,  as  well  as  individual  investment  decisions.  
Correctly   identified   in  both   the  Rectangular  Strategy  and   the  NSDP   is   the  central   role  played  by  good  
governance  processes  at  all  levels  in  achieving  progress  in  all  developmental  objectives.  This  will  need  to  
include   linking  national  and   sub-­‐national   systems,   improving  civil   service   capacity  and  performance   in  
delivering  services,  fighting  corruption,  improving  the  rule  of  law  and  increasing  public  confidence  in  the  
judiciary,   and   establishing   constructive   dialogue   with   civil   society.   While   this   recognition   in   the   key  
planning  documents   is  a  necessary  step,   it   is   left   to  be  seen  whether  and  how  such  commitments  are  
translated  into  practice.    
  
In   the   energy   sector,   the   government’s   increasing   reliance   on   public-­‐private   investment   partnerships  
with  regional   investors   in  preference  to  the  multilateral  donor  agencies  brings  with  it  the  risk  that  the  
social   and   ecological   costs   of   individual   hydropower   projects   will   be   increasingly   externalized   to  
maintain  the  returns  on  investment  expect  by  the  private  partners.    
  
  
3.2.	   Institutional	   analysis:	   Legislation,	   jurisdictions	   and	   sectoral	   decision	  
making	  
The  Constitution  is  the  supreme  source  of  law  in  Cambodia,  and  as  such  guides  the  content  of  all  other  
laws  which   need   to   conform   to   it.16  Next   in   the   hierarchy   are   Laws   (Chhbab)   passed   by   the  National  
Assembly   and   Senate.   These   are   followed  by  Royal  Decrees   (Reach-­‐Kret)	  and   Sub-­‐Decrees   (Anu-­‐Kret).	  
                                                                                                                        
16  Article  131,  Constitution  of  Cambodia.  
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Under  the  Constitution,  a  Royal  Decree  is  signed  by  the  King  (or  Head  of  State  as  the  case  may  be)  for  a  
list  of  very  specific  tasks  after  being  proposed  by  the  Council  of  Ministers.  The  Sub-­‐Decrees  are  drafted  
by   a   single   ministry   or   in   collaboration   with   other   ministries   over   competent   subject   matters,   to  
implement  and  further  clarify  a  Law,  and  is  signed  by  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  Minister/s  in  charge  of  
implementation,  upon  approval  of  the  Sub-­‐Decree  by  the  Council  of  Ministers.  Next  down  the  line  in  the  
hierarchy  are  Proclamations  (Prakas),  which  also  clarify  and  set  out  implementation  guidelines  for  Laws.  
Like  the  Sub-­‐Decrees  they  are  drafted  by  the  Ministry/ies  having  competence  over  the  subject  matter  
but  with  a  much  more  limited  scope.  However,  in  the  case  of  the  Prakas,	  they  can  be  signed  into  effect  
by  the  Minister/s  in  charge  of  the  ministry  having  competence  over  the  subject  matter  without  having  to  
go  to  the  Council  of  Ministers.  In  that  sense,  it  is  much  easier  to  bring  into  effect  than  Sub-­‐Decrees.  The  
next  in  line  is  the  Circular  (Sarachor)	  which  is  an  instrument  that  a  Ministry  or  higher  authority  uses  to  
clarify  a  point  of  law  or  to  provide  instructions.  A  circular  is  only  advisory  and  does  not  have  the  force  of  
law.  Finally,  there  is  the  Deika,  which  are  orders  given  by  the  provincial  governors  or  commune  councils  
which  are  effective  only  within  the  geographical  region  under  their  authority.  
  
Overall	  public	  sector	  decision	  making	  and	  planning	  
National	  Assembly	  
The  National  Assembly  forms  the  government  and  holds  legislative  power.  It  is  vested  with  the  powers  
to  approve  laws,  in  particular  with  regard  to  the  national  budget,  state  planning,  loans  and  lending,  the  
creation,   change   or   annulment   of   taxes,   administrative   accounts,   amnesties,   treaties   or   international  
conventions,  and  declarations  of  war.  
  
Council	  of	  Ministers	  	  
This   is   the   government's   top   executive   organ   and   serves   as   the   administrative   nerve   center   of   the  
government.  It  is  supposed  to  prepare,  facilitate,  coordinate,  unify,  and  guide  all  activities  of  individual  
ministries   and   local   government.   The   National   Assembly   elects   the   council's   ministers   for   five-­‐year  
terms,   and   the   Council   is   responsible   to   the   Assembly.   The   Council   of  Ministers  meets   weekly   in   an  
executive   session   which   is   attended   by   the   prime   minister   and   deputy   prime   ministers.   It   reviews  
projects  with   investment   capital   exceeding  $50  million  and   sensitive  projects   that  may   impact  on   the  
environment  or  exploit  natural  resources..  If  specific  legislation  is  required  for  the  approval  of  a  project,  
then  the  consent  of  the  National  Assembly  is  also  required.  
  
Council	  for	  the	  Development	  of	  Cambodia	  (CDC)	  	  
The  CDC  is  intended  as  a  “one-­‐stop  service”  for  private  and  public  sector  investment  review  and  decision  
making  in  Cambodia  and  was  established  in  1994  under  the  Law  on  Foreign  Investment  in  the  Kingdom  
of   Cambodia.   As   such,   it   defines   the   framework   for   investment   strategies   and   accepting   or   rejecting  
investment  proposals.  The  CDC’s  functions  are:  
• to   guide   the   preparation   and   the   conception   of   development   frameworks   and   strategies   for  
Cambodia  in  cooperation  with  the  relevant  institutions    
• to  facilitate  and  coordinate  inter-­‐ministerial  activities,  as  well  as  the  activities  of  the  ministries  
and  institutions  involved  with  donor  countries,  organizations  and  investors.  
• to  provide  guidance  in  the  use  of  public  and  private  resources  in  the  development  process    
  
The  CDC  is  chaired  by  the  Prime  Minister  and  composed  of  senior  ministers  from  relevant  government  
agencies.  It  has  two  boards:  one  for  private  sector  investment  (The  Cambodian  Investment  Board);  and  
one   for   public   sector   investment   (The   Cambodian   Rehabilitation   and   Development   Board).   The  
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Cambodian  Investment  Board  (CIB)  receives  and  evaluates  investment  proposals  made  by  individual  or  
corporate  investors  or  submissions  made  in  response  to  Governmental  appeals.  As  part  of  the  one-­‐stop-­‐  
service  for  investors,  it  offers  them  all  the  necessary  information,  assistance  and  guidance  for  obtaining  
as  quickly  as  possible  the  necessary  registrations,  authorizations  or  tax  exemptions.  
  
The  Cambodian  Rehabilitation  and  Development  Board   (CRDB)  hosts   the  annual   “Consultative  Group”  
(CG)  meeting   between   the   Cambodian   government   and   its   donors   at   which   development   issues   and  
challenges   are   discussed.   The   CG  meeting   facilitates   donor   coordination   and   discussion   on   financing  
needs   for   development   programs.   Linked   to   the   CG   meeting,   “Technical   Working   Groups”   focus   on  
specific  development  sectors,  such  as  Agriculture  and  Water,  and  meet  on  a  quarterly  basis  throughout  
the  year  bringing  together  relevant  government  and  donor  agencies  to  coordinate  their  activities.  
  
Ministry	  of	  Planning	  
The  Ministry  consists  of  three  Directorates:  
• the   General   Directorate   of   Planning   (GDP)   which   is   responsible   for   guiding   and   managing  
national  socioeconomic  development  planning.    
• the   National   Institute   of   Statistics   (NIS)   for   managing   the   statistical   functions   of   the   Royal  
Government;  and    
• the  General  Directorate  of  Inspection.    
  
Of   particular   relevance   to   this   report   is   the   General   Directorate   of   Planning  which   has   the   following  
overall  responsibilities:  
• To   ensure   consistency   in   socio-­‐economic   development   by   coordinating   with   all   sector  
development  plans,  programs  and  projects  prepared  by  ministries,   state   secretariats,   relevant  
agencies,  provinces  and  municipalities;    
• To  monitor  the  implementation  of  plans  and  programs  in  collaboration  with  line  ministries,  state  
secretariats,   provinces   and  municipalities,   report   and   provide   comments   to   the  Minister   and  
report  and  request  approval  from  the  Royal  Government;    
• To  coordinate  with  line  ministries,  state  secretariats,  provinces,  municipalities  and  the  National  
Institute  of  Statistics  in  preparing  trimester,  semester,  third  quarterly  and  annual  reports  about  
the  socioeconomic  situation  of  the  country  to  the  Government.  
  
For   the   GDP   the   highest   priority   is   the   implementation   of   the   NSDP   and   the   achievement   of   the  
Cambodian   Millennium   Development   Goals   (CMDGs).     This   priority   is   carried   through   into   the  
objectives,   targets   and   activities   of   the   MoP   Strategic   Plan   (MPSP).    The   GDP   is   organized   into   five  
Departments,  as  follows:    
• General   Planning  Department   which   formulates   concepts,   strategies,   plans   and   programs   for  
short,   medium   and   long   term   socioeconomic   development   by   coordinating   with   the   other  
departments  in  the  GDP.  This  involves  analyzing  and  forecasting  overall  macroeconomic  growth,  
and  preparing  strategies,  policies  and  plans  in  the  macroeconomic  sectors.  
• Economic   Planning  Department  which   analyzes   and   forecasts   overall   economic   growth   in   the  
country;   provides   advice   and   targets   for   economic   development,   and   prepares   strategies,  
policies  and  plans  in  the  economic  sectors.  
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• Social   Planning   Department   which   analyzes   and   forecasts   the   overall   status   of   social  
development  and  demography;  advises  and  sets   targets   for   social  development,  and  prepares  
strategies,  policies  and  plan  in  the  social  sectors.  
  
• Investment  Planning  Department,  whose  functions  include:    
o Analyzing  and  forecasting  the  overall  situation  of  the  investment  sectors;    
o Advising   on   public   and   private   investment   and   targeting   investment   to   be   consistent  
with  the  development  objectives  of  the  country;    
o Preparing  short,  medium  and  long  term  investment  strategies;    
o Determining  priorities  for  capital  allocation  amongst  sectors;    
o Monitor   the   design   of   public   investment   projects   of   line   ministries   and   other  
institutions;    
o Participating  in  the  bidding  Committee  of  all  public  investment  projects,  and  
o Monitoring  and  evaluating  the  implementation  of  public  investment  programmes.  
  
	  
Ministry	  of	  Rural	  Development	  (MRD)	  
This  Ministry  has  responsibility  within  Cambodia  for:        
• Coordinating,  cooperating,  implementing,  monitoring  and  evaluating  rural  development  projects  
and  programs  in  order  to  rehabilitate  and  help  develop  the  country's  rural  areas  by  assisting  the  
rural  population.  
• Coordinating  the  operational  efforts  of  the  various  line  ministries  and  assistance  programs.  
• Undertaking  independent  research  initiatives  to  practically  develop  the  rural  areas  of  Cambodia  
by   liaising  widely,   in  order  to  assess   likely  needs  and   investigate  possible  solutions  that  would  





Figure  11:  Organisational  chart  of  the  Ministry  of  Rural  Development  
Source:  MRD  website17  
  
The   Ministry   of   Rural   Development   (MRD)   was   established   in   January,   1996   for   improving   living  
standards   and   alleviating   rural   poverty.   Under   a   centralised   system,   it   worked   through   its  
deconcentrated   provincial   and   district   level   offices.   The   Provincial   Department   of   Rural   Development  
(PDRD)   is   responsible   for   implementing   and   coordinating   all   MRD-­‐supported   activities   within   each  
province.  It  is  assisted  in  this  task  at  the  district  level  by  the  District  Office  of  Rural  Development  (DORD).  
More  details  of  each  are  available  in  the  section  dealing  with  local  government.  
  
It  needs  to  be  pointed  out  that  though  there  is  a  line  department  looking  after  water  and  sanitation  
respectively  within   the  MRD,   they   have   very   little   funding   to   be   able   to   provide   any  meaningful  
delivery  of  services  to  rural  Cambodia.  The  structure  of  the  electricity  sub-­‐sector  within  the  energy  
sector  is  driven  by  the  agencies  represented  in  Figure  12.    
  
                                                                                                                        




Figure  12:  Organisational  Chart  of  the  Energy  (Electricity)  Sector  in  Cambodia  
Source:  Country  Report  On  energy  sector  in  Cambodia18  
  
Ministry	  of	  Industry,	  Mines	  and	  Energy	  (MIME)	  
Established   in   1992,   this   is   the   key   ministry   responsible   for   setting   and   administrating   government  
policies,  strategies  and  planning  in  the  power  sector.  According  to  the  Electricity  Law  of  2001  MIME  is  to  
“be  responsible   for  setting  and  administrating   the  government  policies,   strategies  and  planning   in   the  
power  sector”19.  Its  functions  encompass  power  sector  restructuring,  electricity  trade  with  neighbouring  
countries,  major   investment  projects  and  full  management  of  the  rural  electrification  sector.  Excluded  
from   its   purview   is   the   oil   and   gas   sector,   which   comes   under   the   Cambodian   National   Petroleum  
Authority  (CNPA).  In  partnership  with  the  Ministry  of  Economy  and  Finance  (MEF),  MIME  is  the  owner  of  
the  Electricite  du  Cambodge  (EDC).    
  
With   respect   to   hydropower,   the   Sub-­‐decree   on   the  Organisation   and   Functioning   of   the  Ministry   of  
Industry,  Mines   and   Energy   (1999)   lays   out   the  mandates   and   responsibilities   of   the  ministry,   which  
include  but   are   not   limited   to:   (a)   conducting   research  on   the  hydropower  distribution  networks   and  
estimating  the  potential  in  order  to  develop  electrical  projects  where  electricity  production  is  the  main  
purpose;   and   (b)   participation   in   the   implementation   of   any   works   related   to   the   Mekong   Basin  
according  to  the  obligations  of  the  ministry.  The  Sub-­‐decree  also  provides  clear  mandate  for  monitoring  
existing  hydropower  dams,  but   there   is  no  clear   legislative   framework   for  carrying  out  the  monitoring  
and   evaluation   process.   MIME   acts   as   the   primary   point   of   contact   for   hydropower   developers  
interested   in   investing   in   the   sector,   and   is   also   the   agency   that   signs   the   MoUs   with   hydropower  
companies  (H.E.  Tun  Lean,20  personal  communication  2011,  Middleton  &  Chanthy  2008).  
  
                                                                                                                        
18  http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/3143.pdf    
19  Article  3  




Figure  13:  MIME  organizational  structure  
Source:  Water  Environment  Partnership  in  Asia  (WEPA)21  
	  
The   main   department   within   MIME   responsible   for   hydropower   development   is   the   Department   of  
Hydropower,  located  within  the  General  Department  of  Energy.  Its  responsibilities  include:  
• developing  and  implementing  the  national  policy  of  electric  power  including  low  cost  of  electric  
power  utilization,  effective  uses  and  making  electricity  available  in  most  urban  and  rural  areas;  
• collecting   ,   analyzing,   maintaining   and   utilizing   data   for   study,   and   developing   hydro-­‐electric  
power  in  potential  areas  with  sound  environment;    
• developing  and  implementing  the  action  plan  of  hydro-­‐electric  power  development  throughout  
the  country,  including  its  monitoring  programme.  
  
The	  Electricity	  Authority	  of	  Cambodia	  (EAC)	  	  
The  EAC  is  an  independent  regulator  established  under  the  2001  Electricity  Law  as  an  autonomous  body  
responsible   for   licensing,   approving   tariffs,   reviewing  planning   and   financial   performance,   setting   and  
enforcing   performance   standards,   settling   disputes   and   imposing   penalties.   EAC   comprises   three  
members   (one   chairman   and   two   vice-­‐chairmen)   appointed   by   the   Prime  Minister   and   a   secretariat  
headed   by   an   executive   director   and   comprising   the   Departments   of   Legislation,   Financial/Pricing,  
Electricity  Regulation,  and  Administration  and  Personnel.  
                                                                                                                        
21  http://www.wepa-­‐db.net/policies/structure/chart/cambodia/mime.htm    
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The	  Electricite	  du	  Cambodge	  (EDC)	  
In   1996,   EDC  became  a  wholly   state-­‐owned   limited   liability   company,  with   responsibility   to   generate,  
transmit  and  distribute  electricity   throughout  Cambodia.  On  a  national  scale,   its  key   functions  are  the  
creation  of  the  main  transmission  grid  and  the  import  and  export  of  electricity  to  and  from  neighbouring  
countries.   EDC   functions   under   a   seven-­‐member   Board   of   Directors,   and   is   managed   by   a  managing  
director  and  three  deputy  managing  directors.  The  entity  comprises  the  following:  (i)  the  Departments  
of  Generation,  Corporate  Planning  and  Projects,  Transmission  and  Distribution,  International  Energy;  (ii)  
Departments  of  Administration,  Training,  Provincial  Affairs,  Technical;  (iii)  Departments  of  Financing  and  
Accounting,  Business,   Internal  Audit;  and  (iv)  13  Provincial  Electricity  Units.  Major   Independent  Power  
Producers  (IPPs)  will  typically  sell  their  power  directly  to  EdC  for  transmission  and  distribution.  Smaller  
IPPs  that  serve  remoter  regions  of  Cambodia  sell  their  power  directly  to  the  consumer.  
  
The	  proposed	  National	  Hydropower	  Institute	  	  
The  Cambodian  government  plans  to  establish  a  Hydropower  Institute  to  develop  in-­‐country  capacities.  
This  seems  to  be  driven  by  the  Build-­‐Operate-­‐Transfer  (BOT)  system  where  the  government  will  need  to  
have  the  skills  to  operate  and  maintain  the  dams  once  they  are  transferred  by  the  company  at  the  end  
of  the  BOT  agreement  (Ms.  Chea  Phallika,22  personal  communication  2011).  
  




The  environment  has  suffered  as  a  consequence  of  the  turbulent  nature  of  Cambodia’s  recent  past  with  
poor   geographical   access   and   institutional   capacities   in   the   face   of   a   highly   militarized   context.   The  
current  institutional  and  legal  frameworks  thus  face  a  significant  challenge  of  establishing  its  authority  
over  the  environment  at  a  time  when  rapid  economic  development  is  the  priority  following  decades  of  
destruction  and  stagnation.  
  
The	  Ministry	  of	  Environment	  (MoE)	  
Established  in  1993,  the  Ministry  of  Environment  has  a  broad  mandate  to  protect  the  natural  resources  
of   the   country   and   to   prevent   environmental   degradation.   This   mandate   includes   responsibility   for  
managing  protected  areas.  The  Ministry  must  also  be  consulted  about  energy  and  forestry  development.  
The  long  range  goals  of  the  MoE  include:  
• Management   and   protection   of   natural   resources   to   ensure   sustainable   environmental  
development;  
• Strengthening   cooperation   with   relevant   ministries   to   control   and   improve   environmental  
quality;  and  
• Administration   and   review   of   the   environmental   impact   assessment   (EIA)   of   all   development  
projects  within  the  country.  
  
                                                                                                                        





Figure  14:  Organizational  structure  of  MoE  
Source:  Water  Environment  Partnership  in  Asia  (WEPA)23  
  
MoE  administers  the  Law  on  Environmental  Protection  and  Natural  Resources  Management  (1996)  and  
associated   sub-­‐decrees.24   This   is   the   framework   law  governing   environmental   protection   and  natural-­‐
resources   management,   and   directs   that   the   natural   resources   of   Cambodia   shall   be   preserved,  
developed  and  managed  to  use   in  a  rational  and  sustainable  manner   (Article  8).  The  Law  requires  the  
government   to   prepare   national   and   regional   environmental   plans   for   environment   protection   and  
sustainable  natural   resource  management      (Articles   2   and  3),   and   to   adopt   sub-­‐decrees   concerning   a  
wide  range  of  environmental  issues,  including  environmental  impact  assessments,  pollution  prevention  
and   control,   public   participation,   and   access   to   information.   Activities   related   to   the   conservation,  
development,  management  or  use  of  natural  resources  must  be  sustainable  (Article  10)  and  if  it  is  found  
that   such   activities   are   not   sustainable,   MoE   is   to   inform   the   concerned   ministries   undertaking   the  
activities  (Article  11).  This  is  a  critical  power  given  that  decisions  concerning  land  use  and  exploitation  of  
natural  resources  are  made  by  line  ministries  e.g.  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Forests  and  Fisheries,  Ministry  
of  Public  Works  and  Transport,  and  Ministry  of  Industry,  Mines  and  Energy.    
  
                                                                                                                        
23  http://www.wepa-­‐db.net/policies/structure/chart/cambodia/moe.htm    
24  The  Sub-­‐Decree  on  the  EIA  process,  11  August  1999;  The  Sub-­‐decree  on  Water  Pollution  Control  6  April  1999;  The  Sub-­‐decree  
on  Solid  Waste  Management  27  April  1999;  and  the  Sub-­‐decree  on  Air  and  Noise  Pollution  Control  10  July  2000.  
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The  MoE   is   also   responsible   for   administering   Cambodia’s   protected   areas.   23   protected   areas   were  
established   through   the   Regulations   on   the   Creation   and  Designation   of   Protected   Areas   (1993),   and  
were  classified  under  four  major  categories:  National  Parks,  Wildlife  Sanctuaries,  Protected  Landscapes,  
and  Multiple  Use  Areas  (Article  1).  These  and  three  Ramsar  Sites  are  administered  by  MoE’s  Department  
of  Nature  Conservation  and  Protection.  The  Declaration  on  the  Protection  of  Natural  Areas  followed  in  
1994  with  the  objective  of  stipulating  prohibited  and  permitted  activities  in  protected  areas.  Prohibited  
activities   include  construction  of  saw  mills,  hunting,  placing  of   traps,   fishing  of  mammals,  amphibians,  
reptiles   and   aquatic   animals   for   specified   purposes,   deforestation   for   land   use,   water   pollution   and  
other  forms  of  pollution  of  the  environment.  Research  requires  approval  from  MoE.  
  
The  Protected  Area  Law  of  2008  defines  the  framework  of  management,  conservation  and  development  
of  protected  areas.  This  Law  has  a  scope  of  application  in  protected  areas  defined  by  the  provisions  of  
the   Law   on   Environmental   Protection   and   Natural   Resources   Management,   1996.   The   categories   of  
protected  area  were  also  expanded  from  the  four  identified  in  the  1993  Regulations  to  include  Ramsar  
sites,   Biosphere   reserves,   Natural   heritage   sites   and   Marine   parks.   The   Law   establishes   a   National  
Committee   for   Conflict   Resolution   on   Protected   Area   Management   (NCRPAM),   chaired   by   MoE   and  
consisting  of  representatives  of  relevant  ministries  and  other  institutions  (Article  20).  
  
This   Law   also   gives   significant   attention   to   minority   groups   and   other   local   communities.   Article   4  
guarantees  the  rights  of  local  communities,  indigenous  ethnic  minorities  and  the  public  to  participate  in  
decision-­‐making   on   the   sustainable   management   and   conservation   of   biodiversity   although   the  
modalities  to  do  so  are  not  made  clear.  Article  22  recognizes  and  secures  access  to  traditional  uses,  local  
customs,   beliefs   and   religions   of   local   communities,   and   indigenous   ethnic   minority   groups   residing  
within  and  adjacent  to  the  protected  areas.      It  also  proves   for  access  to  the  sustainable  use  zone  and  
conservation  zone  of  protected  areas  to  sustain  the  traditional  resource  uses  and  customary  practices  of  
local   community   and   indigenous   ethnic  minority   groups,  where   these   are   practices   at   a   family   scale.  
Such  access  is  to  be  based  on  guidelines  which  are  to  be  prescribed  by  MoE.  
  
Furthermore,  MoE  is  vested  with  the  authority  to  allocate  part  or  parts  of  the  sustainable  use  zone  to  
communities   residing   within   or   adjacent   to   a   protected   area   as   a   community   protected   area.   The  
community   is   to  enter   into  an  agreement   (valid   for  up  to  15  years)  with  the  Nature  Conservation  and  
Protection  Administration  (Article  25).  Community  protected  area  regulations  are  to  be  established  by  
local  community  and  indigenous  ethnic  minorities  that  are  recognised  as  such  by  the  local  authority,  and  
the   regulations  must   be   endorsed   by   the  Nature   Conservation   and   Protection   Administration   (Article  
25).  These  communities  are  also  required  to  develop  a  natural  resources  management  plan  which  will  
be  reviewed  and  approved  by  the  Nature  Conservation  and  Protection  Administration.  The  Plan  and  the  
community   protected   area   development   activities   are   then   to   be   integrated   into   the   commune  
development  plan  (Article  28).  
  
The  protected  areas  categories  established  under  the  purview  of  MoE  constitute  the  majority  but  not  all  
of   the  protected  area   categories   in  Cambodia.   In   addition   to   these  areas,   the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  
Forestry   and   Fisheries   (MAFF)   has   set   aside   a   number   of   areas   for   biodiversity   conservation,   forest  
protection,  genetic  conservation,  and  wildlife  habitat  protection,  as  has  the  Department  of  Fisheries.  
While  the  MoE’s  responsibility  in  controlling  water  pollution  has  been  discussed  in  previous  section,  its  
leadership  in  administering  the  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  process  will  be  detailed  in  section  3.3  




Water	  resources	  management	  
The  agencies  that  can  exercise  influence  over  water  resources  management  are  as  follows:  
  
Ministry	  of	  Water	  Resources	  and	  Meteorology	  (MoWRAM)	  
MoWRAM  was  created  in  1999  as  the  apex  body  responsible  for  the  overall  management  of  Cambodia’s  
surface   and   ground   water   resources,   and   for   administering   the   Water   Resources   Law   of   2007.   Its  
functions  include:  
• defining   and   developing   policies   and   strategies   for   the   use,   development   and   sustainable  
conservation  of  water  resources  at  national  and  international  levels;  
• studying  potential  water  resources  in  terms  of  surface  and  ground  water;  
• developing   the   short,   medium   and   long   term   plans   for   exploration,   development   and  
conservation  of  water  resources  to  support  the  national  economy  and  living  standards;  
• managing  all  direct  and  indirect  utilization  of  water  resources  and  minimizing  disasters;  
• developing  legislations  related  to  water  resources  management,  and  their  application;  
• providing   technical   support   and   advice   to   private   sectors,   organizations,   communities,   and  
individuals  involved  in  the  improvement  and  exploitation  of  water  resources.  
  
Within   MoWRAM,   the   Department   of   Water   Resources   Management   and   Conservation   carries   out  
several  key  functions  including:    
• Developing   and   carrying   out   the   strategic   plans   for   various   development   activities,   e.g.,  
hydropower,   flood   control,   irrigation,   except   the  projects  which   are   serving   an  electric   power  
production  which  is  the  first  priority  for  the  government;  
• Managing  watershed  areas  and  develop   relevant  programmes   for  ensuring   the  utilization  and  
conservation  of  water  resources  in  an  effective  and  sustainable  manner,  and  






Figure  15:  Organizational  structure  of  MOWRAM  




Figure  16:  Organizational  structure  of  DWRMC  
Source:  Water  Environment  Partnership  in  Asia  (WEPA)26  
  
                                                                                                                        
25  http://www.wepa-­‐db.net/policies/structure/chart/cambodia/mowram.htm    
26  http://www.wepa-­‐db.net/policies/structure/chart/cambodia/dwrmc.htm    
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MoWRAM’s  most  important  function  relevant  to  hydropower  development  is  to  issue  licenses  for  water  
use   and   water   works   construction;   monitor   their   compliance,   and   impose   water   user   fees.   This   is  
administered  by  the  Department  of  Water  Resources  Management  and  Conservation.  This  Department  
is  also  responsible  for  developing  legislation  and  for  river  basin  management.  However,  the  exclusion  of  
electricity   production   from   this   Department’s   influence   is   of   particular   relevance   as   it   effectively  
undermines  MoWRAM’s  overall  influence  over  hydropower  decision  making.  
  
Ministry	  of	  Industry,	  Mines	  and	  Energy	  	  
The  emphasis  on  hydropower  as  the  key  source  of  Cambodia’s  energy  supply  makes  the  construction  of  
hydroelectric  dams  one  if  not  the  major  influences  on  the  country’s  ability  to  realize  its  policy  ambition  
of  shifting  to  an  IWRM  platform.  While  whether  they  will  all  be  built  remains  unclear,  the  large  number  
of  hydropower  projects  identified  by  the  government  for  implementation  along  the  trunk  and  tributaries  
of   the   country’s   major   rivers   suggests   the   impacts   on   the   entire   water   sector   will   be   massive.   The  
virtually  monopolistic  nature  of  decision  making  on   these  projects  exercised  by  MIME  poses  a   critical  
challenge  not  only  to  MoWRAM,  but  also  to  the  broader  development  policy  process  which  is  expected  
to  sustainably  improve  economic  performance.  As  such,  it  can  be  highlighted  as  one  of  the  fundamental  
institutional  weaknesses,  the  implications  of  which  reach  well  beyond  the  water  sector  and  into  the  very  
core  of  Cambodia’s  overall  development  policies  and  practices.  
  
Department	  of	  Fisheries	  
While  water   resources   is  pivotal   for   the   fisheries   sector  making   fisheries  a  primary   stakeholder   in   the  
water   resources  management   process,   it   is   at   a   disadvantage   in   relation   to   other   sectors   in   that   the  
Department’s   jurisdiction  pertains  not   to  water  management,  but   rather   to   the   fish   resource   that   the  
water  resources  supports.  In  practical  terms  this  means  that  the  Department  lacks  the  legislative  basis  
to   compel   or   prevent   specific   actions   by   other  water   resource   users.   The   quality   of   inter-­‐agency   co-­‐
ordination  within  the  water  sector  thus  becomes  especially   important   if   the   interests  of   fisheries,  and  
consequently  the  food  and  income  security  of  a  vast  part  of  Cambodia’s  population  is  to  be  safeguarded.  
  
The	  Ministry	  of	  Environment	  (MoE)	  
Within  MoE’s  overall  mandate  of  overall  environmental  planning  and  its  integration  with  development  
planning   processes,   the   Department   of   Environmental   Pollution   Control   is   specifically   mandated   to  
manage   the   impact   of   pollution   on   various   components   of   the   environment   including   water.   With  
respect  to  water  quality,  its  functions  are  as  follows:  
• monitoring  and  controlling  effluents  and/or  treated  effluents  discharged  from  various  pollution  
sources  into  receiving  sources;  
• issuing  a  licence  or  giving  permission  of  treated  wastewater  discharge  to  owners  or  managers  of  
factory  that  is  approved  to  comply  the  national  effluent  water  quality  standard  
• monitoring  and  controlling  water  quality  at  public  water  areas  in  compliance  with  the  Public  
Water  Quality  Standard  for  Biodiversity  Conservation,  reporting  to  the  decision-­‐makers  about  
the  current  water  quality  aspect  and  its  future  trend;  
• cooperating  and  implementing  the  international  conventions  of  which  approved  by  the  Royal  
Government;    
• promoting  staff  awareness  and  knowledge  at  provincial/municipal  environmental  departments  
regarding  causes/effects  and  benefits  of  water  quality  to  people  and  the  environment,  including  






Ministry	  of	  Public	  Works	  	  
The  Ministry  of  Public  Works  and  Transport  can  influence  water  resources  management  as  the  agency  
mandated   to   develop   national   policy   concerning   all   public   works,   and   to   build   and   manage   all  
infrastructure  including  bridges,  ports,  and  waterways.  
  
Of  particular  relevance  is  the  Department  of  Waterways  whose  functions  include:  
• studying  and  executing  works  concerning  navigation  in  natural  watercourses;    
• making  plans  and  maps  of  rivers,  waterways  and  channels;  
• examining  the  construction  of  structures  along  the  river;  
• ensuring  the  protection  of  the  river  banks;    
• building  local  ports  by  co-­‐operating  with  local  authorities;  
• managing  land  practices  to  protect  rivers,  and  
• monitoring  the  water  level  of  all  the  rivers  for  navigation  purposes.    
  
  
Figure  17:  Organizational  structure  of  MPWT  
Source:  Water  Environment  Partnership  in  Asia  (WEPA)27  
  
Cambodia	  National	  Mekong	  Committee	  (CNMC)    
The  CNMC   is  a   cooperative  body  of   the  ministries   involved   in  water  management,  and   is  expected   to  
coordinate  various  ministries  on  a  national  level  and  serve  as  a  link  between  the  national  and  regional  
levels.  It  is  effectively  the  primary  medium  for  inter-­‐agency  coordination,  at  least  on  paper.  
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The   Law   on   Water   Resources   Management   in   the   Kingdom   of   Cambodia   (2007)   encourages   the  
application  of  Integrated  Water  Resources  Management  (IWRM)  as  the  holistic  approach  for  sustainable  
management  and  development  of  water  and  related  resources   in   the  country.  This   is  a   relatively  new  
approach  in  Cambodia  and  appears  at  odds  with  what  continues  to  be  a  compartmentalized  institutional  
structure   and   environment   within   the   water   sector.   This   remains   the   case   despite   the   creation   of  
MoWRAM.  This  is  partly  due  to  a  failure  to  confer  adequate  powers  for  MoWRAM  to  function  as  the  key  
policy  maker  and  planner  in  the  water  sector  (Middleton  2008).  In  fact,  many  of  the  functions  relating  to  
water  have  already  been  divided  amongst  other  agencies  such  as  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Forestry  
and   Fisheries   (water   quality),   the   Ministry   of   Industry,   Mines   and   Minerals,   the   Ministry   of   Rural  
Development,  Ministry  of  Public  Works,  and  the  Department  of  Agriculture  (Irrigation).  Coordination  is  
thus   difficult   due   to   the   institutional   overlaps   and   competition,   and   the   fact   that   MoWRAM   is   the  
youngest   of   these   agencies   leaves   it   at   a   considerable   disadvantage   (Dr.   So   Nam,28   personal  
communication,   2011).   Companies   and   donors   continue   to   deal  mainly  with  MIME  which   is   also   the  
institutional  home  for  hydropower  (Mr.  Theng  Tara,  personal  communication  201129).  
  
The  challenge  for  MoWRAM  is  to  achieve  the  active  participation  of  MIME  and  other  water  users  which  
may   perceive   such   involvement   as   peripheral   to   their   mandate   or   can   override   MoWRAM   where   a  
development   activity   is   deemed   to   be   a   priority   (e.g.   hydropower).   More   formalized   regulatory  
procedures  for  ensuring  that  hydropower  planning  processes  are  aligned  with  water  resources  planning  
processes,  and  indeed  policy,  will  be  necessary,  and  this  may  provide  a  practical  and  critical  entry  point  
for   the   project.   Similar   constraints   exist   to   the   integration   of   sectoral   interests   across   national   and  
provincial  borders.  The  extent  to  which  water  resources  agencies  have  an  opportunity  to  influence  the  
formative  stages  of  project  design  is  likely  to  be  very  limited  unless  there  are  legislated  requirements  in  
respect   of  water   resources,   for   example  maintaining  minimum   releases   in   the   river   system,   requiring  
regulation  of  peak  flows  or  linking  development  plans  to  protected  area  strategies.  (King  et  al.  2007)  
  
In  practice,  it  appears  that  there  is  very  limited  interagency  coordination  in  the  water  sector  at  national  
level,   either   in   planning   or   operational   matters.   Arrangements   for   exchanging   information   also   are  
rather   hierarchical   and   controlled,   so   that   staff  may   not   have   easy   access   to   information   from   other  
agencies   that   would   assist   them   in   their   own   duties.   As   a   result,   ministries   and   their   constituent  
departments   (even   within   a   single   ministry)   may   often   act   largely   in   isolation.   At   provincial   level,  
operational  activity  is  focused  through  Provincial  governors  (who  are  responsible  to  the  Minister  of  the  
Interior).   Provincial   departments   receive   their   budget   allocations   from   their   parent  ministries,   and   in  
principle  receive  technical  support  from  and  report  to  them.  Coordination  among  ministry/department  
staff  at  provincial  level  may  be  stronger  than  at  national  level,  because  of  more  immediate  oversight  by  
governors.  (ADB  2000)  
  
Fisheries	  Management	  
The   Law   on   Fisheries   of   2006   states   its   objectives   to   be   fishery   resource   management,   aquaculture  
development,   the   management   of   production   and   processing,   and   promotion   of   local   community  
livelihoods,  and  the  sustainability  of  biodiversity  and  natural  culture  heritages  (Article  1).  According  to  
this  Law,  the  fishery  management  shall  be  under  the  jurisdiction  MAFF  and  is  refered  to  as  the  Fisheries  
Administration.  This  is  a  nation-­‐wide  organizational  structure,  with  a  vertical  hierarchy  classified  into  a  
central   level,   inspectorate,   cantonment,   division   and   Sangkat   (Article   6).   Fisheries   Administration  
                                                                                                                        
28  Adjunct  Professor  and  Director,  IFReDI.  
29  Deputy  Director,  General  Technical  Affairs,  MOWRAM  
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activities  are  to  be  based  on  the  principle  of  transparency  by  ensuring  the  public’s  right  to  participate  in  
decision  making  on  sustainable  management,  use,  conservation,  and  development  of  fishery  resources  
(Article  7),  although  here  to  details  on  the  how  is  not  provided.  
  
The  Department  of  Fisheries  forms  the  apex  of  the  Fisheries  Administration  at  national  level,  and  has  
the  following  responsibilities:  
• Preparing  and  establishing  fishery  resource  inventories,  and  assessing  potentiality  classified  the  
fishery  resource  and  aquaculture;  
• Enacting  law  and  regulations  to  protect  and  improve  fisheries  as  well  as  the  managing  fishery  
resource  utilisation;  
• Preparing  plans  to  manage  fishery  zones;  fishery  conservation  and  setting  up,  fishery  resource  
development  policies,  and  measures  to  ensure  the  environmental  protection;  
• Conducting  scientific  research  on  fisheries  and  aquaculture,  including  their  documentation;  




Figure  18:  Organizational  structure  of  Department  of  Fisheries  (DoF)  
Source:  Water  Environment  Partnership  in  Asia  (WEPA)30  
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At   the   provincial   level   the   Fisheries   Administration   Cantonment,   (FiAC)   is   responsible   for   promoting,  
overseeing   and   regulating   the   development   of   fisheries   in   each   province   through   the   provision   of  
technical  assistance   to  community   fisheries.  The  FiACs  also   issue   the  permits   for  establishing   fisheries  
communities.  Between  the  Fisheries  Department  and  the  FiAC  is  the  Fisheries  Inspector.  Each  Commune  
is  supposed  to  have  a  Fisheries  Officer  (Mr.  Yong  Yeath,31  personal  communication,  2011).  
  
In  addition  to  implementing  the  fisheries  policy  and  legislation,  the  Fisheries  Department  is  also  home  to  
the  Inland  Fisheries  Research  and  Development  Institute  (IFReDI)  which  reviews  all  water  development  
projects   and   projects   of   other   sectors   with   any   link   to   fisheries   for   impacts   on   fisheries,   and  makes  
recommendations  to  MoE.  Other  relevant  agencies  are  invited  to  discuss  the  impacts,  and  MoE  is  then  
expected  to  communicate  this  feedback  to  the  Prime  Minister.  (Dr.  So  Nam,32  personal  communication,  
2011)  
  
According  to  the  Law  on  Fisheries,  sustainable  fishery  management  should  be  exercised  according  to  the  
National  Fishery  Policy  and  the  provisions  of   this  Law  (Article  14).  The  National  Fishery  Policy   is   to  be  
developed   through   a   National   Fishery   Policy   Formulation   Committee   headed   by   the   Minister   of  
Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fisheries  with  members  from  relevant  Ministries  (Article  14).   In  addition,  the  
Fisheries  Administration   is   required   to  develop  a  National   Fishery  Management  Plan  according   to   the  
National   Fishery   Policy   with   “broad   participation”   from   local   communities   and   relevant   authorities  
(Article  15).  
  
The  area  over  which  the  Fisheries  Administration  has  jurisdiction  is  considered  the  fishery  domain,  and  
this  is  divided  into  the  inland  and  marine  fishery  domains.  The  inland  fishery  domain  consists:  
• Concession  fishing  lots  allocated  for  investment.  
• Fishery  conservation  areas,  defined  as  habitats  of  aquatic  flora  and  fauna.  
• Inundated  forest  areas  including  inundated  forest  zone,  which  provide  important  aquatic  animal  
habitats  for  feeding,  spawning  and  breeding,  and  protected  inundated  areas.  
• Family-­‐scale  fishing  areas  reserved  for  people  or  traditional  community  fishing.  
• Open  access  areas  which  are  areas  that  are  not  otherwise  classified.  
• Fishing  areas  for  aquaculture  development.  
• Flooded  plains  that  occur  in  the  wet  season.  
  
The  fishery  domain  is  the  property  of  the  state.  The  boundaries  of  fishery  domains  are  to  be  defined  by  
sub-­‐decree.   The   fishery   domain   can   cover   public   or   private   land   in   the   flooding   season,   but   the  
management  of  these  fisheries  does  not  affect  the  ownership  of  the  above  mentioned  lands  (Article  9).  
The  Law  on  Fisheries  empowers  MAFF  to  grant  any  legal  person  permission  to  carry  out  such  activities  in  
the   fishery  domain,  based  on   the  provision  of   this   Law,   for  harvesting   fish  and  conducting   research.33  
The  management  of  inundated  forest  and  mangrove  forests  which  are  key  components  of  the  lifecycle  
of  fishery  resources  shall  be  under  the  extent  of  this  law  (Article  3).    
  
The  management  of  fisheries  is  also  based  on  the  classification  of  three  scales  of  fishing  gear,34  namely:    
                                                                                                                        
31  Project  Officer,  Fisheries  Action  Coalition  Team  (FACT).  Interviewed  on  15th  February,  2011,  Phnom  Penh.  
32  Adjunct  Professor  and  Director,  IFReDI.  Interviewd  on  17th  February,  2011,  Phnom  Penh.  
33  Article  10.  
34  Article  30,  Law  on  Fisheries,  2007.  
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• Large  scale  (commercial),    
• Medium  scale  (commercial),  and    
• Small   scale   (family,   non-­‐commercial)   mainly   for   household   consumption   and   income,   and  
defined  in  terms  of  the  use  of  up  to  50m  of  fishing  net  and  4-­‐5  fish  traps.  
  
Fishery	  Management	  Areas	  	  
According  to  the  Law  on  Fisheries,  any  fishery  domain  may  be  declared  as  a  fishery  management  area  
(Article  12).  In  such  areas,  the  granting  of  ownership  or  land  title  will  be  determined  by  the  Ministry  of  
Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fisheries  (Article  13).  Fishery  Management  Areas  are  to  be  treated  as  Fishery  
Conservation   Areas   and   any   fishing   activities   in   these   areas   are   prohibited   except   with   special  
permission  from  MAFF  (Article  18).  
  
Open  Access  areas  
These  are  those  areas  that  are  not  classified  as  any  other  type  of  fishery  domain,  and  only  family  and  
medium  scale  fisheries  are  allowed.    
  
Fishing  Lots  
According  to  the  Proclamation  on  Demarcation  of  Inland  Fishing  Lots  and  Fish  Sanctuaries  of  1989,  the  
boundary  and  location  of  fishing  lots  are  to  be  demarcated  on  the  fishery  map  (Article  1).  Some  fishing  
lots   are   to   be   reserved   for   the   Fishery   Department   to   undertake   fisheries,   and   the   rest   are   to   be  
auctioned   to  private   individuals  and  companies,35  and   those  who  purchase   these   lots  are  granted   the  
right  to  use  the  lot  for  two  consecutive  fishing  seasons.36  Anyone  holding  a  right  to  a  fishing  lot  enjoys  a  
monopoly  on  access,  and   the   right   to  apprehend  any  unauthorised  third  party  who   fishes  or  uses   the  
flooded   forest   within   the   fishing   lot.37   In   practice,  most   fishing   lots   are   owed   by   private   commercial  
operators  (Mr.  Yong  Yeath,38  personal  communication,  2011).  
  
Community  Fisheries  
Community  fishing  areas  are  defined  by  the  Law  on  Fisheries  as  the  “fishery  domain  of  the  state  handed  
over   to   the   community   fishery   under   the   agreement   between   the   chief   of   the   Cantonment   of   the  
Fisheries  Administration  and  the  communities  or  groups  of  citizens   living   inside  or  around  the  specific  
fishery  domain.  Those  citizens  are  mainly  dependent  on  fisheries  for  their  daily  life  and  using  traditional  
fishing  gears  for  fishing,  which  they  manage  and  use  that  area  sustainably”  (Appendix).  
  
All  Khmer  citizens  have  the  right  join  together  to  establish  community  fisheries  in  their  own  local  areas,  
on  a  voluntary  basis  to   improve  their  own  standard  of   living  and  to  contribute  to  economic  and  social  
improvement  and  poverty  alleviation  by  using  fisheries  resources  sustainably.  This  right  is  underpinned  
by  Article  2  of   the  Law  on  Fisheries  whereby  the  state  ensures   the  rights  on   traditional  use  of   fishery  
resources  for  local  communities.  The  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fisheries  shall  however  have  
general  jurisdiction  over  management  of  community  fisheries.39  The  fishing  community  has  no  rights  to  
sell,  exchange,  hire,  donate  or  divide  the  community  fishing  area.40  They  also  do  not  have  the  power  to  
                                                                                                                        
35  Article  3,  Sub-­‐Decree  on  Hiring  Inland  &  Marine  Fishery  Domain  for  Fishery  Exploitation,  1989.  
36  Article  7,  Sub-­‐Decree  on  Hiring  Inland  &  Marine  Fishery  Domain  for  Fishery  Exploitation,  1989.  
37  Article  18,  Sub-­‐Decree  on  Hiring  Inland  &  Marine  Fishery  Domain  for  Fishery  Exploitation,  1989.  
38  Project  Officer,  Fisheries  Action  Coalition  Team  (FACT).  Interviewed  on  15th  February,  2011,  Phnom  Penh.  
39  Article  1,  Royal  Decree  on  the  establishment  of  community  fisheries,  2005.  
40  Article  62,  Law  on  Fisheries,  2007.  
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make   arrests;   they   can  only   inform   the   local   fisheries   officer   of   any   illegal   activity   (Mr.   Yong   Yeath,41  
personal  communication,  2011).  
  
The   Cantonment   of   the   Fisheries   Administration,   forllowing   consultation   with   other   concerned  
authorities  is  responsible  for  studying  and  preparing  the  fishery  domain  for  forming  community  fisheries  
by  making  clear  boundaries  and  demarcating  suitable  areas  depending  on  the  fishery  resources  and  the  
traditional  or  use  by  the  community.  The  chief  of  a  Cantonment  Fisheries  Administration  is  entitled  to  
decide   or   cancel   the   agreements   of   a   community   fishing   area   with   the   local   community   living   in   or  
around  the   fishery  domain.  This  agreement   is  valid   for  3  years  but  can  be  renewed  depending  on  the  
monitoring  report  and  re-­‐evaluation  by  the  Fisheries  Administration  Division.42  
  
The   community   fishing   areas   have   to   be   continuously   managed   by   the   fishing   communities   in  
accordance   with   a   Community   Fishery   Area   Management   Plan   (CFAMP)   prepared   by   the   local  
community   and   approved   by   the   head   of   the   central   Fisheries   Administration.   The   Fisheries  
Administration  is  required  to  provide  the  technical  support  at  the  request  of  a  local  community  and  to  
monitor   the   implementation  of   the  CFAMPs.   The  CFAMPs  are   to  be   re-­‐examined  every   three   years.43  
Also  required  are  by-­‐laws,  internal  regulations,  management  plans  and  maps  of  the  community  fishing  
area.44  Where  there  are  adjacent  community  fisheries  areas,  federations  of  community  fisheries  can  be  
established  to  foster  cooperation.45  The  law  on  Fisheries  grants  the  Minister  of  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  
Fisheries  the  power  to  abolish  community  fishing  area  for  public  benefit  if  deemed  so  (Article  63).  
  
Licensing  
All  types  of  fisheries  exploitation  except  subsistence  fishing  are  required  to  obtain  a  fishing  license  and  
to   pay   tax   and   fishing   fees   to   the   Sate.46   According   to   the   Proclamation   on   competent   authorities   in  
issuing   permission   to   do   fishery   in   open   water,   aquaculture,   fish   processing   and   special   permissions  
(1989),   large   scale   inland   fisheries   need   a   license   issued   by   the   Department   of   Fisheries,   while   the  
Provincial/Urban   fisheries   authority   issues   the   licenses   in   respect   of  middle   scale   fisheries   (Article   1).  
Aquaculture  requires  a  license  from  the  Department  of  Fisheries  where  the  pond/pen  is  not  more  than  2  
hectares  or  a  cage  not  more  than  200  sq.  meters.  The  license  is  given  by  the  Provincial/Urban  authority  
in  the  case  of  inland  ponds/pens  less  than  0.5ha  or  cage  of  between  15-­‐  200  sq.  meters  (Article  2).  The  
licenses   are   valid   for   one   fishing   season   or   at   most   for   one   year,   unless   authorization   for   industrial  
fisheries  is  obtained  (Article  5).  
  
Role	  in	  EIAs	  	  
The  fishery  administration  does  not  have  any  links  with  dam  operators  once  dams  are  built,  although  it  
is  a  member  of  the  implementation  monitoring  committee.  Monitoring  is  meant  to  be  done  according  to  
the  Agreement  signed  with  the  operator.  (Mr.  Theng  Tara,47  personal  communication,  2011).  Permission  
from  MAFF   is   however   needed   before   the   flow   of   any   river   is   blocked,   and   a  member   of   IFReDI48   is  
                                                                                                                        
41  Project  Officer,  Fisheries  Action  Coalition  Team  (FACT).  Interviewed  on  15th  February,  2011,  Phnom  Penh.  
42  Article  61,  Law  on  Fisheries,  2007.  
43  Article  62,  Law  on  Fisheries,  2007.  
44  Art.2,  Royal  Decree  on  the  establishment  of  community  fisheries,  2005.  
45  Art.3,  Royal  Decree  on  the  establishment  of  community  fisheries,  2005.  
46  Article  30,  Law  on  Fisheries,  2007.  
47  Deputy  Director,  General  Technical  Affairs,  Department  of  Water  Resources  Management  and  Conservation,  MOWRAM.  
Interviewed  on  14th  February,  2011,  Phnom  Penh.  
48  IFReDi  chairs  a  Technical  Working  Group  of  Fisheries  which  includes  several  non-­‐government  stakeholders  and  other  
technical  bodies.  This  Group  also  has  a  sub-­‐group  on  the  impacts  of  dams.  
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always  involved  when  assessing  hydro  impacts  by  carrying  out  an  independent  review  of  impacts  of  the  
fisheries   and   their   habitats   and   the   implications   for   people’s   livelihoods.   The   scope   of   such   an  
evaluation,  which  is  more  akin  to  a  SEA,  includes  fish  species,  migration  and  habitats;  numbers  of  people  
affected,  level  of  dependency,  markets  even  beyond  the  province  and  alternate  livelihoods;  and  covers  
both   upstream   and   downstream   impacts   (Dr.   So  Nam,49   personal   communication,   2011).   In   contrast,  
most  EIAs   compiled  by   the  project  proponent  usually  only   cover   the   local   reservoir  area  even   though  
most  fish  migrate.  The  findings  of  this  assessment  are  communicated  to  the  MoE  during  the  inter-­‐MAFF  
meeting  to  review  the  draft  EIA  report.  Despite  IFReDi’s  expertise  and  familiarity  with  the  issues,  the  EIA  
consultants  contracted  by  the  project  proponents  do  lot  contact  IFReDI,  and  they  therefore  do  not  have  
a  baseline  for  assessing  impacts  and  costs  and  benefits  and  for  calculating  compensation.  In  fact,  while  
the  EIA  Guidelines  provide  a  generic  structure  for  EIA  reports,  the  content  filled  by  the  company  is  not  
accurate.   This   can   also   be   partly   attributed   to   the   fact   that   the   legal   framework   on   EIAs   does   not  
adequately  clarify  the  roles  of  the  various  agencies,  or  any  duty  on  the  part  of  the  project  proponent  to  
consult  specific  agencies.  
  
As  part  of  the  evaluation  of  fisheries  and  related  impacts,  IFReDi  also  recommends  compensation  levels,  
especially  since  the  company  does  not  have  a  method  to  quantify  impacts  and  compensation  during  the  
EIA  process.  In  the  case  of  the  Lower  Sesan  2  dam,  IFReDi  has  recommended  fish  culture  as  an  alternate  
income   source  and  a  budget  of   $1.5Mn   for   its   implementation.  However,   it   is   not   clear   from   the  EIA  
reports  as  at  who  will  be  compensated  and  by  how  much.  Overall,   there   is   little  or  no  monitoring  on  
whether  compensation  has  been  paid.  (Dr.  So  Nam,50  personal  communication,  2011).  
  
Forestry	  Management	  
The  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fisheries  (MAFF)  governs  three  conflicting  sectors,  one  being  
forestry.  The  Forestry  Administration  is  mandated  under  the  Law  on  Forestry  (2002)  to  oversee  forestry  
and  wildlife  policy  and  management,  with  the  exceptions  of  flooded  forests  which  are  managed  by  the  
Department   of   Fisheries   (Article   3);   fish   and   animals   that   breed   in   water   (Article   48),   and   protected  
areas  which   are  managed   by  MoE.   The   existence   of   overlapping   jurisdictions  within   the   forestry   and  
wildlife  sectors  are  thus  apparent.  Management  of  the  sector  is  to  be  according  to  the  National  Forest  
Sector   Policy   and   the   Law  on   Forestry.   This   Law  defines   the   framework   for  management,   harvesting,  
use,  development  and  conservation  of  the  forests.   It  applies  to  all   forests,  whether  natural  or  planted  
(Article  2)  with  the  exception  of  flooded  forests  (Article  3)  which  is  under  the  Law  on  Fisheries.  
  
                                                                                                                        
49  Adjunct  Professor  and  Director,  IFReDI.  




Figure  19:  Organizational  structure  of  the  Forestry  Administration  
Source:  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fisheries.  
  
Classification	  of	  forests	  
Under  the  Law  on  Forestry  (2002),  the  Permanent  Forest  Estate  is  categorized  into  Permanent  Forests  
Reserves   and   Private   Forests,   and   is   to   be   managed   according   to   the   principle   of   sustainable   forest  
management  (Article  8).  The  Permanent  Forest  Estate  is  sub-­‐divided  into  Production  Forests,  Protection  
Forests,  and  Conversion  Forest  (Article  10).  Production  Forests  consist  of  (Article  10):    
• Forest  Concessions,  
• Production  Forests  not  under  concession,  
• Forests  rehabilitated,  
• Reserved  forestland  for  reforestation  or  tree  plantation,  
• Reserved  forestland  for  forest  regeneration,  
• Degraded  Forestland,  and    
• Community  Forests.  
  
Production   Forests   that   are   not   under   concessions   are   to   be   managed   with   the   priority   purpose   of  
meeting  domestic  needs  for  forest  products  and  by-­‐products  (Article  20).  Protection  Forests  are  meant  
primarily  for  protecting  forest  ecosystems  and  natural  resources  therein.  These  consist  of  the  following  
sub-­‐categories  (Article  10):  
• Reserve  Forests  for  special  ecosystems  
• Research  forests  
• Forests  for  regulating  water  sources  
• Forests  for  watershed  protection  
• Recreation  forests  
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• Botanical  gardens,  and    
• Religious  forests.  
  
According   to   the   Law   on   Forestry,   MAFF   may   propose   to   the   Government   the   designation   as   a  
Protection  Forest  any  part  of  the  Permanent  Forest  Reserve  which  qualifies  as  a  special  ecosystem  area,  
an  area  of  scientific,  cultural,  or  tourism  value  or  an  area  for  biodiversity,  water  and  soil  conservation  
(Article  22).  The  category  of  Conversion  Forests  appears  to  be  somewhat  misleading  as  it  is  defined  by  
the  same  Law  as  land  for  other  development  purposes  comprised  mainly  of  secondary  vegetation,  and  
which  has  not  yet  been  designated  for  use  by  any  sector  (Article  15).  Each  allocation  of  the  Permanent  
Forest  Reserves  to  harvest  forest  products  and  by-­‐products  may  be  conducted  only  in  Permanent  Forest  
Reserve  considered  as  Production  Forests.  No  permits  are  to  be   issued  to  harvest   forest  products  and  
by-­‐products  within  all  types  of  Protection  Forests  in  the  Permanent  Forest  Reserves  (Article  28).  
  
Forest  Concessions  
The  Government  may,  according  to  the  Law  on  Forestry,  grant  an  area  of  production  forest  that  is  not  
under  use  as  a  forest  concession  through  public  bidding,  so  long  as  this  is  consistent  with  the  National  
Forest   Management   Plan,   and   after   consultation   with   concerned   Ministries,   local   authorities   and  
communities   (Article   13).   The   concessionaires   shall   have   the   right   to   manage   and   harvest   forest  
Products  and  by-­‐products  within  their  concession,  while  ensuring  that  the  operation  does  not  interfere  
with  the  following:      
• Customary  user  rights  enjoyed  by      indigenous  communities  on   land  that   is  registered  with  the  
state  consistent  with  the  Land  law,  and    




The  Sub-­‐Decree  on  community  forestry  management  (2003)  defines  a  Community  Forest  as  the  forest  
plantation  of  a  Community  or  State  forest,  where  the  right  is  granted  to  a  local  Community  living  in  or  
near   the   forest   to   manage   and   utilize   the   forest   in   a   sustainable   manner   between   the   Forestry  
Administration  and  a  local  Community  (Article  5).  A  community  is  defined  as  a  group  of  residents  in  one  
or   more   villages   in   the   Kingdom   of   Cambodia   who   share   a   common   social,   cultural,   traditional   and  
economic  interest  and  use  the  natural  resources  in  an  area,  where  they  live  in  or  near,  in  a  sustainable  
way   for   subsistence   and   livelihood   improvement   purposes   (Article   5).   Minority   ethnic   groups   are  
distinguished   from   other   communities   by   defining   them   as   Local   Communities:   the   minority   ethnic  
community  or  a  group  of  local  residents  with  original  settlement  in  one  or  more  villages,  where  they  live  
in  or  near  state  forest  with  their  tradition,  custom,  religious  belief,  culture  and  subsistence  depending  
on  the  harvest  of  forest  and  non-­‐forest  products  and  the  basic  use  of  those  forest  resources  (Article  5).  
  
According  to  the  Law  on  Forestry  MAFF  has  the  authority  to  allocate  any  part  of  the  Permanent  Forest  
Reserve  to  a  community   living   inside  or  near  a   forest  area   in  the  form  of  a  Community  Forest   (Article  
41).  The  cantonment  of  the  Forestry  Administration,  through  consultation  with  other  parties  concerned,  
has  the  duty  to  study  conditions  of  the  Permanent  Forest  Reserves  to  establish  Community  Forests  by  
identifying  clear  boundaries  of  appropriate  areas  based  on  the  capacity  of  forest  resources  and  the  need  
to  ensure  customary  user  rights  of  local  communities  (Article  42).  MAFF  is  also  required  to  recognize  the  
religious   forests   of   local   communities,   living   within   or   near   the   forest,   as   Protection   Forests   serving  
religious,  cultural  or  conservation  purposes.  It  is  prohibited  to  harvest  any  spirit  trees  and  these  are  to  
be  specially  marked  and  identified  in  a  Community  Forest  Management  Plan  (Article  45).    
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The  chief  of  the  cantonment  of  the  Forestry  Administration  signs  a  Community  Forest  Agreement  with  a  
community   living  within   or   near   a   forest   area   in   the   Permanent   Forest   Reserve.   This   agreement   has  
validity  for  a  period  not  to  exceed  fifteen  years,51  and  grants  and  protects  the  Community's  rights  within  
any   specific   area   to   access,   use,  manage,   protect   and   benefit   from   forest   resources   in   a   sustainable  
manner.52  An  agreement  may  be  extended  based  on  monitoring  and  evaluation  reports  of  the  division  of  
the   Forestry   Administration.53   The   Agreement  may   be   terminated   prior   to   the   expiration   date   if   the  
government  believes  that  there  is  another  purpose  which  provides  a  higher  social  and  public  benefit  to  
the   country.   In   such   a   situation,   the   Forestry   Administration   Cantonment   is   to   give   the   Community  
Forestry  Management  Committee  a  written  notice  six  months  prior  to  termination.  Within  this  period,  
the  Forestry  Administration  Cantonment  Chief  is  required  to  discuss  and  negotiate  with  the  Community  
Forestry  Management  Committee  to  determine  the  fair  compensation  for  the  Community’s  loss.54  This  
does  not  adequately  create  a  duty  on  the  government  to  pay  compensation  or  establish  any  principles  
by  which  such  compensation  is  to  be  assessed.  
  
Each  Community  Forest  Community  is  to  be  led  by  a  Community  Forestry  Management  Committee.  Its  
members  are  selected  from  the  CF  Community  through  secret  ballot  by  at  least  2/3  of  the  members  of  
the   CF   Community   during   a   public   meeting.   The   local   authority   or   commune   councils   and   Forestry  
Administration  Cantonment  are  to  be  present  as  observers.55  
  
It   is  expected  that  a  Community  Forest  will  be  managed   in  an  “economic  and  sustainable  manner”  by  
the   local   community,   and   in   conformity   with   a   Community   Forest   Management   Plan,   rules   on  
Community  Forestry  and  guidelines  on  Community  Forestry.  The  Forestry  Administration  is  required  to  
monitor   the   implementation   of   the   Management   Plan   and   provide   technical   assistance,   where  
appropriate,   upon   the   request   of   the   local   community.56   The   management   plan   of   the   Community  
Forest,  according   to   the  Sub-­‐Decree  on  community   forestry  management   (2003)   is   to  be  prepared  by  
the   local  community  and  subject   to  approval  by   the  Cantonment   level  of   the  Forestry  Administration.  
Sustainable   harvest   rates   for   a   specified   period   are   set   by   the   Community   Forestry   Management  
Committee   and   approved   by   the   Forestry   Administration   (Article   5).   By-­‐Laws   can   be   adopted   by   the  
Community   Forestry   Management   Committee   on   the   internal   operation   of   the   Community   Forestry  
Management   Committee,   including   such   aspects   as   quorum   requirements,   term   and   number   of  
committee  members   and  method   for   electing   the  Community   Forestry  Management  Committee.   The  
User  Rights  of  CF  Community  members  include:  
• Customary  user  rights  prescribed  in  Article  40  of  the  Forestry  Law,  namely:  
o The  collection  of  dead  wood,  picking  wild  fruit,  collecting  bees'  honeys,  taking  resin,  and  
collecting  other  forest  by-­‐products;    
o Using   timbers   to   build   houses,   stables   for   animals,   fences   and   to   make   agricultural  
instruments;    
o Grass  cutting  or  unleashing  livestock  to  graze  within  the  forests;    
o Using  other  forest  products  and  by-­‐products  consistent  with  traditional  family  use,  and  
                                                                                                                        
51  Article  27,  Sub-­‐Decree  No:  79  on  community  forestry  management,  2003  
52  Article  44,  Law  on  Forestry  2002  and  Art.5,  Sub-­‐Decree  No:  79  on  community  forestry  management,  2003  
53  Article  42,  Law  on  Forestry  2002  
54  Article  28,  Sub-­‐Decree  No:  79  on  community  forestry  management,  2003  
55  Article  16,  Sub-­‐Decree  No:  79  on  community  forestry  management,  2003  
56  Article  43,  Law  on  Forestry  2002  
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o The  right  to  barter  or  sell  forest  by-­‐products  shall  without  a  permit,  if  those  activities  do  
not   cause   significant   threat   to   the   sustainability   of   the   forest.   This   right   is   however  
granted  only  after   the   first   five  years   following   the  approval  of   the  Community  Forest  
Management  Plan.  
• The  traditional  practice  of  swidden  agriculture  during  specific  periods  of  time  as  determined  in  
the  Community  Forest  Management  Plan.  
• The  right  to  appeal  decisions  which  impact  Community  rights.  
• The  rights  granted  under  a  Community  Forest  Agreement  within  a  specific  area  that  shall  ensure  
the  sustainable  use  of  forest  resources.  
  
A   permit   is   needed   by   a   community  with   the   rights   to   harvest   forest   products   and   by-­‐products   in   a  
community   forest   that  exceed  customary  user   rights  defined  by  rules  on  community   forestry,  and  are  
issued  by  the  Chief  of  Cantonment  of  the  Forestry  Administration.  
    
The  Forestry  Administration’s  support  to  the  Community  Forest  Communities  is  to  include:       
• Resolving  conflicts  on  request  by  a  Community  Forest  Community;    
• Establishing   and   managing   a   Community   Forestry   Central   Registry   and   map   of   Community  
Forests;  and  
• Providing  technical  support,  and  providing  training  to  local  Forestry  Administration.57  
  
In  contrast  to  the  legal  framework  on  EIAs,  the  Law  on  Forestry  requires  that  an  Environmental  as  well  
as   a   Social   Impact   Assessment   be   prepared   for   any  major   forest   ecosystem   related   activity   that  may  
cause   adverse   impact   on   society   and   the   environment.   It   further   directs   that   these   reports   be  made  
available  for  public  comment,  although  no  procedure  for  doing  so  is  specified  (Article  4).  Unfortunately,  
hydropower  dams  do  not   appear   to   fall  within   the  meaning  of   an   energy   related   activity   despite   the  
significant  deforestation  they  cause.  
  
The	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  and	  other	  local	  communities	  
In  addition  to  Community  Forests,  local  communities  that  traditionally  practice  shifting  cultivation  may  
conduct   such   practices   on   property   of   indigenous   communities   which   are   registered   with   the   state.  
According   to   the   Law   of   Forestry,   the   Forestry   Administration   is   to  manage   and   control   the   shifting  
cultivation   that   is   a  part  of   the   community   forest  management  plan.   Shifting   cultivation  practices  are  
prohibited  in  natural  intact  forest  in  the  Permanent  Forest  Reserves  (Article  37).  For  local  communities  
living  within  or  near  the  Permanent  Forest  Reserves,  the  state  is  directed  to  recognize  and  ensure  their  
traditional  user   rights   for   the  purpose  of   traditional  customs,  beliefs,   religions  and   living  as  defined   in  
this  article  (Article  40).  
  
The   Forest   Law   (Article   15)   and   the   Sub-­‐Decree   on   Forest   Concession   Management   (Article   2)   both  
provide  for  the  rights  of  indigenous  peoples  living  within  or  adjacent  to  a  forest  concession  by  ensuring  
that  the  concession  owners  do  not  interfere  with  the  customary  user  rights  of  indigenous  communities  
and   that   they   protect   and   maintain   their   access   rights   to   forest   resources   that   are   of   economic,  
subsistence  and  spiritual  value  to  them.  
	  
	  
                                                                                                                        
57  Art.24,  Sub-­‐Decree  No:  79  on  community  forestry  management,  2003  
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Role	  in	  hydropower	  (and	  Sesan	  2)	  
The  Forestry  Administration  is  not  directly  involved  in  the  EIA  process  and  do  not  have  dealings  with  the  
company  or  its  EIA  consultant.  Its  main  role  is  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  the  dam  on  forests,  but  this  is  in  
practice   limited   to  merely  clearing   the  area   to  be   inundated  by   the   reservoir  as   identified  by   the  EIA.  
They   are   not   involved   in   assessing   any   losses   to   people   (Mr.  Mak   Chillea,58   personal   communication,  
2011).  A  second  role   is  assessing  the  suitability  of   land  for  resettlement,  although  there   is  no  decision  
making  power  as   the   land  will  have  already  been  demarcated  by  MIME  and  the  project  proponent.   It  
only   advises   MIME   on   the   suitability   of   proposed   sites.   (Mr.   Mak   Chillea,   personal   communication,  
2011).  In  theory,  the  project  proponent  will  need  to  get  permission  from  the  Forestry  Administration  if  it  
requires  any  trees  to  be  cut  for  house  construction   in  resettlement  areas.  FA  will  also  stipulate  where  
the  trees  may  be  cut.  (Mr.  Mak  Chillea,  personal  communication,  2011).  
  
Land	  Management	  
According  to  Article  44  of  the  Constitution  “[a]ll  persons,  individually  or  collectively,  shall  have  the  right  
to  ownership.  Only  Khmer   legal   entities   and   citizens  of  Khmer  nationality   shall   have   the   right   to  own  
land.   Legal  private  ownership   shall  be  protected  by   law.  The   right   to   confiscate  possessions   from  any  
person  shall  be  exercised  only  in  the  public  interest  as  provided  for  under  law  and  shall  require  fair  and  
just  compensation  in  advance.”    
  
The   law   that  now   regulates   land  ownership   is   the   Land   Law  of   2001  which   replaced   the   Land   Law  of  
1992.  According  to  the  Land  Law  (2001),  any  regime  of  ownership  of  immovable  property  prior  to  1979  
shall   not  be   recognized   (Article  7).   The  State   is   the  owner  of      property   in  Cambodia  as   also   stated   in  
Article  58  of  the  1993  Constitution.  This  includes  any  property  that  has  a  natural  origin,  such  as  forests,  
courses   of   navigable   or   floatable   water,   natural   lakes,   banks   of   navigable   and   floatable   rivers   and  
seashores  (Articles  12  and  15).  Any  person  who  enjoyed  peaceful,  uncontested  possession  of  immovable  
property   for   five  years  or  more  prior   to   the  promulgation  of   the  2001  Land  Law   is  entitled   to  private  
ownership,  and  has  the  right  to  request  the  registration  of  his/her  title  (Article  30).  
  
With  respect  to  indigenous  communities,  the  Land  Law  states  that  these  groups  can  continue  to  manage  
their   community   and   immovable   property   according   to   their   traditional   customs,   but   shall   be   also  
governed   by   the   Land   Law   which   sets   the   overall   framework   within   which   customary   practices   can  
operate   (Article   23).   Article   25   states   that   indigenous   community   lands   are   “lands   where   the   said  
communities   have   established   their   residences   and  where   they   carry   out   traditional   agriculture”   and  
includes   “not   only   lands   actually   cultivated   but   also   includes   reserves   necessary   for   the   shifting   of  
cultivation”  as  per  their  traditional  agricultural  practice.  However,  the  qualification  in  the  provision  that  
such   lands   should   be   those   “recognized   by   the   administrative   authorities”   weakens   the   provision   by  
granting  the  administrative  authorities  the  final  say  over  demarcating  land  as  belonging  to  a  community.  
Moreover,  the  provisions  of  this  article  are  not  to  be  an  obstacle  to  the  undertaking  of  works  done  by  
the  State  that  are  required  by  the  national  interests  or  the  needs  of  a  national  emergency  (Article  26).  
This  appears  to  be  in  contradiction  of  Article  28  which  states  that  no  authority  outside  the  community  
may  acquire  any  rights  to  immovable  properties  belonging  to  an  indigenous  community.    
  
Article  26  provides  for  communal  ownership  to  have  “all  the  rights  and  protections  of  ownership  as  are  
enjoyed  by  private  owners”  except  the  right  to  “dispose  off  any  communal  ownership  that  is  State  public  
property   to   any   person  or   group.”   It   also   goes   on   to   emphasize   and   recognize   the   role   of   traditional  
                                                                                                                        
58  Deputy  Director,  Watershed  Management,  Forestry  Administration.  Interviewed  on  17th  February  2011,  Phnom  Penh.  
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authorities,   mechanisms   and   customs   in   decision   making   and   exercising   the   ownership   rights   of  
immovable  properties  of  the  community.    
  
The   Land   Law   is   to   be   administered   by   the   Ministry   of   Land   Management,   Urban   Planning   and  
Construction   (MLMUPC)   (Article   3),  with   the   support   of   provincial/municipal   and   srok/khan   Cadastral  
Offices  which  are  required  to   implement  all   instructions   issued  by  the  Ministry   (Article  232).  Land  use  
planning  is  the  joint  responsibility  of  the  Ministy  of  Land  Management  and  the  Ministry  of  Interior  (Mr.  
Lim  Haing   Kry,59   personal   communication,   2011).   The   Land   Policy   of   2009   states   that   the   Council   for  
Land  Policy  has  the  duty  to  promote  and  monitor  implementation  of  land  policy  in  compliance  with  the  
direction  of  the  Supreme  Council  for  State  Reform,  as  well  as  to  coordinate  among  the  three  land  sub-­‐
sectors  (land  administration,  land  management,  and  land  distribution)  to  strengthen  implementation  of  
the  Land  Law  and  other  statutes   related   to  environment,   forest,   fisheries,  water   resources,  civil   code,  
decentralization  and  de-­‐concentration.  This  suggests  an  overall  co-­‐ordinating  function  for  the  Council  for  
Land   Policy,   although   it   is   unclear   to   what   extent   this   creates   an   overlap   with   the   mandate   of   the  
Ministry  of  Land  Management,  Urban  Planning  and  Construction,  and  how  this  is  to  be  addressed.  
  
Social  land  concessions    
According  to  the  Land  Law,  land  concessions  responding  to  a  social  purpose  allow  beneficiaries  to  build  
residential  constructions  or  to  cultivate  lands  belonging  to  the  State  for  their  subsistence  (Article  49).  A  
land   concession   cannot   establish   ownership   rights   on   the   land   provided   for   concession   except   for  
concessions  responding  to  social  purposes  (Article  52).  It  is  a  legal  mechanism  to  transfer  state  land  for  
social  purposes  to  the  poor  who  lack  land  for  residential  and/or  family  farming  purposes  which  equates  
to  family  cultivation  or  animal-­‐raising  to  meet  basic  needs,  and  to  provide  land  to  resettle  families  who  
have  been  displaced  resulting  from  public  infrastructure  development.60  This  is  thus  likely  to  be  the  basis  
for  the  land  needed  for  resettling  communities  displaced  by  the  Sesan  2  dam.  
  
According   to   the  Sub-­‐Decree  on  Social   Land  Concessions,   the  maximum  size  of   social   concession   land  
granted   for   residential  purposes   is  1,200  square  meters,  except   in   rural  areas  where   land   is  available,  
the  size  of  social  concession  may  be  increased  up  to  3,600  square  meters  (Article  16).  The  maximum  size  
of  social  concession   land  granted  for   family   farming  purposes   is   two  hectares,  but   for  some  areas  the  
size   of   social   concession   land  may   be   increased   up   to   five   hectares   based   on   the   characteristics   and  
potentiality  of  the  land  or  the  type  of  crop,  and  labor  (Article  17).  After  complying  with  the  criteria  of  the  
social  land  concession  program  for  five  years  the  target  land  recipient  has  the  right  to  ownership  of  the  
land  and  may  request  ownership  title  according  to  procedures  determined  by  the  Minister  of  MLMUPC.  
If   a   target   land   recipient   dies   during   the   implementation   of   the   social   land   concession   program,   the  
successors  may  continue  to   implement  the  social   land  concession  program  to  complete  five  years  and  
shall   have   the   right   to   ownership.   The   target   land   recipient   may   not   sell,   rent   or   donate   social  
concession   land   during   the   first   five   years   (Article   18).   Land   concessions   responding   to   an   economic  
purpose   allow   the   beneficiaries   to   clear   the   land   for   industrial   agricultural   exploitation   of   land.61   The  
maximum  duration  of  a  land  concession  is  limited  to  ninety-­‐nine  years.62  
  
                                                                                                                        
59  National  Program  Advisor,  Ministry  of  Interior,  Department  of  Local  Administration  Project  to  Support  Democratic  
Development  (PSDD),  Interviewed  on  18th  February,  2011,  Phnom  Penh.  
60  Article  3,  Sub-­‐Decree  No.  19  on  Social  Land  Concessions,  2003  
61  Article  49,  Land  Law  2001  
62  Article  61,  Land  Law  2001  
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The  social  land  concession  mechanism,  according  to  the  Sub-­‐Decree  on  Social  land  Concessions  (2003)  is  
to  have  the  following  structure:  
1.  The  National  Social  Land  Concessions  Committee  (NSCC)  located  in  the  MLMUPC;  
2.   Provincial/Municipal   Land   Use   and   Allocation   Committee   (PLUAC)   located   in   the  
provincial/municipal  hall;    
3.  District  Working  Group  (DWG)  located  in  district/Khan  hall,  and  
4.  Commune  Council.  
  
The   Provincial/Municipal   Land   Use   and   Allocation   Committee   is   the   Provincial/Municipal   social   land  
concession  policy  making  body.  Its  tasks  include:  
• Identify  the  state  public  land  and  state  private  land.  
• Review  and  assess   land  use  plans  and  social   land  concession  plans  proposed  by  the  commune  
councils.  
• Approve  land  classification,  land  use  plans,  and  decisions  about  state  land  allocation.  
• Assist  commune  councils  to  develop  land  use  plans  and  land  classifications.  
• Approve,  refuse  or  modify  social  land  concession  plans  proposed  by  commune  councils.      
  
The  District  Working  Groups’  functions  include:  
• Carrying   out   all   the   work   of   Provincial/Municipal   Land   Use   and   Allocation   Committee   at   the  
district  level.  
• Providing  technical  assistance  to  the  commune  councils  to  identify  and  classify  land,  to  develop  
land   use   plans,   to   select   target   land   recipients   and   to   implement   social   land   concession  
programs.  
  
A   commune  council   according   to   the  Sub-­‐Decree  on  Social   land  Concessions  can   initiate  a   local   social  
land   concession   program   by   preparing   a   social   land   concession   plan.   One   or   more   citizens   or  
organizations   working   with   or   on   behalf   of   citizens   in   a   commune,   may   initiate   a   local   social   land  
concession  program,   that  shall  be  done  through  the  commune  council,   in  which   the  social  concession  
land  is   located,  by  preparing  a  social   land  concession  plan  (Article  5).  The  commune  council  shall  have  
the  following  duties  and  tasks  (Article  28):  
• Initiate  and  consider  the  social  land  concession  plan.  
• Implement  the  local  social  land  concession  program  with  technical  support  provided  by  District  
Working  Group.  
• Be  responsible  for  selection  of  target  land  recipients  from  among  applicants.  
• Be  responsible  for  fair  and  efficient  allocation  of  land.  
  
A  National   Social   Land  Concession  Program  may  be   initiated  by  one  or  more   concerned  ministries   or  
institutions   in   situations  where   there   is   a   program   to   resettle   large   groups  of   families,   such   as   urban  
squatters,  or  displaced  persons  ((Article  6).  
  
The  Commune  Council   shall   submit   the   local   social   land  concession  plan   through   the  District  Working  
Group   for   approval   to   the   Provincial/Municipal   Land   Use   and   Allocation   Committee.   This   Committee  
may   approve   the   plan   if   it   is   seen   that   the   land   is   vacant   state   land   and   suitable   for   the   social   land  
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concession  plan.  The  Committee  will  then  inform  the  National  Social  Land  Concession  Committee  about  
each  plan  that  it  approves  (Article  6).  
  
So   far,   there   are   some   cases   of   social   land   concession   distribution   which   had   been   done   without  
thoroughly  examining  land  space  at  the  ground.  This  lack  of  attention  and  concerted  effort  has  resulted  
in  overlaps  between   land  granted   to   some  private   companies   through  economic   land   concession  and  
land  already  occupied  by  local  people  (The  NGO  Forum  on  Cambodia  2010).  Areas  of  granting  economic  
land   concession   are   generally   identified   on   the   map   without   ground   truthing   (Mr.   Mith   Samonn,63  
personal  communication,  2011).    
  
3.3.	  Hydropower	  decision	  making	  	  
The  first  step  in  the  decision  making  process  is  a  screening  and  ranking  of  potential  projects,  after  which  
some  may  be  selected  for  further  study,  while  others  will  be  included  in  the  national  power  generation  
expansion  plan   (King  et  al.   2007).   Those  projects   in   the  national  plan  are   then  open   to  public/private  
investment.  The  practice  appears  to  be  that  any  project  proponent  company  first  presents  the  project  
proposal  to  the  Prime  Minister,  Deputy  Prime  Minister  or  a  member  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  or  the  
Minister  of  Economics  and  Finance  (Mr.  Tep  Bunnarith,64  personal  communication  2011).  If  the  blessings  
of  the  individual  are  given,  the  project  proposal  can  be  handed  to  the  CDC  which  assigns  it  to  MIME  (Mr.  
Tep  Bunnarith,  personal   communication  2011).   The  project  proponent  must   then   sign  a  MoU  with  or  
receive   a   Letter   of   Permission   from  MIME.   This   grants   the   proponent   two   years   to   go   through   the  
process  of  preparing  the  feasibility  studies  (IEIA),65  EIA66  and  Environmental  Management  Plan  (EMP)67  
(H.E.  Tun  Lean,68  personal  communication  2011).    
  
The   project   proponent’s   technical   staff   will   then   prepare   the   feasibility   study,   with   MIME   arranging  
access   to   relevant  government  staff,  data  and  the  necessary  approval  permits.  The  project  proponent  
typically  self-­‐finances  the  study,  which  becomes  the  joint  property  of  the  project  proponent  and  MIME  
once  completed.  On  satisfactory  completion  of  the  feasibility  study,  the  project  proponent  is  entitled  to  
enter   into  discussion  with  MIME  on   the  possibility  of  developing   the  hydropower  project.   (Middleton  
2008).   According   to   the   Sub-­‐Decree   on   the   Environmental   Impact   Assessment   Process   (1999),   the  
project  proponent  is  also  required  to  submit  the  feasibility  study  to  the  MoE  for  review  (Article  7).  If  the  
project  is  deemed  by  MoE  to  have  a  “serious  impact  on  natural  resources,  ecosystem,  health  or  public  
welfare”   it   may   then   be   required   to   submit   a   full   EIA   (Article   8).   This   is   to   be   determined   after   the  
                                                                                                                        
63  Project  Coordinator,  WorldFish  Center.  Interviewed  on  15th  February,  2011,  Phnom  Penh.  
64  Executive  Director,  Culture  and  Environment  Preservation  Association  (CEPA)  
65  Defined  as:  “the  preliminary  assessment  of  primarily  secondary  data  of  physical,  biological  and  socio-­‐economic  environment  
and  resources  on  the  area  within  or  in  the  surrounding  the  project  site.  It  forms  basis  for  identification,  prediction  and  analysis  
of   potential   adverse   environmental   and   social   impacts   by   project   activities,   aiming   to   identify   actions   to  minimize   negative  
impacts   and   maximize   positive   impacts.”   (Annex   1,   The   Declaration   on   General   Guidelines   for   Developing   Initial   and   Full  
Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Reports,  2009.  Translation)  
66  Defined  as:  “the  detailed  assessment  of  physical,  biological  and  socio-­‐economic  environment  and  resources,  based  mainly  on  
primary  data  on  the  area  within  or  in  the  surrounding  the  project  site.  It  forms  basis  for  identification,  prediction  and  analysis  of  
potential   adverse   environmental   and   social   impacts   by   project   activities,   aiming   to   identify   actions   to   minimize   negative  
impacts   and   maximize   positive   impacts.”   (Annex   1,   The   Declaration   on   General   Guidelines   for   Developing   Initial   and   Full  
Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Reports,  2009.  Translation)  
67  Defined  as:  “the  plan  for  environmental  management  as  stipulated  in  the  IEIA  or  full  EIA  report  developed  by  the  project  
owner  and  approved  by  the  Ministry  of  Environment.”  (Annex  1,  The  Declaration  on  General  Guidelines  for  Developing  Initial  
and  Full  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Reports,  2009.  Translation)  
68  Director  General  of  Energy  General  Department  of  Energy,  MIME  
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Department   of   Environmental   Impact   Assessment   Review   in   MoE   or   the   concerned   Provincial  
Departments  of  Environment  visits   the  project   site.69   In  practice,  according   to   the  Director  General  of  
the  Energy   (of  MIME)70   an   inter-­‐agency   feasibility   study  workshop   including  MIME,  MAFF,  Ministry  of  
Economics  and  Finance  and  MoWRAM  is  held  to  jointly  review  the  results  and  determine  whether  the  
proposed   project   should   continue   to   the   feasibility   study   and   IEIA.   If   this   is   the   case,   the   terms   of  
reference  are  provided  on  the  basis  of  the  discussions  at  the  workshop.  
  
The  EIA  process  is  government  by  three  enactments  that  constitute  the  current  framework  of  rules  and  
processes  to  be  followed.  These  are:  
• The  Law  on  Environmental  Protection  and  Natural  Resources  of  1996,  
• The  Sub-­‐Decree  on  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Process,  1999  and  
• The   Declaration   on   General   Guidelines   for   Developing   Initial   and   Full   Environmental   Impact  
Assessment  Reports  made  by  MoE   in   2009,  which   aims   to  provide   general   guidelines  on   the  




Figure  20:  Process  for  EIA  clearance    
Source:  Declaration  on  General  Guidelines  for  Developing  Initial  and  Full  Environmental  Impact  
Assessment  Reports,  2009  
  
The  Law  on  Environmental  Protection  and  Natural  Resources  stipulates  that  an  assessment  of  impacts  to  
the  environment  shall  be  done  for  every  project  and  activity,  private  or  public  before  the  issuance  of  a  
decision  by   the   royal   government  on  all   submitted  proposed  projects   (Article  1).  Consequently,   every  
investment   project   application   and   proposed   project   submitted   by   the   state  was   to   include   an   initial  
environmental  impact  assessment  (IEIA)  or  environmental  impact  assessment  (EIA)  (Article  7).  However,  
believing   that   this  would   take   too   long,   the  government  developed  a  prescribed   list  of   those  projects  
requiring  an  IEIA  and/or  EIA  through  the  1999  Sub-­‐Decree  (Oliver  et  al.  2006.).  All  activities  included  in  
this  list  are  considered  as  a  potential  threat  to  the  environment,  and  includes  all  hydropower  structures  
                                                                                                                        
69  Article  7,  The  Declaration  on  General  Guidelines  for  Developing  Initial  and  Full  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Reports,  
2009  
70  H.E.  Tun  Lean,  General  Department  of  Energy,  MIME.  Interviewed  on  14th  February,  2011,  Phom  Penh.  
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that   intend   to   yield   more   than   one   megawatt   of   electricity,   which   in   effect   will   include   all   major  
hydropower  dams.71    
  
Preparing	  for	  an	  EIA	  
As  noted  in  section  4.4,  the  Ministry  of  Environment  is  mandated  as  the  lead  agency  for  implementing  
the  EIA  process  by  the  Law  on  Environmental  Protection  and  Natural  Resources  (Article  1).    The  project  
proponent   will   draft   the   Terms   of   Reference   (ToR)   for   the   EIA   and   submit   to   the   Department   of  
Environmental   Impact   Assessment   Review   in  MoE,   which   is   to   have   the   ToR   assessed   by   a   group   of  
experts.   The   ToR   may   be   revised   in   consultation   with   the   project   proponent   (Mr.   Tep   Bunnarith,  
personal   communication   2011).   Once   the   ToR   is   finalised,   the   EIA   is   conducted   by   a   consultancy  
company   hired   by   the   proponent   (Mr.   Tep   Bunnarith,   personal   communication   2011).   The   project  
proponent   can   contract   a   consultant   of   its   choice   as   provided   for   by   the   Declaration   on   General  
Guidelines  for  Developing  Initial  and  Full  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Reports  of  2009  (Article  4).  
Such  consulting  companies  are  to  be  registered  with  MoE  which   (by   implication)   is   to  ensure  that   the  
company  has  the  requisite  capacities  to  carry  out  the  activities  in  the  ToR  (Article  6).  
  
Content	  of	  an	  EIA	  Report	  
Since  the  MoE’s  Declaration  on  General  Guidelines  for  Developing  Initial  and  Full  Environmental  Impact  
Assessment  Reports  in  2009,  there  is  now  a  stipulated  structure  for  the  EIA  report.  This  consists  of  nine  
chapters,   references   and   annexes.   Chapter   4   includes   a   description   of   the   physical   environment  
including  “biological  resources”  and  “socio-­‐economic  aspects”.  Chapter  5  deals  with  public  participation,  
and  requires  information  on  the  following:  
• Dissemination   by   the   project   owner   with   local   authorities   and   local   communities   of   the  
development  project;  
• Feedback  from  relevant  ministries/  agencies/  departments  and  relevant  local  authorities;  
• Comments  from  relevant  non-­‐government  organizations  (NGOs);  and  
• Consultation  with  affected  local  communities.  
  
Environmental  impacts  and  mitigation  measures  is  dealt  with  in  Chapter  6  where  a  description  of  both  
positive  and  negative  environmental  and  socio-­‐economic  impacts  is  required.  It  is  expressly  stated  that  
cumulative  impacts  should  be  provided.  The  Environmental  Management  Plan  is  the  subject  of  Chapter  
7.  It  makes  it  the  project  owner’s  responsibility  to  “make  available  sufficient  funds  and  a  unit/team  with  
sufficient   skills   and   expertise,   equipment,   methodology,   and   schedule   for   monitoring   environmental  
quality   in   close   collaboration   with   relevant   ministries/agencies   in   order   to   implement   measures   to  
minimize  adverse  socio-­‐economic  and  environmental  impacts”  (Unofficial  translation).  While  the  duty  of  
the  project  owner  to  fund  the  EMP’s  implementation  was  confirmed  during  the  stakeholder  interviews  
conducted  in  Phnom  Penh  for  this  report,  there  appears  to  be  less  awareness  of  the  owner’s  duty  to  also  
provide  the  personnel  with  the  necessary  skills.  Chapter  7  also  outlines  the  structure  of  an  EMP:  
• A  summary  of  main  negative  environmental  impacts  and  mitigation  measures;  
• Trainings  to  be  provided;  
• Environmental   monitoring   program   for   the   construction,   operation   and   closure   periods  
illustrating  the  following:  
• Agency  responsible  for  project  monitoring;  
                                                                                                                        
71  Other  activities  include  irrigation  systems,  port  construction  and  dredging.  
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• Identified  parameters  to  be  monitored;  
• Monitoring  methodology;  
• Environmental  standards  or  guidelines  to  base  for  monitoring;  
• Schedule  and  cycle  which  be  control;  
• Assessment  of  monitoring  results;  
• Quarterly  report  to  be  submitted  to  Ministry  of  Environment  and  relevant  ministries/  agencies.  
  
Chapter  8  on  “Economic  Analysis  and  Environmental  Value”   requires  a   “description  of   the  benefits  of  
the   project   in   relation   to   the   value   of   environmental   damage   arising   from   the   project   activities”  
(Unofficial  translation).  While  this  wording  is  ambiguous  as  to  what  exactly  is  required,  the  need  to  value  
the   environmental   damage   is   an   important   and   clear   component.   The   Conclusions   and  
recommendations   chapter   (Chapter   9),   states   that   it   is   “important   that   the   investment   project  
recommends  adverse  environmental  impacts  mitigation  that  can  sustain  positive  environmental  impacts  
and   promote   local   livelihood  with   the   development   projects   in   the   area”   (Unofficial   translation).   The  
explicit  duty  to  ensure  sustainable  livelihoods  are  supported  is  particularly  relevant,  although  no  further  
guidance   is   provided   on   how   sustainability   should   be   understood   or   assessed   in   the   context   of   the  
project’s   impacts.   Overall,   though   this   structure   lacks   the   details   required   to   ensure   that  meaningful  
information   is   provided,   it   may   still   present   the   MK1   Project   with   an   opportunity   to   develop   these  
detailed  data  requirements  in  collaboration  with  MoE.  
  
EIA	  Review	  Process	  
The  Project  proponent   is   required  to  submit  the  draft  EIA  report  to  the  Department  of  Environmental  
Impact  Assessment  Review  in  MoE  with  a  copy  to  MIME.  This  Department,  according  to  the  Sub-­‐Decree  
on   Environmental   Impact   Assessment   Process,   must   then   review   the   EIA   within   30   working   days   of  
receipt   and  provide   its   comments  and   recommendations   to   the  Project  Proponent  and  MIME   (Article  
17).  In  the  case  of  a  local  project,  the  project  proponent  is  required  to  also  forward  the  EIA  report  to  
the  Provincial/Urban  Environmental  Department  for  review.  If  MoE  is  unable  to  submit  its  comments  
within  this  period,  the  project  owner  can  assume  that  the  EIA  has  been  accepted  (Article  18).  
  
The  Declaration  on  General  Guidelines  for  Developing  Initial  and  Full  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  
Reports,  2009  stipulates  that  the  review  at  the  national  level  is  to  consist  of  the  following  steps  (Article  
11):  
• A   visit   to   the   project   site   and   comments   made   by   technical   officials   of   the   Department   of  
Environmental  Impact  Assessment  (within  10  working  days);  
• Comments   made   by   other   relevant   departments   of   the   Ministry   of   Environment   (within   5  
working  days);  
• Comments  by  the  management  of  the  Ministry  of  Environment  (within  5  working  days),  and  
• Comments   generated   from  a  multi-­‐stakeholder  meeting   chaired  by   the  Minister   in   charge  of  
the   Ministry   of   Environment   with   representation   from   relevant   government   ministries/  
agencies,  local  authorities,  non-­‐governmental  organizations,  and  other  stakeholders  concerned  
with  the  investment  project  (within  5  working  days).  
  
Where  the  draft  EIA  requires  review  at  the  provincial  level,  the  steps  are:  
• A   visit   to   the   project   site   and   comments   made   by   technical   officials   of   Department   of  
Environmental  Impact  Assessment  (within  15  working  days);  
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• Comments  by  the  management  of  the  provincial  Department  of  Environment  (within  5  working  
days);  
• Comments   resulting   from   a   multi-­‐stakeholder   meeting   chaired   by   the   Director   of   provincial  
Department   of   Environment   with   representation   from   relevant   provincial  
departments/agencies,   local   authorities,   non-­‐governmental   organizations,   and   other  
stakeholders  concerned  with  the  investment  project  (within  5  working  days).  
  
In   practice,   according   to  Mr.   Dong   Sankeath   of   the   Department   of   EIA   Review,72   a   working   group   is  
usually   formed  at  national   level,  which  could   include  technical  staff   from  other  MoE  departments  and  
other  Ministries.  He  also  stated  that  the  meetings  stipulated  by  the  Guidelines  of  2009  included  public  
consultations  at  the  site  of  the  proposed  dam.  In  the  opinion  of  Conservation  International73  however,  
the  multi-­‐stakeholder  workshop   lasts  for  only  a  couple  of  hours,  and  the  EIA  report   is  received  by  the  
participants   the  day  before   the  workshop.   It  was  also  opined   that   senior  ministers  are  present  at   the  
workshop  to  control  the  discussions  and  prevent  key  issues  from  being  aired.  
  
It  is  also  apparent  from  the  General  Guidelines  that  the  time  allocated  for  these  reviews  are  much  too  
short  in  light  of  the  scale  of  impacts  involved.  Following  the  30  day  review  period,  the  MoE  or  provincial  
Department  of  Environment  is  expected  to  make  a  formal  notification  to  the  project  proponent  of  the  
approval   or   request   for   revision   within   5   working   days.  Where   revisions   are   deemed   necessary,   the  
second   review   is   to   be   made   by   MoE   or   provincial   Department   of   Environment   within   another   30  
working   days   upon   official   receipt   of   the   revised   report   from   the   project   proponent.74   The   project  
proponent  is  required  to  pays  a  fee  determined  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Economy75  for  the  review  
of   the   first   EIA   draft   (about   USD90076).   It   is   also   required   to   transfer   to   the   National   budget   a   sum  
calculated  by  MoE  in  support  of  MoE’s  duty  to  monitor  the  project’s  implementation.  
  
Public	  Participation	  in	  the	  EIA	  Review	  
Cambodia’s   overarching   development   strategy,   the   “Rectangular   Strategy   for   Growth,   Employment,  
Equity  and  Efficiency,”  places  good  governance  as  a  cornerstone  to  sustainable  and  equitable  economic  
development,  for  which  public  participation  is  considered  an  essential  element  (Middleton  and  Chanthy,  
2008).   In   terms   of   environmental   management,   the   Law   on   Environmental   Protection   and   Natural  
Resource  Management  1996  requires  MoE  to  provide  the  public  with  “information  on  its  activities,  and  
shall   encourage   participation   of   the   public   in   the   environmental   protection   and   natural   resource  
management”  (Article  16).  The  same  Law  goes  on  to  state  that  procedures  for  participation  of  the  public  
and  access  to   information  pertaining  to  the  environmental  protection  and  management  of  the  natural  
resources,  shall  be  determined  by  an  Anukret  (Sub-­‐Decree)  following  a  proposal  of  MoE  (Article  17).    
  
With  respect  to  the  EIA  process  on  hydroelectricity  projects,  the  Sub-­‐Decree  on  Environmental   Impact  
Assessment  Process,  1999  includes  the  specific  objective  of  encouraging  public  participation  in  the  EIA  
implementation,   and   expressly   recoginizes   the   need   to   take   the   public’s   ‘ideas   and   suggestions’   into  
consideration   during   a   project’s   appraisal,   but   limits   further   comment   on   the   subject   to   stating   that  
public   involvement   is   “encouraged”   (Article   1).   Thus,   no   concrete   requirements   are   stipulated.   The  
                                                                                                                        
72  Interview  with  Mr.  Dong  Sankeath,  Director,  16th  February,  2011,  Phnom  Penh.  
73  Interviewed  on  21st  February,  2011,  Phnom  Penh.  
74  Article  13,  The  Declaration  on  General  Guidelines  for  Developing  Initial  and  Full  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Reports,  
2009.  
75  Article  11,  The  Sub-­‐Decree  on  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Process,  1999.  
76  Interview  with  Mr.  Dong  Sankeath,  Director  Department  of  EIA  Review,  MoE,  16th  February,  2011,  Phom  Penh.  
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MoE’s  Guidelines  on  EIAs  (2009)  defines  “Public  Participation”  as  “the  participation  of  all  stakeholders  
concerned   with   the   development   project   including   ministries/institutions,   local   authorities,   relevant  
departments,   project   owners,   consulting   companies,   representatives   of   affected   people   and   non-­‐
governmental  Organizations  concerned  with  the  project  area(s)”  (Annex  1).  
  
The   experience   to   date   with   respect   to   hydro-­‐electricity   dam   planning   however   suggests   that  
participation  has  not  occurred  in  any  meaningful  manner.  Opportunities  for  consultation  are  limited  to  
the  EIA  report  preparation  and  its  review.  During  the  EIA  report  preparation,  the  project  proponent  or  
its  consultant  determines  the  scope  and  degree  of  consultations  with  stakeholders,  while  consultation  
during   the   report   review   process   is   determined   by   the   MoE.   The   general   view   amongst   the   NGOs  
interviewed   is   that   with   respect   to   the   proposed   Lower   Sesan   2   dam,   villages   in   the   Stung   Treng  
province   have   not   been   consulted   in   any  meaning   way   as   only   a   few   individuals,   namely   the   village  
head/vice  head  from  some  villages  were  invited  for  discussions.  There  have  been  no  group  discussions  
with  the  village  at  large  or  with  any  specific  groups.  No  consultation  has  been  evident  with  downstream  
villages   in   particular.   Moreover,   the   draft   EIA   report   has   not   been   shared   with   any   villages   or   with  
provincial  departments.  (Mr.  Tep  Bunnarith,  personal  communication,  2011;  Baird  2009).  Furthermore,  
the  quality  of  questions  asked  in  the  EIA  are  poor  with  many  closed  questions  (yes/no  answers).  Since  
the  EIA  was  conducted  by  a  sub-­‐contractor  from  Vietnam,  the  language  used  was  Vietnamese  which  was  
then  translated  through  an  interpreter  (Mr.  Tep  Bunnarith,  personal  communication,  2011).  
  
Consequently,   almost   the   only   non-­‐state   stakeholders   to   even   know   of   its   existence   and   have   the  
capacity  to  request  a  copy  from  MoE  are  the  NGOs.  In  the  case  of  Lower  SeSan  2,  no  copies  appear  to  
have  been  sent  to  the  province.  One  reason  suggested  is  that  by  sharing  the  EIA,  the  cost  of  conducting  
it  and  addressing  the  issues  it  highlights  will  increase,  and  both  the  proponent  and  the  government  do  
not  wish   this   to   happen.   The   government   is   concerned   that   the   financial   equation  will   no   longer   be  
attractive  to  the  investor  (Mr.  Tep  Bunnarith,  personal  communication,  2011).  This  thus  appears  to  be  a  
deliberate  strategy  with  a  very  strong  incentive  driving  it.  Participation  in  practice  therefore  appears  to  
be   a   one   way   communication   with   primarily   NGOs   communicating   their   concerns   and   requests   to  
government,  but  with  no  means  of  checking  whether  their  concerns  have  been  incorporated  in  the  EIA  
until   the   final   version   is   approved,   by   which   time   it   is   too   late   (Mr.   Tep   Bunnarith,   personal  
communication,  2011)  
  
Resettlement	  and	  Compensation	  
The   legal   framework  dealing  with  EIAs   is   devoid  of   any   reference   to   resettlement   and   compensation.  
These   issues  therefore  do  not   fall  within  MoE’s  mandate  although  they  are   fundamental   to  mitigating  
the   impacts  of  a  proposed  dam.  This  appears  to  also  be   in   line  with  the  fact  that  the   legal   framework  
does   not   require   a   Social   Impact   Assessment   (SIA).   These   issues   are   instead   overseen   by   the   Inter-­‐
ministerial   Resettlement  Committee   (IRC)  of   the  Ministry  of   Economics   and   Finance   (MEF),  while   line  
ministries   and   local   authorities   are   responsible   for   approving   resettlement   action   plans   and  
compensation   rates   for   projects   requiring   resettlement   (Meach   2008).   The   fact   that   one   of   MEF’s  
objectives   is   to  minimize  overall   costs   for   the   infrastructure  project   gives   rise   to   inherent   conflicts   of  
interest.  As  a  committee  under  MEF,  IRC  is  expected  to  follow  instructions  from  MEF  and  comply  with  
MEF’s  project  guidelines.  It  would  thus  be  difficult  for  IRC  to  make  decisions  that  are  sympathetic  to  the  
situation   of   the   affected   people   in   terms   of   providing   adequate   funding   for   compensation   and  
resettlement.  As  explained  in  a  review  by  the  ADB  (2007)  of  the  resettlement  and  compensation  process  
in   Cambodia:   “[the]   IRC   acts   as   a   “legislature”   in   determining   rules   and   standards   for   valuation   of  
affected   assets   and   resettlement,   as   an   “executive”   in   implementing   these   standards   and   delivering  
compensation   and   resettlement   options,   and   as   a   “judiciary”   in   addressing   affected   peopple’s  
88  
  
grievances  and  complaints.  With  all  three  major  government  functions  in  one  body,  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  
abuse  of  power.”  
  
While  compensation  will   include  resettlement  as  one  component,   its   full   scope  will  be  much  broader,  
although   its   extent   is   not   clear   due   to   the   absence   of   a   definition   of   or   guidelines   for   assessing   the  
diverse   socio-­‐economic   impacts   of   dams,   and   the   absence   of   specific   duties   on   either   the   State,   the  
investor  or  operator  of  the  dam  with  respect  to  the  payment  of  compensation.  
  
In  the  case  of  the  displaced,  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  Land  Law  or  the  Exploitation  Law  will  be  applied  
when   the   valuation   is   done   for   relocation   and   compensation.   The   Exploitation   Law   allows   land   to   be  
taken  for  public  purposes  and  compensation  to  be  provided  at  market  rates.   In  contrast,  the  Land  law  
states  that  this  can  be  done  only  in  a  special  case  which  is  not  defined,  and  that  compensation  should  be  
reasonable  and  equitable  which  are  also  vague.  It  is  not  clear  whether  there  is  any  forum  where  these  
are  discussed.  (Mr.  Tep  Bunnarith,  personal  communication,  2011).  The  fact  that  compensation  for  land  
is  linked  to  a  land  title  also  undermines  the  status  of  many  local  families  given  that  some  families  who  
have  been  allowed  to  cultivate  state  land  do  not  posses  title  to  it,  and  others’  have  not  been  registered.  
Those  who  have  no  permission  to  occupy  state  land  and  are  thus  deemed  to  be  illegal  occupiers  will  not  
be  entitled  to  compensation  for  the  loss  of  land  (Mr.  Phum  Ra,77  personal  communication,  2011).  These  
people  will   have   to   either   encroach   on   state   land   again,   or   purchase   it   through   the  market  which   of  
course  most  cannot  afford  to  do.  Furthermore,  the  government  lacks  the  capacity  to  register  residents  
or  award  land  titles  adequately  due  to  a  lack  of  common  procedures,  a  weak  court  system,  militarism,  
centralization   and   corruption.   This   situation   has   serious   implications   for   the   resettlement   of   large  
numbers  of  people  called  for  by  dam  construction  since  customary  systems  have  no  legal  recognition.  
  
One  of  the  overall  deficiencies  of  the  Sesan  2  dam  resettlement  plan  is  that  the  government  does  not  
have  a  clear  resettlement  policy  or  associated  legislation  to  guide  it  in  the  development  of  high  quality  
resettlement  and  compensation  plans.  Without  a  policy  as  noted  in  section  3.1  of  this  report,  developers  
can  essentially  establish  their  own  standards  as  they  go  along.  Moreover,  options  for  resettlement  have  
been   badly   affected   by   economic   land   concessions,   especially   for   industrial   rubber   cultivation.   This  
important   issue  has  been  completely   ignored   in   the  EMP.  Villagers  do  not  appear   to  be   scheduled   to  
receive  any  compensation  for  lost  forests  and  grazing  lands  (Baird  2009).  Villagers  have  requested  to  be  
resettled  close  to  the  main  road  (#78)  which  provides  access  to  forests  but  also  access  to  transport  and  
business  opportunities.  This   land   is  however  controlled  by  economic  concessions.  What  will  happen   is  
thus   unclear.   (Mr.   Tep   Bunnarith,   personal   communication).   While   it   is   claimed   by   MIME   that   the  
standards  used  to  develop  a  resettlement  plan  are  those  set  by  the  World  Bank  and  Asian  Development  
Bank   (H.E.   Tun   Lean   Director,78   personal   communication,   2011),   other   stakeholders   claim   that   the  
villagers   in   the   case   of   Lower   Sesan   2   have   no   idea   where   they   will   be   relocated   to   or   how   much  
compensation  they  will  receive  (Mr.  Tep  Bunnarith,  personal  communication,  2011).  
  
Environmental	  Management	  Plan	  	  
Under   the   Sub-­‐Decree   on   Environmental   Impact   Assessment   Process   of   1999,   the   project   proponent  
must  implement  the  Environment  Management  Plan  (EMP  )included  in  the  EIA  report  in  6  months  from  
the  date  the  MoE  approves  the  EIA  report  (Article  23).  The  2009  Guidelines  on  EIAs  defines  an  EMP  as  
the  “plan  for  environmental  management  as  stipulated   in  the   IEIA  or   full  EIA  report  developed  by  the  
                                                                                                                        
77  Deputy  Director,  Department  of  Agricultural  Legislation,  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Forests  and  Fisheries,  interviewed  on  17th  
February,  2011,  Phon  Penh.  
78  General  of  Energy  General  Department  of  Energy,  MIME  
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project   owner   and   approved   by   the   Ministry   of   Environment”.   The   Guidelines   go   on   to   set   out   the  
content  of  an  EMP  as  follows:  
• A  summary  of  main  negative  environmental  impacts  and  mitigation  measures;  
• Training  to  be  provided;  
• Environmental   monitoring   program   for   the   construction,   operation   and   closure   periods  
illustrating  the  following:  
• Agency  responsible  for  project  monitoring;  
• Identified  parameters  to  be  monitored;  
• Monitoring  methodology;  
• Environmental  standards  or  guidelines  to  base  for  monitoring;  
• Schedule  and  cycle  which  be  control;  
• Assessment  of  monitoring  results;  
• Quarterly  report  to  be  submitted  to  Ministry  of  Environment  and  relevant  ministries/  agencies.  
  
Management  practices  such  as  environmental  flows  are  not  incorporated  into  EMPs.  It  is  opined  by  Mr.  
Theng   Tara79   that   having   them   incorporated   in   dam   operation   is   difficult   due   to   dry   and  wet   season  
realities.   In   wet   season,   power   companies   need   to   release   large   quantities   of   water   to   avoid  
compromising  the  structural  integrity  of  the  dam,  while  the  opposite  applies  during  the  dry  season  when  
minimum  water  requirements  are  needed  for  electricity  generation.    
  
Final	  Approval	  
If  the  project  is  cleared  through  an  inter-­‐ministerial  meeting  held  at  the  Prime  Minister’s  Office,  MIME  
and  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Economics  sign  an  Implementation  Agreement  (IA)  with  the  company  as  
well  as  a  Concession  Agreement  (H.E.  Tun  Lean,  personal  communication,80  2011).  
  
Monitoring  
The  project  proponent   is   required   to  make  available   “sufficient   funds  and  a  unit/team  with   sufficient  
skills   and   expertise,   equipment,   methodology,   and   schedule   for   monitoring   environmental   quality   in  
close   collaboration   with   relevant   ministries/agencies   in   order   to   implement   measures   to   minimize  
adverse  socio-­‐economic  and  environmental  impacts,”81  although  as  noted  already,  this  does  not  occur.  
In   fact,   the   Sub-­‐Decree  of  1999  makes   the  MoE   responsible   for  monitoring  and  enforcing   the  project  
owner’s  compliance  with  the  EMP  (Article  3).  This  role  is  delegated  to  the  Department  of  Environmental  
Impact  Assessment  Monitoring  and  Review  or  provincial  Department  of  Environment  which  is  to  follow-­‐
up,  monitor   and   take   appropriate  measures   to   ensure   compliance   by   the   project   owner   of   the   EMP  
during  project  construction,  operation  and  closure  as  stated  in  the  EIA  report  approved  by  the  Ministry  
of   Environment   or   provincial   Department   of   Environment.82   In   addition,   Article   27   of   the   Sub-­‐Decree  
also   requires   the   project   approving   agency   (MIME   in   the   case   of   hydropower   dams)   to   ‘advise’   the  
Project's  Owner  to  implement  the  EMP  as  described  in  the  EIA  report  and  approved  by  the  MoE.  Article  
28  of   the   Sub-­‐Decree   further   strengthens   the  enforcement  hand  of  MoE  by   requiring   it   to  work  with  
                                                                                                                        
79  Deputy  Director,  General  Technical  Affairs,  Department  of  Water  Resources  Management  and  Conservation,  MOWRAM.  
80  Director  General  of  Energy  General  Department  of  Energy,  MIME  
81  Chapter  7,  the  Declaration  on  General  Guidelines  for  Developing  Initial  and  Full  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Reports,  
2009.  




other   concerned   agencies   to   ban   the   activity   of   any   Project's  Owner  who  does   not   implemented   the  
EMP  as  described  in  the  EIA  report.  In  addition,  a  ‘Provincial  Monitoring  Committee’  is  supposed  to  be  
established  for  the  project,  chaired  by  the  Province  Vice-­‐Governor.  
  
Despite   the   clear   articulation   of   responsibilities   and   powers   for   monitoring   and   enforcement,   the  
interviews   had   with   various   stakeholders   (World   Wildlife   Fund   (Cambodia),   The   NGO   Forum   on  
Cambodia  and  CEPA)suggests  monitoring  and  enforcement  currently  does  not  take  place.  This  appears  
to   be   corroborated   by   to   H.E.   Tun   Lean83   of   MIME   who   stated   that   monitoring   is   done   by   an  
independent  contractor  hired  by  MIME  due  to  the  paucity  of  skills  and  resources  in  the  state  sector.  The  
consultant  reports  to  a  committee  which  includes  MIME.  MAFF  and  the  governor  of  the  commune  every  
three  months  till  the  BoT  agreement  is  over  (Mr.  Dong  Sankeath,84  personal  communication,  2011).  The  
need  for  a  clearer  and  more  inclusive  process  was  voiced  by  other  stakeholders,  sighting  practical  issues  
such   as   fish  migration   or   flood  mitigation  which   needed   significant   technical   inputs   and   inter-­‐agency  
consultation  to  monitor(Mr.  Tep  Bunnarith,85  personal  communication,  2011).  
  
Discussion	  
The  lengthy  history  of  political  upheaval  has  meant  that  Cambodia  started  using  EIAs  relatively  recently,  
and   this   is   evident   in   that   the   current   legal   framework   guiding   the   EIA   process   remains   rudimentary,  
suffering  particularly   from  the   lack  of  detailed  guidance  for   implementing  key  stages  of  the  process,  a  
case  in  point  being  the  EIA  and  its  review.  The  fact  that  the  project  proponent  is  required  to  conduct  the  
EIA  creates  a  conflict  of  interest  that  amounts  to  a  fundamental  flaw  in  the  process.  The  lack  of  a  truly  
independent   assessment   of   both   the   ecological   and   socio-­‐economic   implications   goes   on   to   directly  
undermine   the   quantification   of   compensation   due   to   often   the  most   vulnerable   stakeholders   in   the  
dam   development   process.   Omissions   and   ambiguities   in   the   legal   framework   are   compounded   by  
limited  capacities  within  Cambodia  to  prepare  and  evaluate  EIAs  and  hiring  international  consultants  to  
conduct   this   work   can   be   prohibitively   expensive   for   the   investing   company.   In   any   case,   industry  
consultants   and   engineering   companies   that   undertake   feasibility   studies   and   environmental   impact  
assessments   know   that   they   need   to   portray   a   project   in   a   favorable   light   if   they  want   to   get   future  
contracts.  It  is  therefore  in  their  interest  to  claim  that  the  impacts  can  be  mitigated  and  that  the  project  
in   question   represents   the   best   option   for   meeting   the   country's   needs.   EIAs   that   should   anticipate  
problems  have  thus  served  as  a  rubber-­‐stamping  device  rather  than  a  real  planning  tool.  
  
The  Department  of  EIA  Review  is  constrained  both  by  its  staff  capacity  and  size  to  manage  the  review  of  
large  EIAs  within  the  30-­‐day  period  stipulated  in  the  Sub-­‐Decree  of  1999.  It  is  arguable  whether  any  staff  
size   will   be   adequate   given   the   30   day   limit.   This   limit   is   thus   another   critical   limiting   factor   where  
ecological  as  well  as  socio-­‐economic  impacts  can  cover  large  areas  and  are  often  cumulative  in  nature.  
Consequently,  no  serious  impact  assessment  on  ecosystems  and  their  services  can  been  done.  
  
In   terms  of   scope,   the   absence   of   an   SIA   is   a  major   gap   and  undermines   the   government’s   ability   to  
minimize  the  negative  developmental  impacts  especially  at  the  local  scale.  EIAs  are  also  limited  to  being  
project-­‐based  rather  than  emerging  from  a  Strategic  Environmental  Assessment  and  the  proposed  hydro  
project  is  not  assessed  in  the  context  of  any  development  plans  in  the  related  province.  In  the  case  of  
Lower   Sesan   2   for   instance,   its   impacts   will   include   inundation   of   planed   national   highways   and  
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concession   areas.   Similarly,   the   government   is   pushing   for   more   community   fisheries   without  
considering  that  the  dams  will  undermine  this  (Mr.  Sangha  Kim,86  personal  communication,  2011).  The  
application   of   SEA   concepts   remains   project   based   (World   Bank.   2006).   This   emerges   as   another   key  
need  considering  the  significant  number  of  hydropower  dams  planned  by  the  government.  There  is  also  
no  requirement  for  consideration  of  alternatives  in  the  EIA  legal  framework  or  the  Guidelines  of  2009.  
  
With   respect   to   participation,   Cambodia’s   power   sector   planning   process   has   demonstrated   limited  
transparency  or  accountability   to  Cambodia’s  citizens,  with  many  decisions   taken  behind  closed  doors  
and  without  meaningful  public  consultation.  The  Department  of  Hydropower  Development  within  MIME  
on  many  counts   remains   inaccessible   to  civil   society   scrutiny   (Middleton,  2008).  Although  Cambodia’s  
Constitution  states  that  “Khmer  citizens  of  either  sex  shall  have  the  right  to  participate  actively   in  the  
political,   economic,   social   and   cultural   life   of   the   nation”   there   is   no   specific   law   on   broader   public  
participation   in   the   decision-­‐making   and   planning   process   for  water   resources   development   projects.  
This   is  a  mojor  drawback  in  there  not  being  a  broader   legal  framework  to  address  the  lack  of  detailed  
processes   and   rules   stipulated   in   the   legal   framework   on   EIAs   for  meaningful   engagement   (e.g.   how  
should  participation  be  implemented  and  reported  on;  and  how  will  public  inputs  be  incorporated  in  the  
final  project  document.  Even  more  fundamental   is  the  absence  of  a  tradition  of  public  participation   in  
the   country’s   governance   history   (Öjendal   2000).   Due   to   the   lack   of   a   clear   procedure   for   public  
participation,  the  public  has  difficulty  in  learning  how  to  use  the  right  of  access  to  information  as  well  as  
participate  in  decision-­‐making  on  the  protection  of  the  environment  and  natural  resource  management  
(Oliver  et  al.  2006).  Participation  by  indigenous  or  tribal  people  is  not  specifically  covered  in  the  Law  on  
Environmental   Protection   and  Natural   Resources  Management  or   the   Sub-­‐decree  on   the   EIA  Process.  
Although   the   former   Law   calls   for   a   sub-­‐decree   on   access   to   information,   this   has   not   materialized  
(Middleton  and  Chanthy,  2008).  
  
Another   key   factor   is   that   the   need   and   importance   of   an   EIA   is   not   widely   recognized   amongst   all  
Ministries,   limiting  the  authority  of  MoE  to  enforce  an  EIA’s  requirements,  with  some  decision-­‐makers  
seeing  the  need  for  a  project’s  compliance  with  the  EIA  process  to  be  secondary  to  the  need  for  rapid  
economic  development  (Middleton  2008).  Moreover,  and  related  to  this   is  that  MoE   is  relatively  new,  
and  remains  a  relatively  weak  agency  compared  to  other  agencies  with  mandates  over  natural  resources  
(e.g.   forestry,   fisheries)   and   MIME   and   other   agencies   with   a   mandate   to   promote   economic  
development.  Its  mandate  is  thus  often  unclear,  contested,  avoided  or  ignored  by  more  powerful  parts  
of  government,  the  military  or  the  private  sector  (Li.  2008,  SEI.  2002).  According  to  the  NGO  Forum  on  
Cambodia,   it  was  unable  to  organize  a  multi-­‐stakeholder  workshop  on  Lower  Sesan  2  with  MoE  as  the  
Ministry   lacks   the   standing   to   bring   the  main   players   (e.g.   MIME,  MEF)   to   the   table.  Writing   of   the  
Kamchay  Dam  project,  Middleton  (2008)  notes  that  there  “is  clearly  a   lot  of  political  pressure  on  both  
national  and  provincial  government  departments  not  to  criticize  the  Kamchay  Dam  project.”  
  
Another  major   concern  with  existing  hydropower  projects   is   that  environmental   impact  monitoring   is  
generally  weak  or  non-­‐existent.  It  reflects  the  general  lack  of  financial  resources,  budget  provision  and  
sustainable   financing  mechanisms   to   pay   for  mitigation  measures   set   out   in   project   EMPs   as  well   as  
unanticipated   environment   impacts   that   arise.   As   with   the   EIA   process,   it   is   also   a   legacy   of   poor  
commitment  to  ensuring  development  choices  are  sustainable.  
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In   addition   to   the   EIA   process,   criteria   by   which   companies   are   selected   as   eligible   for   investing   in  
Cambodia’s  essential  infrastructure  remain  unclear,  with  the  willingness  of  a  key  authority  figure  to  lend  
political  patronage  being  a  major  determinant  over   technical  considerations.  Private   investors  now  go  
directly   to   the  CDC   so   that  ministries   are  not   aware  of  what   is   happening   (Mr.   Sangha  Kim,  personal  
communication,  2011).  Information  regarding  the  sources  of  financing  for  projects  approved  to  date  is  
not   readily   available   in   the   public   domain.   Details   on   the   contractual   agreement   between   the  
Cambodian   government   and   project   developers   remain   undisclosed   to   the   public.   This   lack   of  
transparency   underpinned   by   a   lack   of   political   will   potentially   open   the   door   to   poor   development  
practices  and  corruption   (Middleton,  2008).  Consequently,  even   if  gaps  and   inconsistencies  within  the  
current   legal   framework   are   addressed,   questions   would   remain   about   its   effectiveness   in   ensuring  
sustainable  outcomes  in  an  environment  where  final  decision  making  by  elites  may  overrule  official  EIA-­‐




The   overarching   development   policy   frameworks   recognize   the   need   to   temper   the   desire   for   rapid  
economic   development   with   ecological   and   social   justice   considerations,   if   development   is   to   be  
sustainable   and   equitable,   two   fundamental   features   if   maro-­‐economic   growth   is   to   lead   to   poverty  
reduction  at  household  level.  Unfortunately,  this  review  of  the  legal  framework  meant  to  facilitate  policy  
implementation,   and   decision   making   processes   especially   in   the   hydropower   sub-­‐sector   exposes   a  
serious  disconnect  between  the  policy  statement  and  reality.  It  appears  that,  in  a  country  emerging  from  
decades  of  civil  war  and  authoritarian  rule,  the  policy  development  process,  driven  by  donor  money  and  
expertise,  has  rapidly  outpaced  the  capacities  and   in  deed  the  willingness  of  the  bureaucracy  and  civil  
society   to   fulfill   the   policy   statements   that   often   give   eloquence   to   international   best   practices   and  
concepts  such  as  good  governance,  participation,  sustainable  development,  integrated  water  resources  
management,  and  so  on.  The  reality  appears  to  be  that  these  seemingly  good  intentions  are  faced  with  a  
socio-­‐cultural,   economic   and   political   context   that   is   considered   by   anthropologists   and   political  
scientists  as  one  of  the  least  amenable  to  such  ideals,  being  characterised  by  an  all-­‐pervasive  notion  of  
hierarchy  and  a  strong  control  by  the  state  on  local  life  (Ovesen  et	  al.  1996;).  Opinion  suggest  that  many  
officials   continue   to   believe   that   government   activities   always   advance   the   common   good   no  matter  
how  private  individuals  are  adversely  affected  (Asian  Development  Bank,  2007).  
  
More  specifically  in  terms  of  the  interests  of  the  MK1  project,  while  the  decision  making  process  can  be  
pieced  together,  a  large  part  of  the  process  on  specific  dams  continues  to  happen  behind  closed  doors,  
that  are  well  beyond  the  reach  of  the  current  EIA  process  and  other  provisions  that  call  for  transparency  
through  public  participation.  There  is  little  legislative  detail  on  when  and  how  the  public  is  to  participate  
in   national   development   decision  making   processes   given   the   absence   of   legislation   dedicated   to   the  
right   to   information   and   consultation.   The   same   weakness   characterizes   the   hydropower   sub-­‐sector  
where  the  EIA  is  the  primary  tool.  While  the  Guidleines  on  the  EIA  report  structure  adopted  by  MoE  in  
2010  suggests  an  evolutionary  process  in  progress,  the  positioning  of  the  EIA  within  the  overall  decision  
making  process   is   flawed   in   terms  of  making  ecological  sustainability  and  social  equity  effective   filters  
for  the  selection  of  hydropower  dams.  This  should  ideally  occur  at  the  stage  when  potential  projects  are  
earmarked  for  investment  rather  than  once  a  particular  investment  has  been  all  but  sealed.  While  more  
attention   is   thus   needed   to  develop  detailed   and   transparent   criteria   to   be  used  during   the   IEIA,   the  
more  effective  remedy  would  be  the  adoption  of  SEAs  that  will  provide  the  broader  context  and  well  as  




Several   major   and   often   interlinked   weaknesses   undermine   the   EIA   process.   Allowing   the   project  
proponent   to   conduct   the   EIA   is   a   fundamental   conflict   of   interest,   amplified   by   the   lack   of   capacity  
within  the  MoE  to  critically  review  the  EIA  findings.  The  quality  of  the  EIA  is  further  compromised  by  a  
lack  of  detailed  criteria  in  the  2010  Guidelines  which  are  limited  to  setting  out  the  basic  structure  of  the  
report,   and   stops   well   short   of   requiring   specific   quantitative   and   qualitative   details   required   for   a  
meaningful   assessment.   The   lack   of   reference   to   baseline   data   reflects   a   failure   to   require   adequate  
consultation   by   the   EIA   consultant   with   key   agencies   as   well   as   poor   coordination   or   cooperation  
amongst  the  various  government  agencies  for  purposes  of  the  EIA  review.  The  timeframes  stipulated  for  
the  EIA  and  it  review  are  well  short  of  the  minimum,  especially  in  terms  of  the  vast  geographical  areas  
and  range  of  ecological  and  socio-­‐economic  issues  and  stakeholders  involved.  It  can  in  fact  be  viewed  as  
an  indicator  of  the  lack  of  political  commitment  for  the  role  of  EIAs  in  development  decision  making  in  
the  country.   It   leaves   room  for   little   if  any   time   for  data  collection  and  analysis,  any  real  engagement  
with  affected  people  or  the  evaluation  of  the  draft  EIA  report.  It  is  no  surprise  that  these  weaknesses  are  
viewed   by   stakeholders   outside   of   the   government   bureaucracy   to   be   deliberate   ploys   to   sideline  
attempts  to  hold  development  decisions  ecologically  and  socially  accountable.  
  
These   same  weaknesses   continue   to  undermine   the  decision  making  process  beyond   the  EIA  and   the  
Environmental   Management   Plan   will   reflect   the   inadequacies   of   the   EIA.   The   responsibilities   and  
resources  for  enforcing  the  EMP  appear  to  be  virtually  non-­‐existent.  Compensation  too  suffers  from  a  
compromised  stating  point  (the  EIA),  and  the  narrow  rules  linked  to  land  title  that  determine  eligibility  
for  alternate  land  for  the  displaced  does  not  recognize  the  informality  of  the  rural  land  use  systems  that  
disenfranchise  a  majority  of  the  rural  poor.  Failure  to  adopt  compensation  criteria  to  define  the  breadth  
of  losses  to  be  covered  means  that  the  calculation  of  eligibility,  quantity  and  duration  of  compensation  
is  nowhere  close  to  meeting   international  standards.  These   low  impact  assessment  and  compensation  
standards   and   the   overarching   desire   for   rapid   economic   development   and   market   liberalization  
adopted  by  the  government  means  there  will  be  proportionally  more  hydropower  projects  developed  by  
the  private  sector.  To  the  extent  that  these  projects  are   implemented  without   funds  from  multilateral  
development  banks,  the  weaknesses  of  the  national  EIA  system  are  likely  to  be  exploited  to  externalise  
hydropower’s   social   and   environmental   liabilities.   The   underlying   desire   of   the   government   to   avoid  
adversely  impacting  the  investors’  rate  of  return  is  a  funadamental  incentive  to  maintain  the  status  quo.  
While  this  may  be  beneficial   to  private   investors,  the  significant   impacts  on  the  key  sector  of   fisheries  
and   associated   livelihoods   is   likely   to   cost   Cambodia   will   seriously   undermine   its   ability   to   reduce  
poverty,  inequity  and  meet  its  other  CMDGs.  
  
Moreover,   the   MoE   and   other   natural   resource   management   agencies   often   play   second   fiddle   to  
industry   and   finance   ministries   responsible   for   national   power   policies   and   overall   economic  
development.  While  the  underlying  rationale  of   rapid  economic  development  and  personal  power  are  
well  documented,  this  is  a  fundamental  obstacle  to  conducting  meaningful  EIAs  and  introducing  SEAs  as  
standard  practice.  This  political   inequality   is  reflected  in  the  government’s  failure  to  allocate  adequate  
funds   needed   to   invest   in   the   personnel   and   training   needed   to   even   discharge   the   rudimentary   EIA  
process  that  currently  exists.  Thus  there  appears  to  be  a  serious  issue  of  commitment  to  meaningfully  
examining  both  the  ecological  sustainability  and  social  consequences  of  hydropower  decisions.    
  
The   implication  for  the  MK1  project   is  the  need  to  open  lines  of  dialogue  with  a  range  of  government  
stakeholders      
  
Some   potential   entry   points   for   environment   criteria   that   are   most   relevant   to   hydropower  
development  suggested  in  existing  literature  are  worth  revising:  
94  
  
• Introducing   environmental   and   social   criteria   up-­‐front   in   the   hydropower   project   selection  
process  (King  et  al.  2007);  
• Increasing  the  use  of  available  knowledge  through  systematic  consultations  of  local  stakeholders  
and  of  scientists  (Baran  et  al.  2007);  
• Making  use  of  methods  that  deal  with  scarce  data  and  uncertainty  (Baran  et  al.  2007);    
• Using   methods   for   valuation   of   trade-­‐offs   between   the   various   costs   (esp.   social   and  
environmental)  and  benefits  of  built  structure  projects  (Baran  et  al.  2007)    
• Incorporating  environmental  flows  assessments  (EFA)  into  the  feasibility  and  detailed  design  of  
dams,   and   as   part   of   decision   support   systems   to   optimize   the   performance   of   dams,   for  
example  in  setting  reservoir  operating  parameters  (King  et  al.  2007).  
  
Other  fundamental  changes  required  to  the  present  EIA  framework  include  the  following:    
• The   finalized   IEIA   should   be   made   available   to   the   public.   The   associated   social   and  
environmental   management   plans   should   also   be   made   publicly   available.   The   financial  
arrangements   to   implement   these   plans,   together   with   the   role   and   responsibility   of  
implementing  agencies,  should  be  clearly  detailed.  The  relevant  sections  of  the  each  plan  should  
be  actively  disseminated  to  communities  likely  to  be  affected  by  the  project.  
  
• The   time   frame   for   conducting   an   EIA   should   be   extended   to   at   least   60   days,   and   the  MoE  
should  determine  the  consultant  for  carrying  out  the  EIA  while  the  project  proponent  continues  
to   finance   it.   The   time   limitation   can   also   be   partly   addressed   if   the   MoE   encourages   the  
commencement  of  research  into  potential  implications  of  a  potential  hydropower  project  once  
it   is   identified.   The   collection  of  baseline  data  well   in   advance  of   the  EIA  process  may  greatly  
facilitate   a   more   accurate   assessment   of   impacts,   and   could   be   effected   through   the  
involvement  of  such  as  universities  and  other  academic  and  research  institutions.  
  
• Another   change   required   in   the   legal   framework   is   the   need   for  more   specific   direction  with  
regard   to   the   public’s   right   to   information   and   duties   and   processes   by  which   information   is  
shared   in  a  timely  manner  and   in  a  form  that   is  understandable  and  relevant  to  especially  the  
affected  communities.  Similar  clarity  and  specificity  is  required  with  respect  to  the  calculation  of  
compensation   and   criteria   for   resettlement   to   replace   the   current   vaccum   that   stifles   any  
attempt  to  obtain  a  fair  outcome  for  the  affected.  
  
• Monitoring  should  not  depend  on   the  provision  of   funds  by   the   investor  or  dam  developer.   It  
should   be   possible   for   the   government   to   establish   a   Monitoring   Fund   to   support   the  
independent   monitoring   of   construction   and   operation   by   combining   a   levy   on   the   investor,  
annual  allocations  from  the  government  budget  and  leveraging  contributions  from  donors.    
  
• The  establishment  of  a  permanent  multi-­‐stakeholder   review  committee   for   the  assessment  of  
infrastructure   development   proposals   and   projects.   Creation   of   such   a   committee   will   allow  
social  and  environmental  considerations  to  be  factored  into  the  initial  identification  of  potential  
projects,  and  can  be  linked  to  the  SEA  process.  It  can  also  provide  an  independent  platform  for  
evaluating   the   draft   EIA   reports   and   finally   for   monitoring   the   implementation   of   the  




• Ex	  post	  evaluations  or  post-­‐audit  mechanisms  need  to  be  institutionalised  in  order  to  assess  the  
actual   impacts   of   completed   water   projects,   programmes   and   policies   for   the   population,  
environments,  and  landscapes  that  are  affected  (Oliver  et  al.,  2006).  
  




4. VIETNAM	  COUNTRY	  REPORT	  
  
Unlike  the  previous  two  country  reports  for  respectively  Cambodia  and  Lao  PDR,  Vietnam  country  report  
focuses  more   on   hydropower   sector   planning   and   how   this   is   shaped   through   different   interplays   in  
terms  of  policy  formulation,  institutional  set  up,  and  operational  rules  and  procedures.  Policies  and  legal  
frameworks   related   to   land-­‐water-­‐environment   management   are   reviewed   within   this   overarching  
context  of  hydropower  sector  planning.    
  
4.1.	   The	   natural	   resources	   management	   backdrop	   to	   hydropower	  
development	  
The  government’s  Socio-­‐Economic  Development  Plan  (SEDP)  2006–2010  and  the  draft  SEDP  2011–2015  
detail   the   transition   toward   a   middle   income   country,   based   on   a   market   economy   with   a   socialist  
orientation.    The  Plans  build  on  the  renovation  process  initiated  in  the  late  1980s  while  preserving  the  
strong   poverty-­‐reduction   focus.   The   current   SEDP   sets   out   four   broad   objectives:   to   improve   the  
business   environment;   social   inclusion;   natural   resources   and   environment   management;   and  
governance.  In  the  past  decade  there  has  been  increased  reliance  on  market  mechanisms,  development  
of  a  multi-­‐stakeholder  economy,  and  further  integration  with  the  region  and  the  world.  The  role  of  the  
state  sector  in  manufacturing  has  declined  from  more  than  half  in  1995  to  about  one-­‐third  in  2006,  as  
private  sector  growth  has  outpaced  the  state  sector.    Market  forces  have  tended  to  outpace  the  capacity  
of   institutions   to   regulate   them   effectively   leading   to   misuse   and   excesses   in   natural   resources  
exploitation.  
An   important   institutional  dynamic  has  been  decentralization  of  decision  making  powers   to  provincial  
and   lower   levels   of   government,   administrative   and   service  delivery  units.      Yet,   along  with   important  
political  benefits  of  decentralization,  limited  capacities  at  local  level  have  aggravated  poor  management  
and   overexploitation   of   natural   resources.      Also,   in   the   emphasis   on   decentralizations   certain   critical  
management   approaches   which   require   integration   and   cooperation   across   landscapes   and  
administrative  boundaries  –  such  as  river  basin  management  –  have  been  neglected.    
Population   growth87,   urbanization,   and   industrialization   have   intensified   natural   resource   use   and  
energy  demand  and  had  significant  impacts  on  the  natural  environment.  
                                                                                                                        




Also,  economic  growth  and   reforms  along  with  population  growth  has   led   to  a   situation   today  where  
most   land   is   used,   use   in   all   land   categories   has   intensified   and   conversion   of   agricultural   land   into  
higher-­‐value  nonagricultural  land  has  accelerated.      
The  Land  Law  of  2003  and  subsequent  Decrees  support  the  country’s  industrialization  and  the  economic  
transformation   into   a   market-­‐oriented   economy,   covering   comprehensively   all   the   legal,   land   use  
planning,   land   finance,   and   land   administration   systems.   Cooperative   lands   have   been   reallocated   to  
farmer  households  for  their  long-­‐term  use  and  a  range  of  land  use  rights  have  been  recognised.    Yet,  the  
current  land  policy  framework  places  an  emphasis  on  the  role  of  state  and  pays  less  attention  to  the  role  
of  stakeholders  in  land  management  or  to  effective  and  sustainable  use  of  land  (World  Bank  2011).  
Land  administration  and  management  is  distributed  among  a  large  number  of  central  agencies  including  
for  agriculture  and  forests,  construction  and  transport.  Among  them,  the  Ministry  of  Natural  Resources  
and  Environment  (MONRE),  established  in  2002,  represents  the  government’s  designated  focal  point  for  
the   administration   of   land   resources,   as   well   as   water   and   mineral   resources.   The   land   policy  
implementation   responsibilities   have   been   greatly   delegated   to   provincial,   district,   and   commune  
people’s  committees  supported  by  their  DONREs.    Substantial  gaps  remain  between  land  policy  and  its  
practical  implementation.  
There   are   three   strategic   development   challenges   facing   land  management   (World   Bank   2011).   First,  
past  extensive  use  of  natural  resources,  including  land  means  that  now  there  is  little  “unused”  land.  To  
support   future   growth,   land   must   be   used   more   efficiently.      Second,   a   management   system   for  
sustainable  land  use  is  required,  particularly  for  the  most  fragile  ecosystems  such  as  sloping  land  in  the  
Mountains.    Third,  acquisition  and  compensation  policies  need  to  become  fair  and  transparent.  
Underlying  those  challenges  is  the  fundamental  need  for  and  integrated  special  planning  system  which  
establishes  a  one  area  one  plan  approach   to   land  management.     Different   types  of  plans   such  as   the  
Socio-­‐economic   Development   Plan,   Land   Use   Plans,   Urban   Development   Master   Plans,   and   various  
sectoral  plans  such  as  the  national  and  provincial  Power  Development  Plans,  all  apply  to  the  same  areas  
and  natural  resources.    Despite  an  internal  government  consultation  on  plans  at  various  stages,  capacity  
issues   and  a   lack  of   definitive   spatial   plans   leads   to  overlapping   and   conflicting  uses  with   inadequate  
attention  to  social  and  environmental  dimensions.      
Water	  Resources	  
In   2010,   the   Water   Sector   Review   (WSR)88   emphasized   the   limits   of   Vietnam’s   water   resources:   77  
percent  of  surface  water  occurs  in  only  three  river  basins  and  more  than  60  percent  of  the  total  surface  
water  flow  originates  in  other  countries.    Shortages  now  occur  in  many  rivers  over  the  long  dry  season,  
and  some  aquifers  have  a  limited  life.  
The  Law  on  Water  Resources  1998  established  a  National  Water  Resource  Council  (NWRC)  working  at  a  
national   level   and   Board   for   River   Basin   Planning   and   Management   working   on   a   local   level.   These  




organizations  work  under  the  GoV  as  advisory,  coordination  and  planning  bodies.  The  Law  was  advanced  
legislation  at  the  time  but  there  have  been  serious  difficulties  in  implementation  especially  the  concept  
of  integrated  river  basin  planning  and  management.    The  lack  of  formal  rights  to  water  is  also  a  concern.  
Although  the  Law  on  Water  Resources  creates  a  framework  for  this,  limits  to  the  amount  of  water  that  
can  be  extracted  have  not  been  established  and  rights  are  not  defined.    
The  Law  identified  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  (MARD)  as  the  agency  responsible  
for  the  management  of  water  resources,  a  role  that  has  now  been  transferred  to  MONRE.    The  service  
function   of   irrigation   and   rural   water   supply   remains   with   MARD.   The   creation   of   MONRE   in   2002  
separated   the   function   of   state   management   from   the   functions   of   exploitation   and   use   of   water  
resources  for  economic  purposes.  The  Peoples  Committees  at  province  and  district  level  are  responsible  
for  implementation  in  their  own  jurisdiction.  Specific  functions  of  the  water  resource  management  and  
water  use  allocated  to  other  ministries  and  non-­‐line  agencies.    The  roles  of  other  agencies  in  the  water  
sector   still   need   to   be   more   clearly   defined   to   avoid   overlap   and   to   promote   more   effective  
coordination.      
Already,   Vietnam   has   put   in   place   some   key  measures   for   the  more   effective  management   of  water  
resources,   including   a   strengthened   Law   on   Environmental   Protection,   a   Law   on   Dikes,   the   National  
Water   Resources   Strategy,   the   National   Strategy   on   Disaster   Management,   the   National   Target  
Programme  (NTP)   for  Rural  Water  Supply  and  Sanitation,  and  the  NTP  to  Respond  to  Climate  Change.    
Other  measures  are  also  under  development.  MONRE  is  finalizing  an  NTP  on  Improvement  of  Efficiency  
for  Water  Resource  Protection,  Management  and  Multipurpose  Use,  which  is  based  on  the  concept  of  
integrated  water  resources  management  (World  Bank  2011).    Also,  MONRE  is  revising  the  Law  on  Water  
Resources   and   due   to   be   submitted   to   the   National   Assembly   for   approval   in   2011.   A   greatly  
strengthened   water   rights   and   sharing   framework   is   being   developed   and   the   development   and  
implementation  of  plans  for  water  sources  protection  in  13  priority  river  basins  is  proposed.    
Forest	  management	  
Vietnam’s  Socio-­‐Economic  Development  Strategy  2001–2010  provides   several  development  objectives  
for  the  forest  sector:    
(i) increase  overall  forest  cover  to  43  percent,    
(ii) complete   the   allocation   of   forestland   to   socialize   forestry   development   and   promote  
forestry  based  livelihoods,    
(iii) stabilize  cultivation  practices  and  prevent  the  destruction  and  burning  of  forests,  and    
(iv) accelerate  commercial   reforestation   to  provide  material   for  domestic  and  export  oriented  
industries.    
Those  objectives  are  elaborated  within  the  five  programs  of  the  Vietnam  Forestry  Development  Strategy  
2006–2020,  which   sets   targets   for   forest   development   and   for  management,   policy,   and   institutional  
reforms.    
The   government’s   main   policy   for   forestry   investment   since   1998   has   been   the   Five  Million   Hectare  
Reforestation  Programme  but  results  have  been  disappointing  and  difficult  to  measure.    The  quality  of  
forest  continues  to  degrade  even  if  forest  cover  is  reported  to  have  increased.  Despite  large  investments  
in  the  Program,  the  evidence  suggests  that  it  has  had  little  direct  beneficial  impact  on  poverty  reduction  
and  on  forest  quality  (World  Bank  2011).  Despite  significant  achievements  in  poverty  alleviation  in  the  
country  as  a  whole,  high  rates  of  poverty  in  areas  with  natural  forest  remain,  particularly  in  the  remote  
uplands.  The  Vietnam  Forestry  Development  Strategy  2006–2020  seeks  to  promote  socialization  of  the  
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forest  sector,  encouraging  non-­‐state  actor  tenure  and  resource  access.     Most   forestland,  and  the  best  
forests,  remains  under  state  control.  
The   new  Directorate   of   Forestry   under   the  Ministry   of   Agriculture   and  Rural  Development   (MARD)   is  
responsible  for  developing  forest  policy  and  providing  oversight  and  guidance  for  implementation.  Line  
agencies   at   provincial   and   district   levels   are   responsible   for   administering   forest   protection   and  
development.  However,  decentralization   in   the  sector   is   slow  and  effective   forest  policy  development  
and  management   is  constrained  by  the   lack  of  high  quality  data.     Responsibility   for  protected  areas   is  
divided   among   several   agencies.   The   MARD   Department   of   Forestry   Protection   and   its   provincial  
departments  are  responsible  for  all  special-­‐use  forests,  and  the  Vietnam  Environment  Protection  Agency  
within   MONRE   is   responsible   for   wetlands   and   overall   biodiversity   conservation   facilitation.The  
protected  area  system  suffers  as  a  result  of  this  administrative  fragmentation.    
Energy	  
Vietnam’s  economy  is  expected  to  grow  rapidly  at  7.3  percent  annually  in  the  near-­‐term  through  2010,  
but  will  slowdown  thereafter  to  about  6.0  percent  annually  until  2030.  The  industry  and  service  sectors  
are   expected   to   continue   to   drive   the   economic   growth.      Total   population   is   projected   to   reach   109  
million  by  2030.    Between  2000  and  2005,  total  primary  energy  consumption,  excluding  biomass,  grew  
at  an  annual  rate  of  10.6  percent.  Primary  energy  demand  is  projected  to  grow  annually  at  4.4  percent  
as  a  result  of  industrialization.  Vietnam  is  expected  to  become  a  net  energy  importing  economy  beyond  
2020;  with  the  energy  import  dependency  projected  to  reach  15  percent  in  2030.  
Energy  demand  in  the  residential  sector  is  projected  to  remain  the  largest  but  will  reduce  substantially  
from  67  percent   in  2002   to  35  percent   in  2030,   as   a   result  of  biomass  being   replaced  by   commercial  
energy   sources.   The   industry   sector   is   expected   to  maintain   the   second   largest   share   at   35   percent,  
followed  by  transport  at  24  percent  and  commercial  at  6  percent.  
Meeting  the  economy’s  growing  energy  demand,  on  the  back  of  a  surge  in  the  world  energy  prices  has  
resulted  in  significant  increase  in  energy  production.  To  supply  energy  in  a  manner  meeting  the  rise  in  
consumption,  the  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Trade  has  formulated  the  National  Energy  Policy  of  Vietnam.    
The  main  points  of  the  Policy  are:  1)  development  of  energy   infrastructure  and  enhancement  of   long-­‐
term   energy   supply,   2)   development   of   energy   in   consideration   of   environment,   3)   improvement   of  
energy  efficiency  and  4)  enhancement  of  international  energy  cooperation.  
Two  key  laws  are  influential  in  implementation  of  the  National  Energy  Policy  –  the  Electricity  Law  2005  
and  the  Environment  Protection  Law  2005.    The  Electricity  Law  2005  designates  MOIT  as  responsible  for  
administering   overall   electricity   activities   and  use,  with   the   Provincial   People’s   Committees  managing  
electricity   activities  within   their   jurisdiction.   It   provides   regulations   on   electric   power   sector   planning  
and   investment,   electricity   savings,   power   market   development,   the   rights   and   obligations   of  
organizations   participating   in   providing   and   consuming   electricity,   protection   of   electrical   equipment,  
and  power  safety.    The  Law  provides  the  general  scheme  for  developing  wholesale  and  retail  electricity  
competition.   It   establishes   the   Electricity   Regulatory   Authority   of   Vietnam   (ERAV)   under   MOIT   and  
requires   power   prices   be   set   appropriately   to   encourage  market   development,   facilitate   investors   in  
achieving   a   reasonable   profit,   encourage   energy   savings,   and   protect   the   rights   and   benefits   of  
electricity  providers  as  well  as  consumers.  The  Law  also  establishes  a  special  regime  for  subsidizing  or  
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otherwise   encouraging   local   energy   development   in   rural,  mountainous   and   island   regions,   including  
energy  derived  from  new  sources  and  renewable  energy.  
The  Law  on  Environmental  Protection  administered  by  MONRE  was  amended  by  the  National  Assembly  
on  12  December  2005.  The  Law  provides  regulations  and  resources  for  environmental  protection,  policy  
formulation   and  measurement.   It   also  details   the   rights   and  obligations  of   organizations,   households,  
and   individuals   in   environmental   protection   and   establishes   the   Strategic   Environmental   Assessment  
(SEA)  and  EIA  process  for  significant  development.    
LEP  Article  33   stipulates   that  development  of   clean  energy  and   renewable  energy   is  one  measure   for  
environmental   protection.   More   specifically,   the   Article   states   that   organizations   and   individuals  
investing  in  the  development  and  use  of  clean  energy  and  renewable  energy  will  be  granted  preferential  
taxes,   funding   support,   and   land   for   building   production   facilities.   It   also   obliges   the   Government   to  
formulate   and   implement   a   strategy   to   integrate   clean   and   renewable   energy   development   into  
programs  for  hunger  eradication  and  poverty  reduction,  as  well  as  the  development  of  islands  and  rural,  
mountainous,  and  coastal  areas.  
  
4.2.	  Hydropower	  planning	  in	  Vietnam	  
Vietnam   has   been   focusing   on   hydropower   development   over   the   last   two   decades   to   maximize   its  
potential  as  an  energy  source.  The  Government  of  Vietnam  (GoV)  has  encouraged   its  development  by  
implementing  a  low  tarriff  (4.17  cents/Kwh)89.  Hydropower  planning  includes  large  (ie  of  more  than  30  
MW),  medium  (between  10  to  30  MW)  and  small  (less  than  10  MW)  hydropower  projects.  
There  is  a  relatively  well  established  institutional  framework  with  thorough  legal  and  policy  procedures  
for   hydropower   development.   The   National   Master   Plan   for   Power   Development   (PDP)   normally  
prepared  at  five  year  intervals  directs  national  power  development,  including  hydropower,  in  response  
to  rapidly  growing  energy  demand.  The  6th  PDP  was  approved  by  the  GoV  for  the  period  from  2006–
2015  in  2007  and  the  7th  PDP  is  currently  being  developed  for  the  period  from  2012–2017.    This  analysis  
draws  from  the  PDP  6  and  draft  PDP  7  which  are  quite  consistent  for  the  hydropower  sector  –  with  the  
more   recent   plan   setting   out   even  more   extensive   hydropower   development   in   all   of   Vietnams   river  
basins.  
The  Government  of  Vietnam  has   embarked  on   a  major   expansion  of   the  hydropower   sector  which   is  
transforming   the   aquatic   and   social   systems   of   the   country.      All   main   river   systems   are   or   will   be  
dammed  by  one  or  cascades  of  hydropower  projects  –  each  with  road  access  and  transmission  lines  and  
linked   development   shaping   the   terrestrial,   aquatic   and   social   environment.      Recent   strategic  
assessments  of   the  relationship  between  hydropower  and  biodiversity   in  Vietnam  have  concluded  the  
development  envisaged  would  bring  economic,  social  and  even  some  environmental  benefits.    Yet,  the  
pace  and  scale  of   that  development   is  well  beyond  existing  mechanisms  and  capacities   for  addressing  
social   and   environmental   effects   and   the   full   economic   consequences.      Hydropower   development   is  
proceeding   on   a   rapid   and   comprehensive   scale   for   maximising   power   and   profits   but   with   only  
rudimentary  or  even  misleading  information  and  analysis  on  its  sustainability  and  implications  for  other  
sectors  and  social  and  natural  systems.  
                                                                                                                        
89  Article  29,  Law  on  Water  Resources  (1998)  
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Hydropower	  Planning	  within	  the	  Energy	  Sector	  
Over  the  past  decade,  power  development  policy   in  Vietnam,   including  hydropower,  has  been  revised  
several  times.  This  adjustment  reflects  significant  changes  in  the  power  supply  and  demand  balance  due  
to   rapid   economic   development.   Normally   all   arms   of   government   prepare   ten   year   development  
strategies  (eg.  for  the  period  2001  to  2010)  with  a  20  year  vision  and  then  two  five  year  action  plans  to  
implement   the   strategy   (eg.   for   the   period   2001   to   2005   and   2006   to   2010).   In   the   case   of   power  
development  planning,  the  main  documents  prepared  since  the  year  2000  are:  
• The  Power  Development  Plan  for  2001-­‐2010  and  vision  to  2020  called  the  5th  PDP  (approved  June  
2001  through  Decree  95/2001/QD-­‐TTg).  
• The  Adjusted  5th  PDP  revised  in  2003  (via  Prime  Ministerial  Decree  40/2003/QD-­‐TTg).  
• The  National  Energy  Development  Strategy  up  to  2020  with  vision  to  2050  (approved  by  the  Prime  
Minister  on  December  27,  2007  by  Decree  1855/QD-­‐TTg).    
• The  Power  Development  Plan  for  2006-­‐2015  with  vision  to  2025  called  the  6th  PDP  (approved  by  the  
Prime  Minister  on  July  18,  2007  through  Decree  110/2007/QD-­‐TTg).  
• The  draft  Power  Development  Plan  for  2012–2017  called  the  7th  PDP    
The  Energy  Development  Strategy  is  a  broad  “orientation”  policy  to  guide  energy  development.  The  PDP  
is   a   detailed   action  plan   including  national   and   local   electricity   development   in   line  with   the  national  
socio-­‐economic  development  strategy  and  prepared  by  the  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Trade  (MOIT).  The  
PDP  covers  all  forms  of  power  with  hydropower  receiving  substantial  treatment  given  its  prominence  as  
a  leading  source  of  energy  in  Vietnam.  The  GoV  does  not  prepare  a  separate  hydropower  development  
plan  –  the  national  plan  for  hydropower  development  is  an  integral  part  of  the  PDP.  
  
Each   province   prepares   power   development   plans   which   implement   the   national   strategy   and   plans  
within   their   territory.   Provincial   plans   list   the   relevant   large   hydropower   projects   identified   in   the  
national  plan   in  addition   to  “small”  and  “medium”  projects   initiated  at   local   level.     Many  of   the  small  
and  medium  projects  do  not  appear   in   the  national  PDP  –  only   in   the   respective  provincial  PDPs.  The  
EVN   Institute   of   Energy   (IE)   is   the   main   organization   commissioned   by   national   and   provincial  
government  to  prepare  the  power  strategies  and  plans.  Under  the  Amended  Environmental  Protection  
Act   2005   and   its   SEA   provisions   however,   the  MOIT   and   provincial   DOITs   are   identified   as   the   plan  
“owners”.  Even  though  IE  is  usually  contracted  to  prepare  the  definitive  provincial  PDPs  covering  a  five  
year   period   –   once   adopted   by   the   Provincial   People’s   Committee   and   endorsed   by  MOIT,   they   can  
change  on  a  yearly  and  even  a  monthly  basis  as  new  project  proposals  are  submitted  to  DOIT  by  private  
developers.     That  means  that  sustainability   issues  and  integration  with  other  sectors  on  a  spatial  basis  
across  as  catchment  becomes  challenging.  
In   particular,   the   power   development   planning   process   is   not   well   adapted   to   planning   on   an   inter-­‐
provincial  basis  when  a  river  basin  falls  within  more  than  one  province.  Both  planning  and  management  
occur   mostly   on   a   province   by   province   level.   The   MARD   Institute   of   Water   Resources   models   and  
advises   on   water   at   the   basin   level,   and   the   Institute   of   Energy   also   carries   out   initial   analysis   of  
hydropower   potential   for   river   basins.   Yet,   the   basin   wide   analysis   is   not   comprehensive   from   an  
environmental  and  socio-­‐economic  perspective  and  detailed  planning  quickly  takes  on  an  ad  hoc  project  
focus.   Critical   aspects   of   basin-­‐wide   systems   dynamics   become   difficult   to   accommodate   as  
development  plans  move  into  implementation.    
The  establishment  of  River  Basin  Planning  Organisations  under  the  Water  Law  1998  is  intended  to  help  
address   this   kind   of   limitation   in   existing   development   planning   processes   –   but   the   experience  with  
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RBOs  in  Vietnam  has  not  been  encouraging.    A  major  initiative  to  establish  an  RBO  for  the  Se  San  River  
Basin   is   now  being  mounted   through   the   Vietnam  National  Mekong   Committee   as   part   of   a   regional  
initiative   with   funding   and   a   loan   from   the   World   Bank.      This   initiative   does   provide   an   important  
opportunity   for   more   effective   planning   of   hydropower   along   with   other   water   users   in   the   Se   San  
catchment.  
The	  Vietnam	  Development	  Strategy	  up	  to	  2020	  Vision	  to	  2050	  
The  Vietnam  Energy  Development  Strategy  up  to  2020  with  a  Vision  to  2050,  prepared  by  the  IE  for  the  
MOIT  followed  the  passage  of  the  Law  on  Electricity  in  the  same  year.  The  strategy  identifies  the  need  
for  a  sufficient  supply  of  energy  to  service  the  projected  developments  in  the  national  socio-­‐economic  
plan.      It  proposes   the  gradual   formation  of  a  state-­‐oriented  energy  market  with  diversified  ownership  
and  business.  The  Strategy  requires  that  the  exploitation  of  all  energy  resources  including  water  must  be  
efficient   and   mitigate   environmental   impact   in   conformity   with   regional   and   international  
environmental   standards   to   control   pollution.      The   strategy   prioritizes   hydropower   plants   as   a  
renewable  resource  and  minimising  negative  environmental  impacts.      
Hydropower  is  the  largest  contributor  to  electricity  production  in  the  country  (Table  2).  By  2008,  there  
were  nine  large  and  medium  sized  hydropower  plants;  the  installed  capacity  of  these  existing  plants  was  
4,198   MW.   By   2010   around   50%   of   Vietnam’s   hydropower   potential   was   realised.      That   figure   is  
expected  to  increase  to  83%  of  hydropower  potential  by  2025.  The  estimated  hydropower  potential  of  
Vietnam  is  an  installed  capacity  of  approximately  31,000  MW.    




%  of  Total  Capacity   Electricity  
Production  GWh  
Hydropower   12   4,393   32.5   20,833  
Coal   3   1,545   11.4   8,925  
Oil  &  Gas   2   654   4.5   818  
CCGT   4   4,248   24   19,424  
IPP  /  BOT   N/A   3,668   27.6   16,772  
Total   24   13,512   100   66,773  
Table  2:  Electricity  Generation  by  energy  source  in  Vietnam  
Source:  6th  PDP  2007  
Electricity  generation  is  proposed  to  increase  from  53  billion  kWh  in  2005  to  88-­‐93  billion  kWh  in  2010  
and  201-­‐250  billion   kWh  by   202090   –   i.e.   to   increase   generation  by  up   to   five   times  over   the  next   15  
years.  It  is  anticipated  that,  by  2020,  total  hydropower  capacity  will  reach  13,000-­‐15,000  MW91  or  three  
times  the  current  contribution  of  this  sub-­‐sector.  Nonetheless,  the  contribution  of  hydropower  to  total  
                                                                                                                        
90  Prime  Ministerial  Decree  176/2004/QD-­‐TTg,  5  October  2004,  Approval  of  the  Vietnam  Electricity  Development  





electricity   generation   will   actually   reduce   from   37%   in   2005   to   about   35%   in   2020,   due   to   major  
increases  planned  for  generation  of  electricity  from  coal  (see  figure  21).  
The   revised   Electricity   Law   entered   into   force   in   July   2005.   The   Law   does   not   determine   electricity  
development,   but   focuses   on   regulating   the   relationship   between   electricity   suppliers,   end-­‐users   and  
government.   It   stipulates   that   power   development   will   pay   attention   to   environmental   protection  
(Article   4),   and   that   investors   will   pay   for   compensation,   resettlement   and   land   clearance   during  
construction   of   power   projects   (Article   12).   The   law   requires   that   national   power   development   plans  
should  be  issued  for  10-­‐year  periods  (Article  8).  In  the  updated  law  of  2007  it  stipulates  that  all  activities  
should  conform  to  the  electricity  development  plans  approved  by  the  related  authorities.  
Figure  21:  The  Share  of  Power  Generation  Sources  2006-­‐2025  
Source:  EVN,  2006,  6th  PDP  
  
The	  National	  Power	  Development	  Plan	  	  
The  policy  framework  for  hydropower  development  is  set  out  in  a  number  of  plans  at  central  and  local  
level   and   dealing   with   varying   scales   of   projects.   The   most   significant   policy   is   the   National   Power  
Development  Plan  (PDP).  Vietnam  is  implementing  the  6th  PDP  and  drafting  the  7th  PDP.    
The	  6th	  National	  Power	  Development	  Plan	  
The  6th  PDP  covers  all  power  development  from  2006  to  2015.  Hydropower  development  is   integrated  
with  the  analysis  of  other  power  sources  in  different  chapters.  The  6th  PDP  outlines  the  power  balance  
from  2006   to   2015,  with  medium  and   large  hydropower  projects   continuing   to  have   a   pivotal   role   in  
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Nationwide  electricity  generating  capacity   is  proposed  to   increase  from  11,360  MW  in  2005  to  25,500  
MW  by  2010  and  62,000  MW  by  2020   -­‐   increases  of  124%  and  446%  respectively.92     As   in   the  Energy  
Development  Strategy,  a  significant  proportion  of  those  increases  are  proposed  to  be  met  by  an  increase  
in  hydropower  generating  capacity.  
  
Figure  22:  Power  Generation  by  Sources  2006-­‐2025  
Source:  EVN,  2006,  6th  PDP  
Despite  a  proportional  reduction  in  its  contribution  to  overall  generation  capacity  by  2025,  the  absolute  
generation  capacity  of  hydropower  is  expected  to  increase  from  9,412MW  in  2010  to  20,306  MW.    
  
Type   Installed  Capacity  MW  
In  operation  2010   9,412  
Under  construction   2,296  
Large  planned   4,738  
Other  hydro  (small  and  PS*)   3,860  
TOTAL  HYDRO  2025   20,306  
Table  3:  Hydropower  Development  Status  in  PDPVI  
*PS  =  Pumped  storage  plant  
                                                                                                                        
92  Lam  Du  Son,  EVN  (2006)  Hydropower  Development  Plan  in  Vietnam,  presentation  given  at  the  Pilot	  Strategic	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Large  and  medium  size  plants  (i.e.  >  30MW)  will  account  for  4738  MW  of  installed  capacity,  and  small  
hydropower  and  pumped  storage  plants  will  account  for  3,860  MW93  (Table  3).  
  
PDP  6  refers  to  73  existing  and  proposed  hydropower  projects  (Map  1).  However,  most  of  the  numerous  
small  and  medium  dams  proposed  for  each  basin  (e.g.  some  60  in  Quang  Nam’s  Vu  Gia  –  Thu  Bong  basin  
in  addition   to   the  8   large  projects   listed   in   the  PDP  6,  and  92   in   the  Se  San  Basin   in  addition   to   the  7  
listed  in  PDP  6)  are  not  included  in  the  PDP  6.  
  
Construction  of  the  national  transmission  grid  and  distribution  connections  will  also  expand.  The  length  
of  the  500  kv  grid  system  will  increase  from  3,255  to  8,883  km  (an  increase  of  5,628  km).  The  length  of  
the  220  kv  grid  system  will  increase  from  4,295  to  16,916  km  (an  increase  of  12,621  km),  and  the  110  kv  
grid  system  will  increase  from  10,290  to  25,949  km  (an  increase  of  15,659  km).  
  
  
                                                                                                                        





Map  1:  Existing  and  Proposed  Large  Dams  in  Vietnam  identified  in  the  6th  PDP  
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PDP	  Development	  Process	  
The  MOIT  is  responsible  for  preparing  and  submitting  the  PDP  for  each  ten  year  period  to  Government.    
The   Ministry   assigns   the   IE   to   draft   the   PDP   in   consultation   with   line   agencies   and   international  
organisations   who   support   the   process   such   as   JICA   who   funded   technical   inputs   to   the   6th   PDP.    
Preparing  a  PDP  is  a  long  process,  taking  from  3-­‐5  years.    A  comprehensive  review  of  electricity  sources  
and   demand   throughout   Vietnam   is   required   as   well   as   consultation   with   all   relevant  ministries   and  
review  of  all  proposed  electricity  projects  to  be  included  in  the  plan.    
The  IE  review  of  Vietnam’s  electricity  sources  including  hydropower  aims  to  balance  demand  and  supply  
–   the   projection   of   demand   is   a   challenging   and   contentious   issue   based   on   past   trends   and   many  
assumptions.  The  review  process  shown  in  Figure  23  involves  consultation  and  inputs  from  a  large  range  
of  stakeholders  at  each  step.  Provision  of  all  MOIT  approved  hydropower  master  plans  from  the  Energy  
Department  of  MOIT,  EVN  and  PPCs  for  national,  provincial  and  individual  hydropower  projects  is  key  to  
identifying   hydropower   sources   and   capacity.   All   projects   are   then   ranked   according   to   capacity   and  
year  expected  to  commence  operation  within  the  ten  year  period  of  each  PDP.  If  total  estimated  power  
generation   is   higher   than   expected   demand,   IE   will   propose   to   postpone   certain   projects;   if   total  
generation  is  lower  than  demand,  the  IE  will  propose  sources  for  accelerating  power  construction.    
  
Figure  23:  PDP  Development  Process  
Source:  ICEM  (2011)  
  
All  listed  projects  must  connect  to  the  national  grid,  must  be  able  to  sell  power  to  the  national  grid,  and  
must  have  the  support  of  local  and  provincial  authorities.    In  effect,  often  that  means  that  appear  in  the  
respective  provincial  PDPs  which  may  not  have  involved  any  cross  sector  consultation.  Only  medium  and  
large  hydropower  projects  and  individually  identified  within  the  PDP.    Small  projects  are  grouped  which  
can  cause  difficulties  for   individual  projects   in  receiving  national  support   in  connecting  to  the  national  
grid,  increasing  investment  costs  and  prolonging  construction.  
Operating,	  planned	  and	  proposed	  hydropower	  projects	  
The   three   PDPs   (5th,   Adjusted   5th,   and   6th   PDP)   have   listed  over   80   distinct   hydropower   projects.   The  
number   of   projects   proposed   has   increased   incrementally,   and   their   capacity   and   time   of  
commencement  operation  have  been  adjusted   throughout.  Projects   included   in  early  PDPs  but  not   in  




The   6th   PDP   covers   ‘large’   hydropower   projects   in   detail   but   not   projects   under   30MW   which   only  
require   provincial   government   approval   and   usually   are   not   subject   to   detailed   environmental  
assessment.  Expensive  small-­‐scale  projects  also  require  central  approval.  The  PDPs  distinguish  between  
power   projects   funded   through   EVN   and   projects   to   be   developed   through   investments   by   other  
institutions  and  the  private  sector.  Some  projects  will  be  developed  by  shareholding  companies,  which  
are  jointly  held  between  EVN  (at  least  51%)  and  other  investors,  for  example,  the  Song  Da  Company.  In  
most   cases,   such   as   the  Hoa  Binh  hydropower   project,   EVN  has   contracted  other   companies   to   build  
dams  (the  Song  Da  Company  in  the  case  of  Hoa  Binh)  but  then  taken  over  operations.  The  situation  of  
‘ownership’   of   projects   has   changed,   and   continues   to   become   more   complex   with   an   increasing  
number  of  investors.  
  
According  to  the  6th  PDP,  hydropower  projects  will  be  concentrated  in  10  main  river  basins  in  Vietnam,  
with  58  medium  or  large  hydropower  projects  planned  to  be  operating  by  2020.  Another  15  hydropower  
projects   are   planned   for   other   basins   in   the   country   (although   the   precise   locations   are   not   always  
clear).  Of  the  73  medium  and  large  hydropower  projects  proposed  to  be  in  operation  by  2020,  at  least  
13  are  already  in  operation,  16  are  under  construction,  and  11  are  still  in  planning  or  feasibility  stages.    
  
4.3.	  Hydropower	  Planning	  &	  Development	  Process	  
Hydropower   planning   occurs   at   three   different   levels,   and   consists   of   three   distinct   stages   from   the  
design  to  construction  of  a  project.  A  hydropower  master  plan  fulfilling  all   legal  requirements  must  be  
prepared  for  each  river  basin  or  province  listing  projects  to  be  developed  which  is  in  turn  approved  by  
the  MOIT.    That  “plan”  is  an  evolving  list  of  projects  aiming  to  maximise  the  exploitation  of  a  catchment  
for   hydropower.      It   does   not   involve   an   integrated   assessment   of   water   resource   use   options   and  
potentials.    For  each  project  on  the  list,  an  investment  proposal  must  be  created  and  endorsed  by  PPC  
and  all  licensing  and  contracts  approved  prior  to  construction.    
  
Regional,	  river	  basin	  and	  provincial	  hydropower	  plans  
EVN  plans  for  hydropower  development  focuses  on  10  river  basins  and  relate  only  to  large  and  medium  
projects.  The  6th  PDP  assesses  hydro  capacity  in  those  10  river  basins.  The  hydropower  capacity  of  these  
river  basins   is  estimated  at  17660  MW,  equalling  85.9  per  cent  of  national  hydropower  capacity.  River  
basins   in   north,   central   and   southern   Vietnam   have   a   9990   MW   (55%),   4940   MW   (27%),   and   2870  
MW(16%)  capacity  respectively.    
The  6th  PDP  categorizes  hydropower  projects  by  the  three  large  regions:  north,  central  and  south  -­‐  not  
by  Vietnam’s  eight  social-­‐economic  regions,  river  basins  or  provinces.    






Share  to  total  
capacity  (%)  
1   Ba   670   2,70   150   3.2  
2   Ca   520   2,09   147   2.5  
3   Da   6960   26,96   1400   32.3  
4   Dong  Nai   2870   11,64   436   14.0  
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5   Lo-­‐Gam-­‐Chay   1470   5,18   212   7.0  
6   Ma   890   3,37   74   4.0  
7   Se  San   1980   9,36   700   11.2  
8   Srepok   700   3,32   143   4.0  
9   Tra  Khuc  –  Huong   480   2,13   531   2.6  
10   Vu  Gia  –  Thu  Bon   1120   4,29   475   5.1  
   10  river  basins   17660   71,67   423   85.9  
   All  country   20560   83.42   250   100  
Table  4:  Hydropower  Capacity  of  Vietnam  
Source:  EVN,  2006,  6th  PDP  
Chapter  7  of  the  6th  PDP  lists  82  large  to  medium  projects  and  unspecified  small  projects  for  2005-­‐2025  
and  grouped  them  as  follows:  
• In  the  north,  there  are  32  large-­‐medium  projects,  2  small  projects  and  a  group  of  not-­‐specified  small  
projects  
• In  the  Central,  there  are  36  large-­‐medium  projects,  and  three  groups  of  not-­‐specified  small  projects.  
• In  the  South,  there  are  14  large-­‐medium  projects.    
In  its  Decision  30/2006/QD-­‐BCN,  31  August  2006,  MOIT  recognizes  a  hierarchy  of  hydropower  plans  for  
small   projects.  MOIT   is   responsible   for   approving   the  National   Small   Hydropower   Development   Plan.  
PPCs  will  approve  Provincial  small  hydropower  development  plans  as  part  of  their  overall  PDPs  with  the  
agreement  of  MOIT.    Normally,  provincial  plans  for  small  hydropower  projects  also  include  the  large  and  
medium   scale   projects   identified   in   the  national   PDP.   For   example,   the  Quang  Nam  PDP   approved   in  
2006  and  covering  the  Vu  Gia  –  Thu  Bon  River  Basin  includes  8  large  to  medium  projects  (identified  in  
the  national  PDP)  and  34  small  projects.    That  number  of  small  projects  has  increased  ad  hoc  to  some  60  
small  projects  since  the  provincial  PDP  was  approved.  
Hydropower	  Master	  Plan	  Process	  
A   hydropower  master   plan   for   each   region,   river   basin,   province   or   individual   project   is   required   for  
approval  by  the  MOIT.    
  
River	  Basin	  Master	  Plan  
EVN   is   the   main   party   responsible   for   preparing   river   basin   master   plans   and   investing   in   the  
construction   and   management   of   large   hydropower   projects.   EVN   has   delegated   responsibility   for  
projects  in  river  basins  to  seven  “Hydropower  Management  Boards”  across  Vietnam,  located  in:  
(i)   Ha  Noi  
(ii)   Vinh,  Nghe  An  Province  
(iii)   Da  Nang  City  
(iv)   Pleiku,  Gia  Lai  Province  
(v)   Buon  Me  Thuot,  Dak  Lak  Province  
(vi)   Ho  Chi  Minh  City  
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(vii)   Tuy  Hoa  city,  Phu  Yen  Province    
  
The   Management   boards   can   provide   funding   for   plan   development   and   hydropower   project  
construction.   In   some   situations,   the  management   boards   have   collaborated   on   hydropower   projects  
across   basins   with   private   companies   and   other   state   companies   (for   example,   coal   or   mining  
companies).  In  turn,  the  management  boards  commission  the  Engineering  Consulting  Companies  (PECC)  
to  undertake  necessary  engineering,  environmental  and  social  studies  and  to  draft  hydropower  master  
plans   of   projects.      PECCs,   like   the   Institute   of   Energy,   were   once   part   of   EVN   but   are   now   being  
progressively  privatised,  although  the  relationships  with  their  mother  company  remain  intimate.    PECCs  
provide  necessary  services  to  draft  hydropower  master  plans  including  surveying,  EIAs,  cost  estimations,  
technical   design,   Resettlement   Action   Plans,   Ethnic   Minority   Planning   Frameworks,   detailed   project  
design,  pre-­‐feasibility  and  feasibility  studies.  The  PECCs  undertake  four  steps   in  drafting  a  hydropower  
river  basin  master  plan:  
(i) A  review  of  data,  including  hydrology  of  the  river  basin;    
(ii) Data  collection  on  existing  hydropower  projects   in  the  river  basin,   including  capacity,   location,  
technical  features;  
(iii) Ranking  of  hydropower  projects  based  on  a  set  of  technical,  financial,  social  and  environmental  
criteria,  with  priority  given  to  low  cost  and  high  capacity;  and  
(iv) Define  a  hydropower  development  strategy   for   the  river  basin,  outlining   the  priorities   for  and  
timing  of  construction.  
  
Once  completed,   the  Hydropower  Management  Board  reviews  the  master  plan  and  submits   it   to  EVN  
for  review  and  consolidation.  The  EVN  in  turn  submits  it  to  the  Energy  Department  of  MOIT  for  review  
and  endorsement  and   then   formally   for  Ministerial   approval   as   shown   in   Figure  24.  At   various   stages  
throughout  this  process  several  agencies  may  be  consulted  for  technical  inputs  including:  
• Institute  of  Energy  on  technical  design  matters;    
• Irrigation  University  (IU);  Western  Highlands  Agriculture  &  Forestry  Science  Institute  (WASI)  and  
Agricultural  Planning  Institute  (API)  of  MARD  concerning  agricultural  and  forestry  development  and  
livelihoods  issues;    
• Institute  of  Sociology  (IS)  and  Ethnic  Minority  Institute  (EMI)  of  Vietnam  Academy  of  Social  Science  
(VASS)  on  social  issues;    
• MONRE  (Land  Management  Centre,  Water  resource  management  agency,  and  Vietnam  
Environment  Protection  Authority  VEPA)  responsible  for  land  use  planning,  water  resource  
management  and  environment  protection;    
• Geology  Institute  of  Vietnam  Science  Academy  regarding  landscape  and  ground/soil  issues;  and,  
• Some  international  agencies  such  as  Nippon  Koei  (Japan)  and  SWECO  which  often  provide  technical  
inputs  supported  by  bilateral  donors.    
Provincial	  Master	  Plan	  
The   DOITs   are   responsible   for   the   preparation   of   provincial   master   plans   which   focus   on   small   and  
medium   hydropower   projects.   The   DOITs   engage   the   PECC   servicing   their   region   or   IE   to   draft   the  
hydropower  master  plan,  and  they  are  meant  to  consult  with  other  ministries  such  as  DONRE,  DARD,  DPI  
and   PPC   in   its   preparation   –   although   the   extent   of   consultation   is   often   rudimentary   and   provincial  
plans   have   been   approved   without   the   input   of   relevant   local   agencies,   especially   affected   districts.  
PECCs  follow  the  process  described  earlier  to  complete  the  draft  master  plan  and  then  submit  it  to  DOIT  
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for  review  and  submission  to  the  PPC  for  review  and  comment  before  final  approval  by  MOIT  as  shown  
in  Figure  24.    
  
Figure  24:  Master  Plan  Development  Process  &  Consultation  
Source:  ICEM  (2011)  
Several  other  agencies  are  critical  to  key  stages  of  the  hydropower  master  plan  and  project  processes  at  
all   levels.  The  National  Power  Transmission  Corporation   is  particularly   important   in  small  projects  and  
ensuring  connection  to  the  national  grid  through  input  and  investment  in  transmission  line  connections.  
The  Electricity  Regulation  Authority  plays  an  important  role  in  the  project  investment  phase,  setting  the  
electricity  price  and  facilitating  power  buying  /  selling  contracts.  VEPA  and  MONRE  set  guidelines  for  EIA  
and  SEA  of  proposed  projects.  
Plans	  for	  individual	  projects	  
There   are   separate   development   plans   for   each   hydropower   project.   The   projects   are   classified   into  
three  groups:    
1. Very	   important	   hydropower	   projects:   Projects   which   require   National   Assembly   approval   (section  
6.4.1  and  Box  1  set  out  the  criteria  for  this  category  of  project)  
2. Medium	  and	  large	  projects:  Projects  with  a  capacity  of  more  than  30MW  listed  in  the  national  PDP.  
These  projects  will  be  approved  by  MOIT.  
3. Small	  projects:  Projects  that  have  a  capacity  of  less  than  30  MW  will  be  planned  through  a  provincial  
process  with  investment  approved  by  PPCs  on  the  agreement  of  MOIT.                
  
The  plans  for  nationally  important  hydropower  projects  which  require  NA  approval  will  involve  different  
institutions  in  the  planning  stages  and  a  wide  range  of  review  and  approval  stages  over  many  years.  For  
example,  preparing  and  approving  the  large  and  important  Son  La  Hydropower  Project  took  more  than  5  
years.  Even  now,   in   implementation  this  national  project   is  accompanied  by  a  five  year  environmental  
management  planning  project  supported  by  the  ADB.  
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While  medium  to  large  hydropower  projects  listed  in  the  6th  PDP  require  MOIT  approval,  in  some  cases,  
approval  of  other   institutions  must  be   sought  when  other  national   legislation   requires   it   (such  as   the  
Amended   Environmental   Protection   Law   2005)   or   when   problems   arise.   Other   agencies   become  
involved   in  all   large  scale  projects.  For  example,  MPI  organized  an  Appraisal  Committee  to  review  the  
investment  proposal  for  Yaly  and  Song  Hinh  hydropower  projects  (Decision  604/BKH/VPID,  5  November  
1999).  The  PPC  of  Kon  Tum  Province  issued  the  Decision  on  Strengthening  Management  of  Activities  on  
the   Yaly   Hydropower   Project   area   (No.   07/CT-­‐UB,   28   July   2000).   The   decision   concerned   activities   of  
fishing,  plant  maintenance  and  illegal  logging  in  and  around  the  Yaly  project  area.  
Plans  for  small  projects  may  be  established  by  independent  investors  and  joint  ventures  in  which  case  
an   individual   hydropower  plan   is   developed   for   the   single   project.   In   consultation  with   the  DOIT,   the  
PECC  will  be  contracted  to  draft  a  master  plan  and  undertake  pre-­‐feasibility  studies.  With  approval  from  
MOIT   a   feasibility   study   and   investment   plan   is   completed   and  may  be   included   in   grouping   of   small  
projects  within  the  national  PDP.    A  project  which  is  not  included  in  the  PDP  may  face  greater  difficulty  
in  attaining  power  and  operation  licences  and  selling  power  to  the  national  grid.      
        
4.4.	  Linkages	  between	  hydropower	  planning	  procedures	  and	  related	  plans	  
This   section  describes  how  the  planning  process  and  plans   for  hydropower   link   to  other  development  
plans,   for   example   provincial   socio-­‐economic   plans,   other   sector   development   plans   (e.g.   industry,  
mining,   transport)   land   use   plans,   and   development   plans   for   economic   regions   and   for   river-­‐basin  
plans.  
Development	  Plans	  
Overarching	  socio-­‐economic	  development	  plans	  
The  6th  Power  Development  Plan  and   its  hydropower  content  are  built  up  on   the  basis  of  a   range  of  
other   strategies   and   plans.   The   PDP   is   prepared   to   be   consistent   with   the   national   socio-­‐economic  
development  plan.  Chapter  3   in   the  6th  PDP  was  prepared  based  on  the  Power  Development  Strategy  
2004-­‐2010   and   vision   to   2020,   the   Party’s   10   year   Social   Economic   Development   Orientation   (2001-­‐
2010),  and  MPI’s  Social  Economic  Development  Projection  to  2010  and  Vision  to  2050.  
The  growth  of  GDP,  population  and  industry  (manufacturing,  agriculture,  services)  are  analysed  as  part  
of   the   national   Social   Economic   Development   Planning   process   with   three   projected   development  
scenarios:  high,  middle  and  low.  In  2006-­‐2010,  GDP  growth  is  projected  as  8.5%  per  year  (high  growth  
scenarios),  or  7.2-­‐7.5%  in  middle  growth  scenarios  and  6-­‐7%  in  low  grow  scenarios.    When  preparing  the  
national  PDP,  estimates  of  energy  demand  growth  of   five  major  sectors   (industry,  service,  agriculture,  
family  consumption  and  others)  were  projected  by  MOIT  and  EVN  for  2006  to  2025  based  on  the  SEDP  
scenarios.    
Hydropower  is  addressed  in  various  regional  development  plans.    The  Government,  through  the  Ministry  
of   Planning   and   Investment   Development   Strategies   Institute   prepares   plans   for   the   eight   economic  
regions  and  the  three  Economic  Focal  Regions  to  2010  with  a  vision  to  2020.    Those  plans  do  consider  
energy   development.      For   example,   the   Development   Plan   for   the   Central   Economic   Focal   Region  
identifies   the   development   of   various   hydropower   projects   –   Dakring   100  MW,   Dakre   30  MW,   Nuoc  
Trong   10   MW,   and   some   isolated   hydropower   projects   upstream   on   the   Tra   Khuc   River   (Prime  
Ministerial   Decree   148/2004/QD-­‐TTg,   13   August   2004   –   a   plan’s   approval   is   reflected   in   a   Decree   or  
decision  of  government).  
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At  the  provincial  level,  each  province  prepared  its  Social  Economic  Development  Plan  in  2006-­‐2010,  and  
some   have   a   vision   statement   to   2020.      Most   provinces   with   hydropower   potential   address  
development  of  the  sector  in  their  overall  SED  plans.     For  example,   in  2005,  the  Prime  Minister   issued  
Decree  148/2005/QD-­‐TTg,  17  June  2005  on  the  Social  Economic  Development  Plan  to  2015  for  Quang  
Nam   Province.   This   decree   proposes   that   Quang   Nam   PPC   coordinates   with   central   entities   to  
implement  power  projects  approved  by  MOIT  such  as  the  eight  hydropower  projects  in  the  Vu  Gia  –Thu  
Bon  river  basin.    
Sector	  development	  plans	  
Development   plans   and   strategies   that   provide   general   development   targets   across   most   sectors   in  
Vietnam   for   a   ten   year   period   with   vision   a   further   ten   years   are   prepared   at   both   national   and  
ministerial   levels.  Many   “sector”   strategies   are   affected   by   hydropower   such   as:   the  Natural   Disaster  
Mitigation  Strategy  to  2020;  Comprehensive  Poverty  Reduction  and  Growth  Strategy  2001-­‐2010;  Rural  
Clean  Water   and   Sanitary   Strategy   to   2020;   Strategy   for   Electricity   Development   2004-­‐2010   vision   to  
2020;   Irrigation  Development  Strategy   to  2020  vision   to  2050;  Fishery  Development  Strategy   to  2020;  
Transport  Development  Strategy  to  2020  vision  to  2030;  Water  Resource  Development  Strategy  to  2020;  
Natural   Conservation/   Protection   System   Management   Strategy   to   2010;   Environment   Protection  
Strategy  to  2010  vision  to  2020;  and  the  Forest  Development  Strategy  in  2006-­‐2020.    
However,   the   6th   PDP   in   general   and   associated   hydropower   planning   does   not   mention   these  
development  policies  and  the  power  agencies  do  not  work  actively  with  the  respective  sector  ministries  
in  their  preparation  to  ensure  hydropower  is  well  integrated.    
Integration	  levels	  
Opportunities   for   integration  of  hydropower  plan   into  development  plans   for  areas  and  other   sectors  
exist  at  different  levels:  
1. At	   central	   level,   EVN   plans   hydropower   development   (within   the   national   PDP)   and   submits   it   to  
MOIT  for  review.    MOIT  passes  it  on  to  the  GoV  for  approval.  MPI  is  responsible  for  integrating  the  
proposed   and   approved  hydro   plans   into   the   5-­‐year  National   Social   Economic  Development   Plan.  
Several   MPI   departments   are   involved   in   this   integration   process   such   as   the   Departments   of  
Industry,  of  Regional  Economic  and  of  General  Issues.  
2. At	   regional	   level,   the  MPI   is   responsible   for   preparing   development   plans   for   the   eight   economic  
regions,   and   the   MPI   considers   the   hydropower   plan   and   listed   projects   in   this   draft   before  
submitting  to  Government  for  approval.    MOIT  and  other  government  line  ministries  are  required  to  
comment  on  draft  plans  for  economic  regions.  
3. At	  Economic	  Focal	  Region	  level,  MPI  in  coordination  with  MOIT  integrates  the  hydro  plan  into  draft  
plans  for  the  three  EFRs,  and  passes  these  for  approval  to  Government.  
4. At	   river	  basin	   level:   The  Prime  Ministerial  Decree  of  May  2007   formally   transferred  all   river  basin  
planning   to   MONRE.   MONRE   has   now   been   given   responsibility   for   river   basin   planning   and  
management.   MONRE’s   Department   of   Water   Resources   Management   is   preparing   a   Decree   on  
River  Basin  Management  which  is  intended  to  lay  out  the  procedures  and  institutional  arrangements  
for   the   process.   MONRE’s   combined   mandate   for   land   use   planning,   river   basin   planning   and  
environmental  management   has   potential   to   achieve   integrated   area  wide  development   planning  
according  to  consistent  environmental  safeguards.  
5. At	  province	  level,  each  PPC  approves  the  provincial  SED  plan  drafted  by  the  DPI.  DOIT  and  its  energy  
division  propose  the  power  development  plan  including  hydropower  and  DPI  integrates  this  into  the  
overall  SED  plan  for  the  province.      
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6. On	   the	   same	   river	  within	   a	   province,   there   are   different   sector   development   plans   issued   by   the  
Government,  ministries,  the  PPC,  and  provincial  departments  such  as  industry,  agriculture,  fisheries,  
tourism,   construction,   transport,   trade,   land   use   planning   and   management,   and   biodiversity  
conservation  on  provincial  and  district   level.     At  this  stage,  there  is   little  planning  linkage  between  
these  plans  and  those  prepared  by  MOIT  or  the  DOITs.  
  
Most  plans  for  the  manufacturing  and  service  sectors  (for  example,  industry,  agriculture,  tourism)  focus  
on   increasing   outputs   on   the   assumption   that   energy   for   the   purpose   will   be   available   through   the  
national  grid.    They  also  assume  an  abundant  supply  of  clean  water.    They  do  not  analyse  the  supply  and  
demand   relationships   with   the   power   development   plan.   The   hydropower   plans   have   far   reaching  
impacts  on   sector  plans,   especially   at   local   level.   The  benefits  of  hydropower  are   recognised   in   some  
sector  plans  such  as  tourism,  agriculture  and  fishery  development.    Power  infrastructure  is  considered  as  
an   essential   service.   Power   must   be   developed   to   meet   the   planned   socio-­‐economic   development  
targets   of   other   sectors.   Therefore,   power   and   hydro   development   is   placed   in   the   infrastructure  
services   category   that   is   structured   after   other   manufacturing   and   service   sector   development  
projections  have  been  made  and  approved.      
There   is   great   pressure   on   the   energy   sector   to   deliver   power   by  whatever  means.      In   that   context,  
factors  which  would  be  seen  to  inhibit  or  delay  power  development  are  not  given  systematic  treatment  
or  equal  weight  unless  a  project  is  confronting  local  community  and/or  international  opposition.  
Provincial   SED   plans   do   not   give   due   attention   to   the   power   implications   of   their   socio-­‐economic  
aspirations   because   the   power   sector   “belongs   to”   EVN   and   other   central   companies   (coal   and  
construction)   –   their   mandate   to   maximise   hydropower   development   has   a   strong   momentum   and  
authority  associated  with   it.  Most  power  generation  and  all  power  transmission,  as  well  as  supportive  
infrastructure  like  hydrology  stations  are  planned  and  managed  centrally.  The  large  and  medium  hydro  
plants  in  the  province  are  planned  by  EVN.    Provinces  can  plan  and  develop  small-­‐hydro  but  even  here,  
central   institutes   and   agencies   become   involved   in   their   planning   and   development   because   of   local  
capacity   constraints.   Economically,   hydropower   projects   can   bring   significant   benefits   to   provinces   in  
terms   of   tax   revenues,   employment,   and   overall   investment.   Therefore   they   welcome   power  
development   plans   despite   having   little   involvement   in   their   preparation   and   despite   minimal  
consultation  with  provincial  government  departments.  
  
4.5.	   Integration	   of	   environmental	   and	   social	   factors	   into	   the	   hydropower	  
planning	  process	  
This  section  analyses  how  and  when  environmental  and  social  factors  are  considered  in  the  hydropower  
planning   process.   The   planning   of   hydropower   development   and   the   potential   for   integration   of  
environmental   and   social   concerns   follows   nine   key   steps   (including   plan   preparation,   proposal   and  
approval  at  each  step)  as  shown  in  Table  5.  
  
Step   Conducted  by   Activity   Environmental  
Assessment  
1. Hydro  potential  
study  
 Water  management  
Agency/MARD  
 Build  data  base  on  water  







 Energy  Institute/EVN,  
 IPS/MOIT  
 Collect  data  on  hydro  regime  of  
rivers  
 Check  available  data  on  hydro  
potential  of  river      
factors  




EVN  PECCs  and  institutions  
(Energy  Institute/PECC  
1,2,3,4)    
Identify  most  likely  locations  of  




impact  (eg  flood  
control,  
landslides)  




 EVN  EI,  PECCs  
MOIT/Government  
 DOIT/PPC/MOIT  
 EVN/MOIT  draft  PD  strategy  and  
PDP.    
 Government  approves  
 DOIT/PPC  develop  province  PDP  









Funded  by  investor,  
conducted  by  EVN  EI  and  
PECCs  



















Organize  EIA  team  
 Investment  proposal  
 MONRE  approve  EIA  of  large  
projects  
 MOIT  approve  EIA  of  large  and  
medium  projects  





to  final  approval  
8. Construction   Construction  company   Construction  of  reservoir,  dam,  
road,  transmission  line,  pipelines,  




9. Operation     Hydropower  plant  








Table  5:  Steps  and  environmental  assessment  in  hydropower  planning  
Source:  ICEM  (2011)  
Environmental	  Impact	  Assessments	  
EIAs   are   required   by   law   (AEPL   2005)   for   individual   hydropower   projects   during   the   feasibility   study  
phase.  They  are  undertaken  by  project  ‘owners’  such  as  EVN,  or  by  contract  to  IE,  MONRE/VEPA  or  one  
of   the   PECCs.   MONRE   organizes   an   Environmental   Appraisal   Committee   for   nationally   important  
projects  to  be  approved  by  Government  or  the  National  Assembly.    MOIT  organizes  an  EIA  of  medium  to  
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large  projects   that   are  approved  by  MOIT.   The  PPCs  authorize   the  DONRE  or  DOIT   to  organize  EIA  of  
small  projects  approved  by  the  PPC.        
Strategic  hydropower  development  decisions  are  beyond  the  reach  of  environmental  impact  assessment  
focussing   on   projects   unless   the   National   Assembly   demands   a   fundamental   review   of   a   nationally  
important  project.    MONRE’s  EIA  guidelines  for  hydropower  require  that  EIAs  should  “assess  and  select  
the  site  most  suitable  for  hydropower  works”.    In  practice,  project  siting  has  usually  been  decided  prior  
to   EIA.      EIAs   are   conducted   to   identify   environment   impacts   and   to   bring   them   to   the   attention   of  
concerned  bodies  and  to  argue  for  mitigation  actions.    At  this  late  stage,  often  the  budgets  and  staffing  
are  not  set  in  place  within  the  responsible  agencies  or  companies  to  easily  accommodate  environmental  
mitigation   measures   set   out   in   EIA   reports   and   environmental   protection   commitments.      The  
commitment   by   investors   of   funds   for   environmental   protection   up   front   is   now   required   under   the  
Amended  Environmental  Protection  Law  2005  but  the  systematic  application  of  that  provision  and  the  
estimation  of  what  is  appropriate  levels  of  funding  is  yet  to  happen.  
Environment	  Protection	  Commitments	  (EPC)	  
The   Law   requires  project  owners   to   submit   environment  protection   commitments   to  district   People’s  
Committees,   and   requires   district/commune   PCs   to   monitor   their   implementation.      However,   this  
process   is   poorly   defined   and   implemented   resulting   in   confusion   and   lack   of   understanding   –   with  
capacities  and  authorities  at  local  level  overridden  by  central  level  endorsements  and  involvement.  Also,  
oversight  of  environmental  mitigation  measures,  monitoring  and  reporting  relating  to  hydropower  has  
not  been  assigned  to  any  institution  to  conduct  regularly.    Recently,  DONREs  have  been  able  to  consider  
these   issues   in   provincial   annual   State   of   Environmental   Reports.   In   extreme   cases   (mostly   in  
manufacturing  and  processing  food  projects)  when  there  are  critical  complaints  from  local  populations  
or   public   media,   local   PCs   (province,   district,   commune)   will   make   specific   decisions   and   request  
concerned  institutions  to  take  mitigation  measures.    Public  complaints  have  been  received  by  local  and  
central  governments  relating  to  hydropower  projects,  primarily  on  the  conditions  for  resettlement  and  
illegal  activities  facilitated  by  new  infrastructure.94  
Strategic	  Environment	  Assessment	  (SEA)	  
The   AEPL   SEA/EIA   provisions   are   yet   to   significantly   affect   the   hydropower   planning   process   even  
though  a   relatively   large  number  of  SEAs  have   focussed  on   the  sector.     As  of   July  2006,  SEA   is   legally  
required  under  Article   14  of   the  AEPL   for   national,   provincial   and   inter-­‐provincial   strategies,   planning  
and  plans  including:    
• National  socio-­‐economic  development  strategies,  planning  and  plans.  
• Strategies  and  plans  for  development  of  sectors  on  a  national  scale.  
• Socio-­‐economic  development  strategies,  planning  and  plans  of  provincial  level  or  regions.  
• Plans  for  land  use,  forest  protection  and  development;  exploitation  and  utilization  of  other  natural  
resources  in  inter-­‐provincial  or  inter-­‐regional  areas.  
• Plans  for  development  of  key  economic  regions.  
• General  planning  of  inter-­‐provincial  river  basins.  
                                                                                                                        
94  For  example,  the  Kon  Tum  PPC  Decision  07/CT-­‐UB,  29  July  2000  concerned  illegal  activities  around  the  Yaly  
hydropower  project  facilitated  by  new  infrastructure,  but  not  environmental  impacts  caused  directly  by  the  
project.  The  PC  requested  that  (i)  province  police  coordinate  with  Sa  Thay  district  PC  in  monitoring  illegal  fishing  
and  boating  in  Yaly  reservoir;  (ii)  Forest  protection  department  monitors  illegal  logging  and  intrusions  on  land  
assigned  for  tourism  development;  (iii)  DOI  monitors  illegal  mining;  and  (iv)  PC  of  Sa  Thay  district  and  Kon  Tum  City  
punish  law  violators.  
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Responsibility  for  conducting  SEA  of  plans  falls  on  the  state  agency  plan  proponent.    SEA  reports  will  be  
appraised   by   an   “Appraisal   Council”,   which  will   be   established   by   the   agency  with   legal   authority   to  
approve  the  plan.    For  national  plans  (ie  those  above  sector  level)  this  will  function  will  be  undertaken  by  
MONRE.          
The  ALEP  SEA  provisions  are  supported  by:    
1. Decree	   No.	   80/2006/ND-­‐CP	   (August	   2006),   which   guides   implementation,   reporting   and  
appraisal  arrangements  and  includes  a  detailed  list  of  strategies  and  plans  that  require  SEA.    The  
decree  also  outlines  institutional  responsibilities  for  SEA  and  SEA  reporting  requirements.    
2. Circular	   08/2006/TT-­‐BTNMT	   (September	   2006),	   which	   provides   detailed   guidance   and  
instructions   on   the   implementation   of   the   ALEP   provisions   relating   to   SEA.      The   circular   also  
provides  detailed  guidance  on  the  required  contents  on  an  SEA  report.      
  
Three   substantial   SEAs   have   been   conducted  with   international   support   focusing   on   the   hydropower  
sector:  
• the  World  Bank,  ICEM  and  BirdLife  International  SEA  of  the  National  Hydropower  Plan  with  special  
reference  to  biodiversity  (2006),    
• the  Asian  Development  Bank  (ADB)  and  ICEM  SEA  of  Hydropower  Development  in  the  Vu  Gia  –  Thu  
Bon  River  Basin  (2008)  and    
• the  ADB  and  Stockholm  Environment  Institute  (SEI)  SEA  of  the  National  Power  Development  Plan  
(2009)  all  conducted  with  the  Ministry  of  Natural  Resources  and  Environment  (MoNRE),  the  Ministry  
of  Industry  and  Trade  (MOIT)  and    Electricity  of  Vietnam  (EVN).    
The  Mekong  River  Commission  and  ICEM  SEA  of  Hydropower  on  the  mainstream  Mekong  River  (2010),  
involving  Vietnam  as  a  developer  and  purchaser  is  the  most  recent  SEA  on  the  sector.  
Despite   an   SEA   being   required   by   law   for   submission   and   approval,   its   effectiveness   continues   to   be  
limited  –  and  the  influence  of  the  three  SEAs  is  not  reflected  in  Government  plans  and  procedures.  The  
IE  and  MOIT  responsible  for  drafting  the  7th  PDP  acknowledge  that  an  SEA  for  development  of  PDP  VII  is  
required.95  But  generally  due   to  budget   limitations   for  undertaking  SEAs,   the  organisation  of  effective  
and  comprehensive  SEAs  is  difficult.  The  responsibility  for  SEA  of  the  PDP  falls  on  IE-­‐-­‐  the  same  agency  
responsible   for  drafting   the  PDP   -­‐-­‐  and   is   submitted   to   the  MOIT   responsible   for  energy  development  
and  endorsement  of  the  PDP.  
National	  Assembly	  
The  National  Assembly  has  begun  to  focus  on  monitoring  implementation  of  projects  it  approves.    The  
Assembly  has  requested  concerned  ministries  and  government  to  report  on  progress  of  projects  
regularly  and  organizes  field  monitoring  mission.    In  June  2006,  following  its  approval  of  the  AEPL,  the  
NA  reviewed  criteria  for  projects  of  national  importance  (in  Decision  05/1997/QH10  of  1997),  and  issued  
a  new  decision  (Decision  66/2005/QH11,  29  June  2006).    The  Decision  outlines  project  categories  that  
should  be  submitted  to  NA  for  approval  (Box  1).    
  
                                                                                                                        
95  Sustainability  assessment  of  Vietnam’s  electricity  planning  (AusAID,  M-­‐POWER,  CGIAR  Challenge  Program  on  
Water  &  Food  2011)  
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Among  the  five  criteria  for  identifying  projects  of  national  importance,  three  criteria  concern  
environmental  protection.  The  criteria  defining  projects  of  national  importance  are:  
1. Projects  that  need  more  than  VND20,000  billion  of  investment,  in  which  government  funds  make  up  
more  than  20%.  
2. Projects  that  have  or  will  have  potential  impact  on  the  environment  including:  (i)  nuclear  electricity  
plants  and  (ii)  investment  projects  that  need  to  change  land  use  purpose  of  more  than  200  ha  of  
watershed  protection  forest  land,  or  more  than  500  ha  of  coastal  protection  forest  land,  or  more  
than  200  ha  of  special-­‐use  forest  land,  excluding  the  land  of  national  parks  and  natural  conservation  
areas;  and  more  than  1,000  ha  of  production  forest  land.  
3. Projects  that  have  to  resettle  more  than  20,000  persons  in  mountainous  areas  and  more  than  50,000  
persons  in  other  areas.  
4. Projects  located  in  most  national  important  places  concerning  national  defence,  security,  or  historical,  
cultural  values,  and  
5. Projects  that  require  special  policy  
Box  1:  The  National  Assembly  and  Important  Projects  
Source:  ICEM  (2011)  
Most  of  the  newly  proposed  hydropower  plants  are  in  mountainous  areas,  and  many  affect  large  areas  
of   forest   land   and   local   communities   –   requiring   resettlement   and   long   term   social   adjustments.  
Therefore  many  could  be  subject  to  the  National  Assembly  regulation  if  the  NA  was  fully  informed  and  
chose  to  take  the  initiative.    
	  Integration	  of	  environmental	  concerns	  in	  the	  6th	  PDP	  
The   6th   PDP   itself   takes   initial   steps   to   require   the   consideration   of   environmental   concerns   in  
hydropower  development.     The  Plan   refers   to   the   ranking  of  21  projects  by   financial-­‐technical   factors  
and   economic,   social   and   environment   concerns   in   an   impact   assessment   conducted   by   SWECO-­‐
STAKRAFT-­‐NORPLAN   as   an   input   to   formulation   of   a   National   Hydropower   Plan   (NHPS2   2004)   (NHP  
2007).  The  technical  factors  considered  in  the  study  include  power  generation,  water  supply  and  flood  
control.      The   social   factors   include   rural   electrification,  health,   education,   road,   local   investment,   and  
landscape.     Environment  factors  taken   into  account   in  the  study   include  water  quality,   forest  clearing,  
inundated   land   area,   biodiversity,   heritage   and   resettlement.   The   ranking   identified   by   the   Study  
appears  to  have  had  no  influence  in  the  EVN  and  MOIT  selection  of  projects  to  include  in  the  PDP  –  all  
the   project   have   been   listed   for   development   irrespective   of   the   impact   ranking   and   without   added  
provision  for  mitigation.  
The   6th   PDP   does   note   that   environment   management   in   the   power   sector   is   poor   and   lacks  
comprehensive  coordination  and  integration  at  all  levels.  It  proposes:  
• At	  national	  level:  establishing  a  national  committee  that  could  integrate  energy  development  
strategy  and  planning  with  economic  development  and  environment.        
• At	  energy	  sector	  level:  the  need  to  have  one  entity  within  the  energy  sector  to  coordinate  
environment  protection  relating  to  energy  development  in  all  sectors  and  in  each  sub  sector.  The  
entity  should  have  sufficient  authority  to  conduct  an  effective  environment  management  function.  
Those  proposals  have  yet  to  be  fully  implemented.    
Social	  assessment	  and	  resettlement	  
The  Government  gives  great  attention  to  resettlement   issues  –  because  so  many  hydropower  projects  
require  the  movement  of  people  away  from  the  proposed  reservoir  and  construction  areas.     The  main  
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principle  that  the  Government  has  defined  for  resettlement  is  that  people  moved  should  be  better  off  in  
their   new   areas   than   in   their   former   locations.      In   practice   this   is   far   from   the   case   –   with   many  
resettlement   experiences   leaving   communities   fragmented   and   families   with   inferior   dwellings   and  
agricultural   land  and  without   long  term  support  for  health,  education,  agricultural  extension  and  even  
water  supply  services.      
Ethnic  minorities,   concentrated   in   the  highland   areas   suitable   for   hydropower,   are  disproportionately  
affected   by   involuntary   resettlement.      There   is   only   a   general   policy   for   resettlement   for   the   whole  
nation  (Decree  197  CP,  2004),  no  specific  policy  for  ethnic  minorities,  even  though  among  the  poorest  in  
the   country   and   the   focus   of   national   Program	   135	   (Socio-­‐economic   Development   Program   for  
Extremely   Difficult   Communes   in   Ethnic   Minority   and   Mountainous   Areas).      In   spite   of   government  
efforts   to   address   poverty   among  different   ethnic   groups,   ethnic  minorities   are   vulnerable   to   chronic  
poverty.  According  to  figures  from  the  Vietnam  Household  Living  Standards  Surveys,  while  poverty  rates  
amongst   Kinh   dropped   sharply   between   1993   and   2002   declines   in   poverty   rates   amongst   ethnic  
minorities   were   more   modest.   In   2002,   although   ethnic   minorities   made   up   only   14   percent   of   the  
population,   they  accounted   for  about  30  percent  of   the  poor  –  and   they  make  up   some  70%  of   total  
populations  in  upland  areas  where  hydropower  is  concentrated.  
Hydro-­‐power  can  bring  a  number  of  important  local  benefits  to  ethnic  minorities.  The  large  hydro-­‐power  
dams  in  remote  areas  sometimes  bring  improvements  in  public  infrastructure  through  the  construction  
of  roads  and  other  public  amenities,  such  as  schools,  police  stations  and  health  stations.  The  small  and  
medium   sized   reservoirs   can   help   create   new   sites   for   local   tourism,   although   often   requiring   high  
investment   costs   and   generating   marginal   returns.      Also,   resettlement   can   result   in   improved   living  
standards  for  displaced  communities,  if  planned,  implemented  and  financed  effectively.      
Yet  there  are  fundamental  problems  with  resettlement  requiring  long-­‐term  support  to  rehabilitation  of  
livelihood  sources  and,  where  appropriate,   to  occupational   changes.     Resettlement  sites  are  generally  
caught  between  two  difficult  options.  Commonly  they  are  characterized  by  insufficient  production  land  
where  resettlement  sites  are  relocated,  or  they  have  sufficient  productive  land  but  are  located  in  more  
remote   areas  with   limited   access   to  main   roads,  markets,   public   services   and/or   other   communities.  
Another  key  problem  evident  in  many  resettlement  sites  across  Vietnam  is  poor  quality  construction  for  
infrastructure   and   houses.      Resettled   communities   are   unable   to   benefit   from   infrastructure  
improvements  on  a   long-­‐term  basis.     Often,   for  example,   families  do  not  own  motorized  vehicles  but  
resettlement   sites   require   longer   travel   distances   to   land   and   resources.      Water   supply   systems   are  
often   unreliable   but   the   resettled   families   do   not   have   the   skills   or   the   funds   for   maintenance   and  
repair.      Or   resettlement   areas   are   connected   to   the   national   electric   grid   and   equipped   with   power  
supply  equipment  but  families  do  not  have  money  to  pay  for  electricity.  
In  addition,  institutional  arrangements  on  resettlement  do  not  enable  the  long-­‐term  and  comprehensive  
support  to  ethnic  minority  because:    
(i) The  authority   responsible   for   resettlement   is   set  up  at  district   level   for   individual  HP  projects  
(District’s   Council   for   Compensation   and   Resettlement).   This   limits   a)   the   involvement   of  
different  central  departments  in  supporting  the  ethnic  minority;  b)  the  authority  to  manage  and  
enforce  hydro  developer   commitments;  and,   c)   the  mobilization  of  other   financial   sources   for  
supporting  ethnic  minorities.  
(ii) Current   regulations   on   resettlement   and   compensation   do   not   make   the   investors   fully  
responsible   for   all   financial   costs   and   socio-­‐economic   risks   they   create   for   the   community,  
especially  in  the  long-­‐term.  They  focus  mainly  on  short-­‐term  construction  of  resettlement  sites  
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and   on   compensation   for   household   land.   The   investor’s   responsibility   to   the   relocated  
population  ends  once  the  resettlement  site   is  complete  and  people  have  relocated  there.  Any  
further   financial  or  other  responsibilities  are  then  shifted  either  to  the   local  government   (e.g.,  
via  support  payments)  or  the  resettled  people  themselves.    
  
Under   the   Land   Law   and   its   regulations   only   those   with   land   certificates   are   compensated   in  
resettlement   (Annex   3   sets   out   laws   and   regulations   governing   resettlement).     Many   ethnic  minority  
families  have  been  outside  the  formal  land  allocation  system  and  do  not  have  certificates  either  for  the  
land  on  which   their  houses  are   located  or   the  agricultural,   forest  and   fishing  grounds   they  rely  on   for  
subsistence.      
  
Over  the  decade  the  policy  and  legal  framework  has  significantly  changed  which  has  impacted  on  how  
resettlement   is   conducted.   The  overall   direction  of   these   changes  has   been   to   clarify   land  ownership  
issues   and   strengthen   the   role   of   provinces   in   the   planning   and   management   of   state   budgets   for  
development   purposes,   with   specific   provisions   that   clarify   roles   and   responsibilities   under  
decentralisation   and   that   enhance   the   role   of   local   communities   in   decision   making.   These   changes  
reflect   the   key   overall   direction   of   government   policies,   which   is   towards   decentralisation   of   most  
aspects   of   development   planning   including   resettlement.   This   has   had   significant   impacts   on   the  
preparation  and  construction  of  hydropower  projects  by  promoting  the  planning,   implementation  and  
supervision  role  of  the  People’s  Committee  at  provincial,  district  and  commune  level.    In  effect  what  has  
often  happened  is  that  authority  and  supervision  has  been  decentralized,  without  adequate  budget  and  
integrating  mechanisms  for  effective  and  long  term  support  to  resettled  peoples.      
Decentralisation   has   made   the   institutional   arrangements   for   reviewing   the   social   impacts   of  
hydropower  on  poverty  and  ethnical  minorities  especially  complex  as  illustrated  in  Box  1.  
Some  of  the  more   important   issues  that  are  relevant  to   land  use,  acquisition,  and  resettlement  under  
the  Land  Law  2003,  are  summarized  as  below:  
• The  GoV  reserves  the  right  to  allocate  land  and  determine  its  usage;  
• Compensation  for  recovered  agricultural  and  rural  residential  land  will  be  in  the  form  of  new  land  of  
the  same  purpose  of  use  or,  if  no  new  land  is  available,  cash  equivalent  to  the  land  use  right  value  of  
the  recovered  land  (Article  42(2)  and  (3)).  In  the  latter  case,  the  land  use  right  value  is  established  as  
the  value  of  similar  land  under  normal  market  conditions,  as  determined  on  an  annual  basis  by  PPCs  
(Article  56).  
• Resettlement  zones  will  be  developed  for  people  having  residential  land  recovered  and  having  to  
move  their  places  of  residence.  Resettlement  zones  will  be  developed  for  many  projects  in  the  same  
area  and  will  provide  living  conditions  that  are  equal  to  or  better  than  the  conditions  in  the  former  
places  of  residence.  In  areas  where  there  is  no  established  resettlement  zone,  people  will  receive  
cash  for  recovered  residential  land  and  priority  to  purchase  or  lease  State  owned  dwellings  (Article  
42(3)).  
• Families  and  individuals  who  have  been  allocated  land  have  the  right  to  exchange  their  land  for  
another  piece;  transfer  their  right  to  use  land  to  another  party;  and  rent,  bequeath,  or  use  their  land  
as  collateral;  
• People's  Councils  at  all  levels  are  responsible  for  the  administration  of  land  use  in  their  localities;  the  
People's  Committees  at  all  levels  are  responsible  for  managing  land  issues  in  their  domains;  
120  
  
• The  GoV  reserves  the  right  to  expropriate  land  when  truly  necessary,  in  cases  of  national  defence  or  
security,  or  national  and  public  interest.  In  these  cases,  under  Article  27,  the  land  user  will  be  
compensated  for  loss  of  land  or  assets9.  
Decree  No.  197/2004/ND-­‐CP  regulates  the  eligibility  and  procedures  for  compensation,  assistance  and  
resettlement  in  the  event  of  State  recovery  of  land.    The  principles  underlying  compensation  are:  
(i) recovery  of  land  from  eligible  persons  shall  be  compensated;  
(ii) in   the   event,   the   affected   person   is   not   eligible   for   compensation,   consideration   will   be  
given  to  forms  of  assistance;  
(iii) compensation   for   affected   land   will   be   in   the   form   new   land   allocation   with   the   same  
purpose  of  use  or,  if  no  such  land  is  available,  cash  compensation  equal  to  the  value  of  land  
use  rights  at  the  time  of  recovery;  and,  
(iv) outstanding  financial   liabilities  associated  with  land  to  be  recovered  will  be  deducted  from  
the  amount  of  compensation  or  assistance  money.  
  
The  Decree  and  Circular  No.  116/2004  TT-­‐BTC  set  out  in  detail  the  types  of  compensation  for  different  
types  of  users  and  losses;  assistance  policies;  provisions  for  individual  and  group  resettlement;  and,  the  
roles  and  responsibilities  for  implementation  of  resettlement  projects.  
In  a  small  number  of  cases  when  international  funds  are  involved  in  developing  a  hydropower  project,  
additional   safeguards   apply   and   greater   care   is   taken   to   implement   integrated   support   programs   for  
affected   communities.      For   example,   ADB   is   funding   the   large   Song   Bong   4   project   in   Quang   Nam  
Province.    According  to  ADB  policy  all  project  interventions  affecting  indigenous  peoples  must  be:  
• Consistent  with  the  needs  and  aspirations  of  affected  indigenous  peoples;  
• Compatible  in  substance  and  structure  with  affected  indigenous  peoples’  culture  and  social  
• and  economic  institutions;  
• Conceived,  planned,  and  implemented  with  the  informed  participation  of  affected  
• communities;  
• Equitable  in  terms  of  development  efforts  and  impact;  
• Not  imposing  the  negative  effects  of  development  on  indigenous  peoples  without  appropriate  and  
acceptable  compensation.  
Box  2:  Institutions  responsible  for  considering  poverty  and  ethnic  minority  matters  in  hydropower  
development    
The  issues  of  poverty  and  ethnic  minorities  are  assessed  within  the  following  administrative  structures:  
1.  Central  level.  Steering  committee  for  poverty  reduction  with  the  following  members:  
 Vice  Prime  Minister,  Head  of  Steering  Committee  
 Minister  of  Ministry  of  Labour,  Invalids  and  for  Social  Affairs,  Head  of  Steering  Committee  
 Vice  Minister  of  Ministry  of  Labour,  Invalids  and  Social  Affairs,  member  
 Vice  Minister  of  Ministry  of  Planning  and  Investment,  member  
 Vice  Minister  of  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development,  member  
 Vice  Minister  of  Ministry  of  Health,  member  
 Vice  Minister  of  Ministry  of  Education  and  Training,  member  
 Vice  Minister  of  Ministry  of  Committee  of  Ethnic  Minorities  (CEMMA),  member  
2.  Provincial  level.  Steering  committee  for  poverty  reduction  with  the  following  members:  
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 Vice  Chairman  of  the  Provincial  People’s  Committee,  Head  of  Steering  Committee  
 Head  of  Department  of  Labour,  Invalids  and  Social  Affairs,  Vice  Head  of  Steering  Committee  
 Vice  Head  of  Department  of  Planning  and  Investment,  member  
 Vice  Head  of  Department  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development,  member  
 Vice  Head  of  Department  of  Health,  member  
 Vice  Head  of  Department  of  Education  and  Training,  member  
 Vice  Head  of  Department  of  Ethnic  Minorities  (DEM),  member  
3.  District  level.  Steering  committee  for  poverty  reduction  with  the  following  members:  
 Vice  Chairman  of  the  District  People’s  Committee,  Head  of  Steering  Committee  
 Head  of  Department  of  Labour-­‐Invalid  and  social,  Vice  head  of  Steering  Committee  
 Vice  Head  of  Department  of  Planning,  member  
 Vice  Head  of  Department  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development,  member  
 Vice  Head  of  Department  of  Health,  member  
 Representative  of  District  Farmers’  Association,  member  
 Representative  of  District  Women’s  Union,  member  
 Representative  of  District  Fatherland  Frontier,  member  
4.  Commune  level.  Steering  committee  for  poverty  reduction  with  the  following  members:  
 Vice  Chairman  of  the  Commune  People’s  Committee,  Head  of  Steering  Committee  
 Representative  of  Commune  Communist  Party,  member  
 Representative  of  Commune  Women’s  Union,  member  
 Representative  of  Commune  Fatherland  Frontier,  member  
 Representative  of  Commune  Farmers’  Association,  member  
 Representative  of  Commune  Communist  Youth  Union,  member  
 Leaders  of  the  Villages  in  the  Commune  
  
4.6.	  Consideration	  of	  resettlement	  during	  hydropower	  planning	  process	  
Social  impacts  in  HP  planning  are  considered  at  various  stages  of  hydropower  planning  summarized  
below:  
1. Pre-­‐feasibility  studies:  the  consideration  of  social  impacts  at  this  stage  focuses  on  the  most  critical  
issues  for  example:  
• Area  of  land  that  HP  will  take  for  construction  and  reservoirs    
• Number  of  households  to  be  impacted  
• Number  of  people  to  be  moved  to  allow  construction  to  proceed  
• Area  of  agricultural  land  to  be  lost.  This  land  is  assumed  to  have  a  Land  Use  Certification.    
The  land  without  LUC,  for  example  forest  land  and  slopping  land  that  local  people  are  using  
is  not  considered.          
      
2. Feasibility  studies:  social  impacts  assessment  at  this  stage:  
• Update  data  from  the  Pre-­‐feasibility  study  
• Define  land  available  for  agricultural  production  for  those  to  be  resettled.    This  estimation  
depends  on  potential  land  for  agricultural  production  (eg  suitable  soils,  flat  and  near  water  
resource).    
• Define  land  available  for  housing  for  resettlements.    In  calculation  for  resettlement,  all  
households  will  have  the  same  area  for  housing  and  small  gardens.          
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• Assessing  the  water  resource  for  resettlement,  both  for  drinking  and  agricultural  
production.  This  land  is  around  area  of  agricultural  land.    However  the  water  resource  
assessment  is  often  not  well  done  and  people  have  faced  serious  problems  when  resettled  
including  the  drying  up  of  wells  provided  in  the  resettlement  package.      
• Road  construction  to  connect  to  resettlement  areas.  This  clarifies  the  main  road  map.    
  
3. Investment  Planning,  cost  for  resettlement  is  estimated  and  key  plans  prepared  including:  
• Land	  acquisition	  plan	  for	  resettlement,  including  land  for  housing  and  agricultural  
production.  
• Resettlement	  plan,  including  compensation  cost,  time,  places,  number  of  people  to  be  
resettled,  and  design  of  house  construction.    There  are  two  options  in  resettlement  -­‐  first    
people  could  be  moved  to  existing  settlements  to  be  integrated  with  local  people;    second  
people  will  be  moved  to  new  locations  to  live  in  newly  established  villages.    The  
resettlement  locations  (i)  can  be  far  from  the  hydropower  project  and  far  from  areas  of  
traditional  associations.  In  this  case  people  have  no  direct  contact  with  the  HP  plant,  or  (ii)  
close  to  the  HP  project.  Then  people  still  have  some  contact  with  the  project,  for  example  
fishing  and  boating  in  the  reservoir,  and  cultivation  and  non  timber  forest  product  gathering  
around  reservoir.      
Other	  factors	  assessed	  at	  this	  stage	  include:  
• Connected  road  construction  
• Water  for  drinking    
• Irrigation  for  agricultural  production      
• Schools  and  education  services  
• Health  center  and  services  
• Electricity  supply  
• Funding  arrangements  for  resettlement.      Province  People’s  Committee  will  assign  its  
organizations  for  example  DARD,  district  authority  to  coordinate  with  investors  in    the  
resettlement  process.    
• Arrangements  re  certification  and  allocation  of  land  for  resettlement.    Province  People’s  
Commttees  signs  the  approval  on  Land  allocation  and  Land  Reclassification  to  the  HP  
investor.  District  People’s  Committee  signs  approval  land  allocation  and  provide  LUC  to  
resettled  households.  
• The  resettlement  plan  includes  a  training  plan  for  people  who  prefer  to  change  their  
employment  after  resettlement.                
  
4. HP  Construction,    resettlement  plan  is  implemented  including:  
• Clearing  land  for  resettlement  
• Construction  of  access  road.    The  quality  and  progress  of  road  construction  is  always  a  problem  
in  resettlement  as  generally  roads  are  without  sewage,  are  not  hard  surfaced  and  are  not  
accessible  in  raining  season.        
• Construction  of  houses,  including  water  supply  (could  be  the  wells  or  water  tanker),  electricity  
connection.  There  are  cases  where  the  population  has  increased  since  the  time  from  HP  
feasibility  planning  to  HP  construction  (often  several  years).    New  families  have  faced  problems  
being  allocated  houses  and  land  as  their  names  are  not  on  the  list  for  resettlement.      Houses  can  
be  constructed  by  the  construction  company  or  by  re-­‐settlers.  In  many  cases,  the  house  is  
constructed  by  a  construction  company  without  consultation.    Often  in  those  cases,  the  re-­‐
settlers  do  not  feel  comfortable  with  the    houses  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  for  example  they:    
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o differ  significantly  from  traditional  houses    
o are  too  hot  with  cement  roof  and  few  windows,    
o are  not  stable  and  not  resistant  to  strong  wind,    
o are  not  water  proof  in  strong  rain,    
o are  not  convenience  for  family  life  (eg  no  private  spaces  for  couple,  no  fireplace)          
• Removal  of  people  and  their  effects  
• Removal  of  cemeteries  
• Conducting  archeology  surveys    
• Collect  timber  in  area  to  be  inundated  and  sharing  of  resources  where  there  community  
ownership  
• Allocation  of  agricultural  land  for  households.  There  are  cases  where  the  land  has  been  too  poor  
for  agricultural  production,  or  too  small  to  sustain  households.    
• Provide  food  and  money  for  living  in  first  three  months  –  often  inadequate  and  create  serious  
problems  beyond  that  time.  
• Construction  of  schools  and  health  center.  But  there  have  been  cases  where  communities  are  
without  teachers  and  nurses  for  extended  periods.      
  
5. Handover  for  operation  of  project:  
• Start  to  accumulate  water  in  reservoir.  
• Final  removal  people  from  their  old  land  and  houses  
• In  new  resettlement,  people  and  local  authority  continue  to  complete  resettlement  plan.  
But  often  funds  are  not  available  in  a  timely  or  adequate  manager  for  road  improvement,  
irrigation  updated,  equipment  for  schools  and  health  center  and  maintenance.    Many  
unforeseen  issues  arise  once  communities  are  in  place  with  need  to  be  addressed  but  for  
which  there  is  no  clear  responsibility  or  resources.  
• Cultural  life.  The  loss  of  cultural  life  in  community  is  not  considered  in  many  HP  projects  but  
which  has  serious  consequences.  For  example  traditional  villages  have  traditional  village  
hall,  festivals,  worshipping  patters  linked  to  their  old  location.  
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Table  6:  Resettlement  planning  process  during  HP  planning  
Source:  ICEM  (2011)  
	  
4.7.	  Power	  development	  and	  purchase	  agreements	  
Project   development   agreements   (PDAs)   and   power   purchase   agreements   (PPAs)   are   two   important  
mechanisms  and  decision  points  in  the  HP  development  process.    To  date  PPAs  have  been  restricted  to  
the   financial   and   technical   aspects   of   the   government   purchasing   electricity   from   the   hydropower  
project  owner.    In  many  cases,  the  developer  and  the  purchaser  are  the  same  organization  -­‐  EVN.    PPAs  
have  not  been  used  to  achieve  broader  social  or  environmental  goals.    The  same  applies  to  PDAs  which  
have  been  concerned  only  with  the  economic  and  technical  feasibility  of  a  project.  
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Power	  development	  agreements	  
The  HP  project  PDA  comprises  two  kinds  of  agreements.  
 Agreement  for  HP  project  Pre-­‐feasibility  and  Feasibility  studies  prepared  by  EVN  in  case  of  large  
HP   projects   identified   in   the   PPD,   or   Provincial   People’s   Committees   for   projects   listed   in  
provincial  HP  plans,  and  submitted  to  MOIT  for  approval.  This  agreement  allows  EVN  or  a  PPC  to  
conduct  study  HP  projects  in  detail  prior  to  committing  them  to  the  PPD  or  province  HP  plan.          
 Agreement  for  HP  project  investment  is  prepared  by  investors,  endorsed  by  EVN  and  approved  
by   MOIT   for   PDP   projects,   and   endorsed   by   DOIT   and   approved   by   PPC   for   projects   in   the  
province  HP  plan.  To  enter   into  a  PDA,  an   investor  has  to  establish  a  HP  company   licensed  by  
MPI  or  DPI.    Once  they  have  an  endorsed  PDA  agreement,  the  company  must  prepare  a  Project  
Investment  plan,  and  have  it  approved  prior  to  commencement  of  construction.                
  
EVN   is   by   far   the  main   hydropower   investor   at   both   national   and   local   level.  Other   investors   include  
other   state   companies   such   as   the   large   Song   Da   infrastructure   company   and   LILAMA   joint-­‐stock  
company  and  national   companies   in   the  oil-­‐gas  and  coal  mining  sectors.  To  date   there  are  no   foreign  
private  investors  in  the  HP  sector.      
  
The  projection  of  power  demand  for  development  is  the  key  to  govern  PDA  negotiation.    Those  demand  
projections  are  also  undertaken  by  EVN  and  its  Institute  of  Energy.    That  situation  where  the  developer  
also   projects   national   power   demand   obviously   creates   potential   conflict   of   interest   situations   –   this  
difficulty  is  progressively  being  addressed  by  the  privatization  of  EVN  components  as  separate  entities.      
  
Hydropower  PDAs  have  tended  to  be  easier  to  process  than  other  power  resources  because  it  is  cheaper  
in  power  generation,   cleaner   in  operation   (from  a  pollution  viewpoint)  and   its   capacity   to  be  a  highly  
decentralized  power  source  that  brings  revenues  to  local  authorities,  especially  poor  provinces.  
  
Power	  Purchase	  Agreements	  
Power  Purchase  Agreements  are  made  between  the  HP  investor  and  EVN  which  manages  the  national  
grid   system.   The   Electric   Power   Trading   Company   of   EVN   is   mandated   to   sign   PPAs.      The   PPA   is  
considered  and  drafted  during  preparation  of  the  HP  investment  plan.  The  PPA  includes  issues  on  how  
much   power   will   go   to   national   grid,   estimated   purchase   price,   and   commitments   relating   to   the  
connecting  transmission  line  and  its  location.        
The  regulation  for  PPAs  is  MOIT  decision  N.  41/2010/TT-­‐BCT  on  14  December  2010.  The  Decision  defines  
the  following  responsibilities:  
The  Power  Regulation  Authority  (PRA)  is  responsibility  for:    
 Appraisal  and  final  submission  to  MOIT  on  annual  power  pricing  
 Appraisal  and  approval  of  PPAs  
 Resolving  problems  and  conflicts  associated  with  PPAs  
EVN  is  responsible  for:  
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 Drafting  the  annual  power  price  to  submit  to  the  PRA  for  approval    
 Submission  of  PPAs  to  the  PRA  for  approval  
The  HP  Investor  is  responsible  for  
 Negotiating  the  PPA  
  
PPAs  are  shaped  and  resolved  around  several  factors  including:  
 The  power  demand/  shortage  
 Amount  of  power  that  investor  will  sell      
 Electricity  price  that  investor  offer  to  EVN  
 Current  electricity  price      
 Status  of  transmission  line  connected  between  HP  project  and  national  grid  system  
  
4.8.	  Hydropower	  project	  management	  
The   approach   to   hydropower   project   management   is   not   conducive   to   taking   integrated   and  
collaborative  approaches  to  water  management  on  a  river  or  in  a  basin.    It  is  project  specific  with  on  site  
managers  having   little  authority   to   take   initiative   in   reaching  agreements  with  other  water  uses  or   to  
introduce  approaches  which  improve  access  or  environmental  services.  
HP   project   management   is   shaped   by   the   individual   investor’s   institutional   arrangements.   Large  
investors  such  as  EVN  or  LILAMA  that  have   large  complex  structures  with  different  operations  besides  
HP  take  a  two  stage  project  management  approach:  
1. Set  up  HP  Management  Board.  The  function  of  HP  MB  is  to  manage  HP  construction  following  
technical  design  and  to  coordinate  with  local  authorities  in  resettlement  following  provisions  of  
the   HP   investment   plan.   In   HP   construction   supervision,   a   HP   MB   has   different   divisions  
following  the  various  construction  activities  such  as:  land  clearance,  dam  construction,  machine  
purchase  and  install,  resettlement.  The  HP  MB  is  disbanded  after  construction  completion  and  
handover  HP  project  to  operate.            
2. Set   up   a   HP   company.      The   investor   establishes   a   HP   company   to   operate   HP   project   after  
construction.   The   HP   company   has   overall   responsibility   for   HP   project   operation   including  
reservoir   management,   water   discharge,   power   generation   and   sale,   and   engineering  
maintenance.  The  HP  company  has  one  director  and  2-­‐3  vice  directors,  and  some  divisions  such  
as   administration   and   finance,   technical,   and   maintenance.   The   HP   company   director   is  
responsibility  for  reporting  to  the  investor.    
  
Small   investors  who   focus  on  HP  operation  directly   supervise  all  HP   construction  and  operation.      The  
investor   could   be   an   individual   or   group.      The   investor   must   have   a   registered   HP   company   before  
construction.   The   HP   company   can   be   a   Limited   or   Joint-­‐venture   company.      The   investor   (i)   sub-­‐
contracts  a  construction  company  to  build  the  HP  project  and  (ii)  appoints  HP  company  workers.  In  cases  
where  the  company  is  registered  as  a  joint-­‐stock  company,  a  HP  management  board  and  board  director  
is  appointed.  The  management  board   is   representatives  of  stakeholders  who   invest   in   the  HP  project.  
The  MB  is  responsible  for  fund  management,  reviewing  policy  (tax,  electricity  pricing),  interaction  with  
local  authorizes,  and  the  resolution  of  problems  and  disputes,  for  example,  in  water  discharge  for  local  
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needs  in  irrigation.  The  Board  Director  has  1-­‐2  vice  directors  responsible  for  technical  operation  of  the  
HP  project.                                        
The  operation  of  a  HP  project  is  required  to  follow  the  regulation  of  water  accumulation  and  discharge  
to  sustain  power  generation.  The  operational  management  of  water  reservoir   is  approved  by  different  
levels:  
(i) Management  of  reservoir  that  relates  to  other  reservoirs  in  same  river  is  approved  by  MONRE.  
MONRE   is   preparing   the   guidance   for   inter-­‐reservoir   regulation   following   government   decree  
1879/QD-­‐TTg  on  13  October  2010.    
(ii) Management   and  operation  of   reservoirs  which   are   listed   in   the  national   PDP   is   approved  by  
MOIT  
(iii) Management   of   reservoirs   in   provincial   HP   plans   are   endorsed   by   DOIT   with   comment   from  
DONRE,  DARD,  then  approved  by  the  PPC        
            
The   investor   and   its   management   boards   re   responsibility   for   HP   operation   including   reservoir  
management.  There  is  no  single  institution  which  oversees  the  operation  of  HP  projects.  HP  projects  are  
accountable   to   their   investors   only.   The   Power   Regulation   Authority   holds   information   on   power  
generation  from  HP  projects,  but  it  does  not  have  other  information  on  HP  operation.  In  special  cases,  
EVN   as   the   power   purchaser   and   MOIT   as   decision   maker   on   HP   development   have   requested   HP  
projects   to   submit   operational   information,   for   example   during   electricity   shortages   and   large   floods.    
But  it  is  not  regular  or  comprehensive  information  gathering  process.                              
4.9.	  Hydropower	  as	  multiple	  use	  facilities	  
The  multiple  use  of  HP  project  is  defined  in  the  HP  master  planning  process,  at  the  Pre-­‐feasibility  study  
stage.  Each  HP  project  is  proposed  for  one  or  more  of  three  purposes:  
(i) HP  generation  
(ii) Irrigation  
(iii) Flood  control  
  
Water   transport,   tourism,   environmental   flows   or   fisheries   are   not   considered   in   the   feasibility   study  
process.  These  uses  are  may  be  considered   in  HP  planning   if   introduced  by  other  organizations  which  
are  given  an  opportunity  to  comment  or  review  early  planning  documents.     But  that   is  rare  and  often  
projects  can  go  all  the  way  to  final  design  stages  before  other  sector  agencies  become  aware  of  them.    
In  most  cases,  hydropower  projects  are  designed  with  a  single  purpose  –  power  production.    
The  MOIT  is  the  final  decision  maker  in  defining  multiple  use  options  when  it  approves  the  HP  Master  
plan.  The  multiple  use  options  for  HP  projects  is  based  on  local  water  demand  and  consumption  defined  
by  the  HP  technical  design  team.  HP  investors  often  commit  to  contribute  to  irrigation  and  flood  control  
to  garner  the  agreement  of  local  people  and  authorities.  But  the  experience  has  shown  that  HP  investors  
underestimate   the   water   and   operational   requirements   of   irrigation   and   flood   control   to   minimize  
investment  costs  and  maximize  profits.            
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Formally  the  government  and  EVN  are  committed  to  multiple-­‐use  of  HP  reservoirs  and  water  resources.    
Hydropower  developers  must   follow   the  multiple  use  principle   in   the  national   PDP.      In   practice  most  
project  designs  move  forward  on  the  basis  of  power  production  as  the  single  objective.    Other  uses  are  
considered  once  the  project  is  operational.  
Following   construction  and  during  operations,   the  HP   company  has  overall   responsibility   in  managing  
the   allocated   land   area   and   associated   infrastructure,   for   example,   the   HP   station,   reservoir,   and  
transmission  lines.  However,  its  enforcement  powers  are  limited  to  the  area  immediately  around  the  HP  
station.  The  use  of   the   reservoir   for  activities   such   fishing,   transport,   and   tourist   is  not  within   the  HP  
company’s  mandate.  Local  authorities  can  allow  local  people  to  run  activities  on  the  reservoir  without  
consultation  with  HP   company.   If   irrigation   and   flooding   control   is   included   in   the  HP  project   design,  
local   authorities  will   request   the  HP   company   to   regulate  water   for   these   purposes.   Ad   hoc   requests  
such  as  this  can  be  made  for  environmental  flows  if  downstream  town  are  suffering  water  quality  issues  
or  if  fishing  habitats  are  affected.    An  example  is  the  regular  requests  to  reservoir  managers  made  by  the  
HCMC  PPC  for  releases  to  flush  out  pollution  in  the  city  during  droughts.    Such  requests  are  rare.  
Land  around  HP  projects  is  used  for  forest  or  agriculture  production  –  HP  managers  are  not  involved  in  
this   use   if   it   is   on   land   outside   their   immediate   jurisdiction.     Most   large   hydropower   projects   are   in  
isolated  mountainous  areas   in  which  pumping  and  piping  of  water   for   irrigation  –  and  where  fisheries  
and   tourism   activities   are   not   economically   feasible.      Therefore   one   a   project   is   in   place,   the  
opportunities  for  multiple  use  are  very  limited.  
  
Conclusions	  
In  summary,  this  brief  review  of  hydropower  development  planning  shows  that:  
• The  national  plans  for  hydropower  development  are  integrated  into  the  national  PDP.    There  is  no  
separated   chapter   concerning   hydropower   in   the   PDP   and   no   distinct   national   hydropower  
development  planning  document.  
• The  6th  PDP  includes  73  large  hydropower  projects  –  13  are  already  in  operation.  
• Small   and   medium   hydropower   projects   are   not   clarified   in   detail   as   individual   projects   in   the  
national  PDP  but  are  considered  in  provincial  PDPs.  
• Small   hydropower  projects   face   greater   difficulty   connecting   to   and   selling  power   to   the  national  
grid  as  they  are  not  clarified  in  detail.    
• In   the  national  PDP,  hydropower  projects  are  not  grouped  by   river  basins,  by  provinces  or  by   the  
eight  socio-­‐economic  regions,  but  they  are  grouped  by  the  three  large  regions  (north,  central,  south)  
in  the  country.  
• There  are  no  hydropower  development  plans  by  river  basin  that  include  all  small,  medium  and  large  
scale  projects  (although  in  cases  where  most  of  a  river  basin  falls  within  one  province  –  such  as  the  
Vu  Gia  –  Thu  Bon  in  Quang  Nam  –  the  provincial  PDP  effectively  becomes  the  river  basin  plan).  
• Some  provinces  have  approved  provincial  Power  Development  Plans  which  include  all  hydropower  
projects  within  their  territory.    One  river  basin  may  cover  different  provinces,  but  outside  the  Water  
Law   and   some   pilot   river   basin   organizations,   there   is   no  mechanism   for   integrated   hydropower  




• Hydropower  projects  are  funded  and  managed  by  many  different   investors  although  EVN  is  by  far  
the  dominant  force  in  shaping  both  planning  and  implementation  of  the  sub-­‐sector  at  the  national  
level  and  the  IE  and  PECC  at  provincial  levels.    
• MOIT  is  responsible  for  the  approval  of  hydropower  planning  at  central  and  provincial  levels.  
• Often,  there  are  many  hydropower  projects  on  one  river  and   in  one  river  basin.     But  there  are  no  
procedures   for   planning   projects   for   cumulative   environmental   impacts   and   to   promote  
coordination  among  projects  on  the  same  river  for  water  and  environmental  management.      
• Hydropower   planning   in   Vietnam   has   been   given   top   priority   by   the   government.   Environmental  
protection  and  livelihoods  of  local  people  is  traded  off  and  receives  secondary  consideration.    
• Local   communities  have   little  voice   in  negotiating  during   the  hydropower  planning  process.  While  
some  may  prefer  to  move,  there  is  no  choice  involved.  
• The   EIA   process  would   be   improved   by   ensuring   assessments   are   undertaken   by   an   independent  
body  not  involved  in  the  planning  process  selected  by  MONRE  with  results  submitted  independently  
to  the  People’s  Council  and  National  Assembly  for  consideration  rather  than  to  local  PC’s.  
• Dissemination  of  EPC  requirements  and  process  to  district  and  commune  PCs,  hydropower  project  
‘owners’   and   provincial      level   authorities   would   help   to   define   responsibilities   and   procedures.  
Introducing   monitoring   by   organisations   involved   in   project   implementation   and   encourage  
feedback   to   PCs   from  monitoring   agencies  will   improve   implementation   and   transparency   of   EPC  
process.    
• An   independent   agency   should   be   responsible   for   undertaking   SEAs   that   does   not   participate   in  
strategy  or  master  plan  preparation.  Due  to  the  potentially  high  social  and  environmental  impact  of  
hydropower  projects,  all  SEA  reports  should  be  submitted  to  the  National  Assembly  for  approval  and  
increased   monitoring   of   SEA   implementation   is   critical   to   ensure   greater   consideration   of  
environmental  factors  in  hydropower  planning.    
  
Concerning  social  effects,  the  SEA  on  hydropower  on  the  Vu  Gia  Thu  Bon  River  Basin  made  the  following  
recommendations   to   improve   institutional   and   operational   aspects   of   hydropower   planning   and  
implementation:  
  
Integrated   government   service   delivery   for   ethnic   minorities:   Hydropower   projects   create   radical  
changes   in   the   life   of   affected   ethnic   people.      A   range   of   central   and   local   government   departments  
need   to   be   involved   in   the   delivery   of   integrated   support   programs   including   agriculture,   forestry,  
fishery   and   labor.   The   preparation   and   implementation   of   an   Ethnic   Minorities   Development   Plan  
associated  with  each  project  requires  the  collaborative  delivery  of  services  and  resources  from  central,  
provincial  and  district/commune  governments.    There  is  a  need  to:    
(i) lift  the  provision  of  services  to  the  provincial  level  so  that  financial  and  technical  sources  can  
be   mobilized   effectively   (presently,   the   authority   responsible   for   these   issues   individual  
hydropower  projects  is  with  District’s  Councils  for  Compensation  and  Resettlement);  and    
(ii) require  that  all  government  agencies  make  their  contributions  according  to  one  agreed  and  
integrated  plan.  
  
Long-­‐term  adjustment  programs  for  resettled  communities  (10-­‐15  yrs):  Current  difficulties  suffered  by  
ethnic  minorities  are  created  by  short-­‐term  and  piecemeal  resettlement  programs.  They  focus  mainly  on  
short-­‐term  construction  of  the  resettlement  site  and  the  compensation  for  taking  land  from  households.  
The   investor’s   responsibility   to   the   relocated   population   normally   ends   once   the   resettlement   site   is  
complete  and  people  have  been  relocated.  Any  further  financial  or  other  responsibilities  are  then  shifted  
either  to  the  local  government  (e.g.,  via  subsidies)  or  the  resettled  people  themselves.  The  relocation  of  
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affected  people  to  the  resettlement  site  should  be  seen  as  the  start  of  the  resettlement  project,  which  is  
followed   by   long-­‐term   adjustment   support   program  of   10   to   15   years   to   restore   previous   productive  
capacity  and  living  standards.    The  long-­‐term  adjustment  program  should  be:  
(i) Based  on  a  participatory  approach  
(ii) Tailored  to  local  needs,  including  activities  such  as:  
 Occupational  change  support  and  training  
 Preferential  credit  and  start-­‐up  investment  funds  
 Community  forestry  and  agro-­‐forestry  
 Agricultural  and  forestry  extension  services  
 Health  and  education  awareness  raising  such  as  on  HIV/AIDS,  other  socio  evils  
 Culture/tradition  conservation  programs  
(iii) Contribute  to  and  coordinate  with  national  programs  
The  long-­‐term  adjustment  program  should  be  carried  out  in  such  a  way  that  it  maintains  and  enhances  
the  productive  capacity  of  the  community  
Financial  &  non-­‐financial  commitment  by  investors:  Regulations  on  resettlement  and  compensation  do  
not  make  the  investors  fully  responsible  for  all  financial  costs  and  socio-­‐economic  risks  they  create  for  
the   community,   especially   in   the   long-­‐term.   The  proposed  actions  make   investors   responsible   for   the  
costs  of  mitigation.      
Specific  actions  proposed  include:  
• Setting  up   the  central   legislation   for   contractual   arrangements  between   the  provincial   level   inter-­‐
sector   group   on   ethnic   minority   and   the   hydropower   investors   (eg   through   a   separate  
decree/provision  on  the  resettlement  of  ethnic  minority)    
• Financial   provisions   for   long-­‐term   support   in   various   schemes,   for   example,   from   each   project   a  
combination  of:  
(i) one-­‐off  payments    
(ii) regular  installments  for  defined  periods  
(iii) a  percentage  of  revenue  
  
Financial   commitment   of   the   investors   to   cover   potential   risks   and   costs   to   affected   ethnic  minority  
communities  and   local  authorities  such  as:   loss  of   income  sources,  costs   for   law  enforcement   training  
and  delivery  to  local  police  and  local  forest  protection  rangers  
  
5.	  OVERALL	  SYNTHESIS	  
The   overall   synthesis   focuses   on   the   three   objectives   defined   earlier   in   the   introduction.   First,   we  
identified   and  discussed   the  obstacles   in   the   current  policy,   legal   and  organizational   frameworks   that  
regulate  hydropower  planning.  Second,  we  brought  to  light  opportunities  and  potential  entry  points  to  
accommodate   the   creation   of   better   linkages   between   hydropower   development   and   people’s  
livelihoods  in  general.  As  with  regard  to  its  recommendations  for  the  preferred  livelihoods  options,  this  
will  be  incorporated  as  part  of  the  final  project  output.  This  policy  review  and  institutional  analysis  will  
be  complemented  by  detail  analysis  on  institutional  arrangements  at  the  local  level,  to  be  undertaken  in  
from  June  to  August  2011.  The  complimentary  linkages  highlight  our  multi-­‐level  policy  analysis,  as  well  




Existing  policies  and  legal  frameworks  on  land-­‐water-­‐environment  management  in  Lao  PDR,  Cambodia,  
and   Vietnam   do   not   provide   sufficient   basis   for   consistent,   clear,   and   transparent   decision-­‐making  
processes  with   regard   to   hydropower   development   in   each   of   the   three   countries.   At   national   level,  
hydropower   development   is   governed   by   multiple   government   agencies   operating   in   a   multi-­‐level  
social/legal  field  of  more  than  one  legal  order  (Griffiths  1986).    
  
In   Lao   PDR,   this   state   of   legal   pluralism   is   most   evident   in   WREA’s   and   NLMA’s   inability   to   link  
hydropower  development  as   an   integral  part  of   the   country’s  water   resources  and   land  management  
policy   (both   in   terms   of   EIA   review   and   land   concession   agreement).   In   Cambodia,   hydropower  
development   is   directed  primarily   by  MIME,  with   limited   involvement   from  MoWRAM  and  MoE.   Like  
WREA,  MoE  plays  an  important  role  in  reviewing  the  EIA  for  hydropower  projects.  Yet,  it  lacks  access  to  
the  overall  decision-­‐making  process  not  only  with  regard  to  project  sites  selection,  but  also  in  defining  
the  overall  scope  of  hydropower  development  as  part  of  the  country’s  power  system  planning.  Similarly,  
in   Vietnam,   though   river   basin   planning   occurred   extensively   through   different   administrative   level  
involving  different  government  agencies  both  at  national  and  provincial   level,  the  planning  still  follows  
sectoral  development  approach  with  hydropower,  water  resources  and  environment  aspects  separated  
from  one  another.  Thus,  while  each  government  agency  is  equipped  with  its  (cross)  sectoral  mandates,  
tasks  and  responsibilities,  during  the  policy   implementation  the  actual  compilation  of  these  mandates,  
tasks  and  responsibilities  results  in  unclear  operational  boundary  and  to  a  certain  extent  a  condition  for  
power   vacuum.   This   power   vacuum   is   most   apparent   in   all   three   LMB   countries   when   hydropower  
projects  proceed  following  primarily  private  sector  actors’  investment  interest,  rather  than  any  existing  
plan  defined  by  the  countries  governments.    
  
The  state  of  legal  pluralism  which  reflects  the  current  ‘problem’  in  hydropower  policy  formulation  and  
implementation  in  the  three  Lower  Mekong  Basin  (LMB)  countries  is  rooted  in  the  overall  shortcomings  
of  power  systems  planning  at  national  level,  in  which  hydropower  sector  planning  is  part  of.  In  both  Lao  
PDR   and   Cambodia,   hydropower   planning   is   reduced   to   ‘project   development   list’   comprised   of  
potential  hydropower  projects  private  investors  can  select  to  invest,  construct  and  operate  regardless  of  
their   strategic/actual   significance   for   the   country’s   development   in   general.   Similarly,   in  Vietnam,   the  
application  of  existing  plan  in  hydropower  development  is  determined  mainly  by  the  funding  availability  
(often  come   from   the  private   sector  actors).   In   this   context,  hydropower  planning   is   approached  as  a  
means  to  increase  private  investors’  involvement  in  the  sector  development,  projected  to  have  positive  
effects   on   the   country’s   economic   growth   as   the   government’s   underlying   rationale   in   hydropower  
development.    
  
The  government’s  rationale  in  hydropower  development  is  shaped  by  several  factors.  First,  the  absence  
of  power  system  planning   in  both  Lao  PDR  and  Cambodia  should  be  understood  within  the  context  of  
each  country’s  financial  inability  to  develop  its  hydropower  potential,  and  thus  their  reliance  on  private  
sector   financing.   In   Lao   PDR,   the   government   attempts   to   cope   with   this   lack   of   financial   source   by  
encouraging   private   sector   actor   as   Independent   Power   Producer   (IPP)   to   develop   the   country’s  
hydropower   potential.   While   integrated   power   system   planning   would   be   beneficial   in   shaping   the  
country’s   development   strategies   for   the   long-­‐run,   given   the   current   financial   circumstances,   the  
government’s  priority   for   IPP  does  not  result   in  the  formulation  of  such  a  plan.  Similarly,  while  such  a  
plan  does  exist  in  Vietnam,  the  plan  materialization  became  problematic  when  private  sector  financing  




Second,   in   line   with   the   country’s   national   socio-­‐economic   development   plan,   hydropower   sector   is  
perceived   as   the   country’s   economic   means   to   increase   economic   growth   (both   through   revenue  
collection   and   as   major   preconditions   for   economic   development).   In   this   context,   cross-­‐sectoral  
planning   becomes   less   important   as   compared   to   the   sector’s   role/ability   to   absorb   private   sector  
investments   as   to  meet   the   government’s   investment   targets.   Put   differently,   the   rationale   to   either  
regulate   or   plan   is   side   lined   by   the   need   to   encourage   private   sector   investment   in   hydropower  
development   to   promote   economic   growth   and   increase   export   revenue.   Government   rules   and  
regulations  have  the  tendency  to  facilitate  private  investors’  interests  rather  than  to  strictly  regulate  and  
control   their   conducts,   as   government  depends  on   the   incoming   financial   sources   to   generate   export  
revenue  and  increase  economic  growth.    
  
The  state  of   legal  pluralisms,   the  condition   for  power  vacuum,  and  the  rationale  behind  power  sector  
development   in   LMB   countries   allow   private   actors   to   assert   its   dominance   in   shaping   the   overall  
implementation  of  hydropower  projects,  hardly  linked  with  the  national  hydropower  development  plan  
(even   when   such   plan   exists   like   in   the   case   of   Vietnam).   Private   sector   actors   become   the   ad-­‐hoc  
decision  makers   in   hydropower   development   context,   through   their   direct   role   in   shaping   rules   and  
procedures  at  the  project  level.    
  
5.2. Opportunities	  
Within   the   context   of   private   sector   dominance   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   the   state   of   legal   pluralism   in   Mekong  
hydropower   development,  we   identified   the   following   opportunities,   entry   points   to   improve   current  
linkages  between  hydropower  development  and  people’s  livelihoods.    
  
First,  we  highlight   the   importance  of  government’s   investment  strategies  as  one  of   the  driving   factors  
behind   current   rapid   speed   of   hydropower   development.   In   Lao   PDR,   for   instance,   the   government’s  
attempt  to  shape  the  revenue  development  sustainably  follows  the  logic  of:  economic  growth  leads  to  
increase   in   revenue   collection   and   poverty   reduction.   This   logic   prompts   the   government   to   be   very  
active   in  building  up  and   strengthening   the   conditions   for   economic   growth.   It   also  determines  GoL’s  
strategy  to  eradicate  poverty  by  ensuring  sufficient  investment  from  the  private  sectors,  assuming  that  
this  investment  will  automatically  ensure  economic  growth  and  reduce  poverty.    The  question  remains,  
however,   how   economic   growth,   revenue   collection   and   poverty   reduction   can   be   optimally   linked.  
Sustainable  hydropower   should  be   focused  on  accommodating  direct   linkages  between  government’s  
revenue   collection   and   poverty   reduction   funds.   At   present,   this   link   is   present   in   almost   all  
government’s   general   policies,   but   remains   vague   in   terms   of   policy   application.   Within   the   energy  
sector,   the   role  of  hydropower   in  poverty   reduction  can  be  clarified  by   linking   revenue   from   IPP  with  
government’s  budget  for  rural  electrification.    
  
Second,   we   highlight   the   potential   importance   of   public   participation   as   decisive   element   to   shape  
better   linkages   between   hydropower   development   and   people’s   livelihoods   in   future   hydropower  
decision-­‐making   processes.   Public   participation   was   mentioned   in   the   existing   policies   and   legal  
frameworks   as   a   crucial   element   to   be   included   in   the   overall   process   of   hydropower   development  
projects   primarily   related   to   impact   assessment,   resettlement,  mitigation  measures   and   environment  
management  and  monitoring  plan.  At  present,  public  participation  occurred  mainly  at  project   level,  as  
designed,  arranged,  conducted,  and  monitored  by  private  sector  actors.  The  actual  significance  of  public  
participation  could  be  increased  by  enlarging  its  scope  and  coverage  beyond  the  procedural  context  of  
hydropower  development  project.  Public  participation  should  be  anticipated  not  only  during  the  course  
of  hydropower  development  project,  but  also  during  the  project  actual  operation  as  such  that   it  could  
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improve  local  population’s  (especially  the  affected  people)  access  to  the  overall  decision-­‐making  process  
with  regard  to  hydropower  dam  operation.    
  
Third,  we   identify   the   importance   of   incorporating   the   EIA   as   an   integral   part   of   hydropower   project  
feasibility   study.   As   it   became   evident   from   the   policy   review   and   institutional   analysis,   EIA   was  
formulated   as   a   separate   entity   in   hydropower   development,   not   linked   to   cost-­‐benefit   analysis  
conducted  by  private  sector  actors  in  their  feasibility  study.  The  disintegration  significantly  reduces  EIA’s  
potential  role  in  shaping  the  overall  design  of  hydropower  development  projects  (i.e.  selection  criteria  in  
dam  design).  As  the  EIA  often  was  formulated  at  a  later  stage  in  hydropower  decision-­‐making  process,  it  
acts   merely   as   a   mitigation   measure,   with   no   potential   role   to   influence   the   overall   process   of  
hydropower  dam  design,  construction,  and  operation,   if  not  downplaying  the  overall  assessed  impacts  
altogether.  
  
Last  but  not  least,  we  identified  the  issue  of  land  titling  as  a  potential  entry  point  and  a  means  to  give  
greater   voice   to   rural   community   and   potentially   affected   people   to   hydropower   decision-­‐making  
processes  in  particular,  and  other  development-­‐related  interventions  in  general.  As  the  current  situation  
shows   that   most   land   in   the   rural   areas   do   not   have   any   legal   titles.   This   condition   highlights   the  
vulnerable   position   of   the   rural   community   that   uses   the   land   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   hydropower   development  
projects’  interest  in  terms  of  land  concession.    
  
5.3. Recommendations	  	  	  
Based  on  the  defined  opportunities,  the  following  recommendations  are  proposed.  
  
First,  linkages  between  government’s  strategy  to  promote  economic  growth  and  government’s  objective  
to  reduce  poverty  should  be  made  more  explicit  in  terms  of  policy  formulation  and  implementation.  The  
establishment   of   Poverty   Reduction   Fund   (PRF),   for   instance   should   be   accompanied   with   structural  
measures   to   address   poverty   linking   government   revenues   from   hydropower   with   government  
expenditure  in  relevant  sectors  (health  and  education).    
  
Second,   in   line  with   the   basic   principles   in   the   country’s   national   socio-­‐economic   development   plans  
(decentralization,  good  governance),  we  proposed  that  the  issue  of  public  participation  in  hydropower  
development  projects  to  be  mainstreamed  as  part  of  general  awareness  campaign.  Local  population  and  
potentially   affected   people   should   be   made   aware   about   the   existing   rules   and   procedures   in  
hydropower  development  in  relation  to  their  rights  and  access  to  natural  resources  (land,  water  and  the  
environment).   Currently,   this   awareness   raising   took   place   within   each   individual   project   set-­‐up,  
conducted  under  the   leadership  of  private  sector  actors   (the  respective  power  companies).  While   this  
current  set-­‐up  indirectly  obliges  private  sector  actors  to  follow  the  defined  rules  and  procedures,  it  also  
highlights  the  potential  conflict  of  interest  that  might  occur  when  private  sector  actors  become  the  only  
de-­‐facto  decision  maker  in  shaping  the  overall  process  of  public  participation.    
  
The   proposed   awareness   raising   program   could   be   initiated   at   district   and   provincial   level,   with  
involvement   from  district/provincial   government,   civil   society  groups  and  others  with  direct  access   to  
village  communities  where  hydropower  projects  were  proposed  or  planned.  Elements  of  the  awareness  
raising  program  should  include  basic  information  with  regard  to  project  procedures  and  rules  in  relation  
to   compensation   arrangements,   formulation   of   mitigation   and   environment   management   plan.   In  
addition,  spatial  mapping  exercise  should   form  an   integral  part  of   the  program,   in   terms  of   improving  
local  population’s  ability   to  project   future   impacts   from  hydropower  development.   Last  but  not   least,  
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this   awareness   raising   program   should   be   structurally   supported   by   better   information   disclosure  
applied  by  government  agencies  at  different  administrative  levels.        
  
Third,  EIA  formulation  and  review  should  be  incorporated  into  the  project’s  feasibility  studies.  While  the  
incorporation  can  be  considered  as  a  structural  issue,  its  application  does  not  require  structural  revision  
of   the  existing  policies  and   legal   framework.  Current  policies,   rules  and  regulations  on  EIA  can  still  be  
applied  accordingly.  It  is  the  sequence  of  the  EIA  formulation  and  review  that  need  to  be  moved  up  the  
hydropower  development  procedural  ladder.  The  idea  to  change  the  sequence  of  EIA  review  should  be  
presented  to  the  relevant  government  agencies  in  hydropower  development.  In  Lao  PDR,  for  instance,  
the  idea  can  first  be  presented  to  Water  Resources  Environment  Administration  (WREA)  and  Ministry  of  
Energy   and   Mines   (MEM),   prior   to   more   general   discussion   led   by   the   Ministry   of   Planning   and  
Investment  (MPI)  involving  other  government  agencies.    
  
Finally,  in  line  with  the  issue  of  land  titling  we  suggested  the  provision  of  sufficient  budget  to  ensure  the  
completion  of  current  land  titling  program  in  the  rural  area.  Furthermore,  we  propose  the  incorporation  
of   the   agency   responsible   for   approving   land   concession   as   part   of   the   negotiation   processes   in   the  
different   stages   of   hydropower   development   (i.e.   concession   agreement,   project   development  
agreement).        
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ANNEX   1 :   NAT IONAL    LAWS   AND   OTHER    LEGAL    INSTRUMENTS   
RELATED   TO   RESETTLEMENT    (V I ETNAM)   
1. The  main  National  Laws  and  other  Legal  Instruments  related  to  resettlement  include  the  following  
2. Land  Law  of  Vietnam  issued  on  July  14,  1993.  Amendment  Law  issued  on  November  26,  2003.  
3. Decree  No.  197/2004/ND-­‐CP  by   the  Government,  dated  on  December  03,  2004  on  compensation,  
support  and  resettlement  when  land  is  reclaimed  by  the  Government.  
4. Decree  No.  181/2004/ND-­‐CP  by  the  Government,  dated  on  October  29,  2004  on  implementation  of  
Law  of  land  2003.  
5. Decree   No.   188/2004/ND-­‐CP   by   the   Government,   dated   on   November   16,   2004   on   method   for  
defining  price  of  land  and  price  schedule  for  types  of  land.  
6. Circular  No.  114/2004/TT-­‐BTC  by  Ministry  of  Finance,  dated  on  November  26,  2004  on  instructions  
for   implementation   of   Decree   No.   188/2004/ND-­‐CP   by   the   Government,   on  method   for   defining  
price  of  land  and  price  schedule  for  types  of  land.  
7. Circular  No.  116/2004/TT-­‐BTC  by  Ministry  of  Finance,  dated  on  November  26,  2004  on  instructions  
for  implementation  of  Decree  No.  197/2004/ND-­‐CP  by  the  Government,  on  compensation,  support  
and  resettlement  when  land  is  reclaimed  by  the  Government.  
8. Decree  No.  64/CP  by   the  Government,  dated  on  September  27,  1993  on  hand-­‐over  of  agriculture  
land  for  households  and  individuals  for  long-­‐term  use  of  agricultural  production  purposes.  
9. Circular  No.  05/BXD-­‐DT  by  Ministry  of  Construction,  dated  on  February  9,  1993  on  instructions  for  
definition  of  area  in  use  and  grading  of  houses.  
10. Decision  No.  132/2002/QD-­‐TTG  by   the  Prime  Minister,  dated  on  October  8,  2002,  on   solutions  of  
production  land  for  minority  people  in  Mid-­‐Highland.  
11. The   Grassroots   Democracy   Decree   79/ND-­‐CP,   issued   in   2003,   aimed   to   increase   community  
participation  in  local  decision-­‐making,  especially  planning  and  budgeting.  
12. Decree  33  and,  Guideline  2215  to  provincial  Departments  of  Planning  and  Investment  for  “Rolling-­‐
out  the  development  of  the  provincial  socio-­‐economic  plan  taking  into  account  the  Comprehensive  
Poverty  Reduction  and  Growth  Strategy”  issued  by  MPI  in  April  2004.  
13. The   Revised   State   Budget   Law   came   in   force   in   January   2004.   This   new   law   simplifies   but  
strengthens  the  legal  arrangements  between  central  and  local  levels.  
14. Decision  80  on  the  establishment  of  Community  Supervision  Boards  was   issued  by  the  Ministry  of  
Home   Affairs   In   2005,   to   improve   the   role   of   the   community   in   decisions   about   infrastructure  
selection,  implementation,  supervision  and  monitoring.  
15. Decree   No.   12/2009/ND-­‐CP   issued   by   the   Government   10   February   2009   is   to   improve   the  
decentralization   of   investment  management   and   construction.   The   Decree   12/2009/ND-­‐CP   states  
that:   depending   on   particular   conditions   of   each   locality,   the   chairman   of   the   provincial   people  
committee  will  specify  the  chairman  of  district  and  commune  people  committee  to  make  decision  
on  investment  into  projects  with  fund  financed  by  the  state  banks  
16. Decree  No.  84/2007/ND-­‐CP  dated  25  May  2007,  additionally  stipulating  the  grant  of   land  use  right  
Certificates,   recovery  of   land,  exercise  of   land  use  rights,  order  and  procedures   for  compensation,  
support   and   resettlement   upon   land   recovery   by   the   State,   and   settlement   of   land-­‐related  
complaints.  
17. Circular   No.69/2006/TT-­‐BTC   dated   02   August   2006,   amending   and   supplementing   the   Finance  
Ministry's  Circular  no.  116/2004/TT-­‐BTC  of  December  7,  2004,  which  guides  the  implementation  of  
the  Government's  Decree  no.  197/2004/ND-­‐CP  of  December  3,  2004,  on  compensation,  support  and  
resettlement  upon  land  recovery  by  the  state.  
18. Decree   No.17/2006/ND-­‐CP   dated   January   27,   2006,   amending   and   supplementing   a   number   of  
articles  of  the  Decrees  guiding  the  implementation  of  the  Land  Law  and  Decree  No.  187/2004/ND-­‐
140  
  
CP  on  transformation  of  state  companies  into  joint-­‐stock  companies.  
19. Circular   No.06/2007/TT-­‐BTNMT   dated   02   July   2007   guiding   the   implementation   of   a   number   of  
article   of   decree   84/2007/ND-­‐CP   dated   25/05/2007   providing   additional   regulations   on   granting  
land  use  right  certificates,  retrieving  land,  paying  compensation,  resettling,  settling  complaints  and  
denouncements.  
20. Circular  No.126/2007/TT-­‐BTC  dated  30  October  2007  guiding  the  formulation  of  the  cost  estimation,  
utilization   and   liquidation   of   the   cost   for   the   implementation   of   compensation,   support   and  
resettlement  for  the  construction  of  transportation  works  over  the  administrative  areas  of  difficult  
regions.  
  
ANNEX   2 :    INST ITUT IONAL   ARRANGEMENTS   OF   RELEVANCE   TO   
HYDROPOWER   DEVELOPMENT   
Vietnam’s   administrative   structure   is   divided   into   four   levels   of   government:   (1)   national   level,   (2)  
province  (tinh)  and  city  (thanh	  po),  (3)  rural  district  (huyen),  urban  district  (quan)  and  town  (thi	  xa),  (4)  
ward/precinct  (phuong),  town  districts  (thi	  tran)  and  communes  (xa)  and  village  (thon)  and  hamlet  (xom,	  
ap)  in  rural  areas.    
The   national   level   includes   the   National   Assembly,   the   President,   the   Government   and   its   various  
Ministries  and  agencies,  the  People’s  Supreme  Court  and  the  Supreme  People’s  Procuracy.    Each  level  of  
state   administration   at   the   local   government   level   (i.e.,	   province,   district   and   commune)   has   a  
corresponding   People’s   Council   and   People’s   Committee,   with   the   People’s   Council   being   the  
administrative   agency   of   the   state   in   the   locality   with   the   People's   Committee   being   its   executive  
agency.      
The   main   institutions   of   relevance   to   hydropower   development   and   its   environment   and   social  
implications  are  described  in  this  annex.  
Ministry  of  Natural  Resource  and  Environment  (MONRE)  
At   the   National   level,   MoNRE,   which   was   established   by   the   National   Assembly   in   2002,   leads  
environmental  management   in   the   country.   Article   121,   chapter   13   of   2005   LEP   (No.   52-­‐2005-­‐QH11)  
outlines   the   responsibilities   of   MoNRE   for   State   administration   of   environment   protection.   It   also  
mandates   that   all  ministries,  ministry-­‐level   agencies   and  other  Government  bodies   to   cooperate  with  
MoNRE  in  carrying  out  environmental  protection  within  their  sectors  and  in  establishments  under  their  
direct  supervision.    
In  order  to  guide  the  implementation  of  the  2005  LEP,  the  Government  issued  Decree  No  81/2007/ND-­‐
CP  on  23  May  2007  on  regulating  professional  units  on  environment  protection  at  authorities  and  state-­‐
owned  enterprises.  According   to   this  decree,  a  Department  of  Environment  will  be  established  within  
Ministry  of  Industry  and  Trade  (MOIT),  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  (MARD),  Ministry  
of  Health,  Ministry  of  Construction   (MOC),  and  Ministry  of  Transport  and  Ministry  of  Fisheries   (which  
has  now  been  subsumed  under  MARD).  In  other  ministries  and/or  ministerial  level  organizations  where  
Departments  of  Science  and  Technology  exists,  these  departments  will  be  renamed  as  Departments  of  
Science,  Technology  and  Environment.  These  departments  will  assist  the  ministers  in  promulgating  and  
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implementing   environmental   protection   laws,   programs   and   projects   in   the   fields   of   their   state  
management.  To  date,  some  of  the  Ministries  have  not  established  their  own  Environment  Department,  
as  is  the  case  of  the  MoC.  
In   2008,   the   Prime   Minister   issued   a   decree   mandating   the   functions,   tasks,   powers,   and   the   new  
organizational  structure  of  MoNRE.96    The  decree  upgrades  the  former  Vietnam  Environment  Protection  
Agency  (VEPA)  of  MoNRE  into  a  General  Department  of  Environment  (to  be  the  Vietnam  Environment  
Administration  [VEA])  which  will  function  like  a  small  ministry  within  MoNRE  with  its  own  departments  
(including   an   international   department),   institutes,   and   centers.   In   September   30,   2008,   the   Prime  
Minister  issued  Decision  No.  132/2008/QD-­‐TTg  defining  the  functions,  tasks,  powers  and  organizational  
structure  of  the  VEA.  Under  this  decision,  the  VEA  acts  as  a  subsidiary  body  under  MoNRE  and  functions  
to   advise   and   assist  MoNRE   in   the   field   of   state  management   of   environment   and   to   provide   public  
services  in  compliance  with  the  laws.  
Overall   the  Ministry   of  Natural   Resource   and   Environment   (MONRE)   is   responsibility   for   drafting   and  
management   of   policy   and   strategy   on   natural   resources   and   environment   approved   by   the  National  
Assembly   and   Prime   Minister.   The   main   sectors   under   MONRE   management   (including   providing  
guidance  to  other  sectors)  are:    
(i) Land	  use	  planning,    land  allocation,  compensation  for  resettlement  
(ii) Water	   resource	   management:   water   resource   planning   and   strategy,   water   resource  
management   and   utilization,   water   use   license,   standing   body   of   National   Council   on  
Water  Resource,  and  MeKong  River  Committee  of  Vietnam.  
(iii) Mineral	  resource	  mangement:  conduct  mineral  resource  inventory  study,  mining  license,                
(iv) Environment:  monitoring  of   nature  protection,   biodiversity   conservation,   environmental  
quality,  national  standards  on  environment  and  waste;  national  reporting  on  the  state  of  
environment,   guidance   and   systems   for   Strategy   Environment   Assessment   and  
Environment   Impact  Assessment,  monitoring  environment  protection  commitments  and  
management  plans,  managing  the  Vietnam  Environment  Fund.    
(v) Hydro	  Meteorology  system  and  climate  change  
(vi) Mapping  and  topographical  survey  
(vii) Marine	  systems	  and	  islands  resource  management        
MONRE  has  3  business  companies,  14  public  service  organizations,  9  departments,  5  agencies,  and  three  
General   Agencies   such   as   the   Vietnam   Biodiversity   Agency.   Entities   most   related   to   hydropower  
development   are   the   Vietnam   Environment   Protection   Agency   –   now   Vietnam   Environment  
Administration  (approving  SEA  and  EIAs),  Agency  for  Water  Resource  Management,  the  General  Agency  
for  Land  Management  (ie  land  allocation  and  resettlement).    A  structure  diagram  of  MONRE  appears  at  
Figure  2.1. 
Vietnam  Environment  Administration  
The   VEA   includes   the   Departments   of   Environmental   Assessment   and   the   new   Vietnam   Biodiversity  




Figure  2.1:  MONRE  organization  structure  
  
Figure  2.2:  VEA  organization  structure  
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Ministry  of  Industry  and  Trade  (MOIT)  
The  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Trade  (MOIT)  is  responsible  for  administrative  management  of  industry  and  
trade   covering   the   key   sector  of   energy  development.      Like  other  ministries   it   has   responsibilities   for  
drafting   law   and   policy   within   its   mandate   for   submission   to   government   for   approval.      It   prepares  
National   Master   Plans   and   Development   Strategies   covering   its   sectors.      It   also   appraises   regional  
economic   development   strategies   for   the   industrial   and   energy   concerns.      MOIT   is   responsible   for  
issuing  decisions,   technical   norms   and   guidance  on   implementing   government   approved   industry   and  
power  development  policy.    It  is  required  to  provide  guidance  on  licensing  in  electricity  production  and  
to  monitor  performance.  
Overall   it   is  the  main  authority  behind  electricity,  power  and  renewable  energy  development.      It  must  
review  and  endorse  the  national  power  development  plan  priort  to  submissiomn  to  government  and  it  
approves  power  development  plans  of  provinces.    MOIT  announces  the  list  of  electricity  projects  calling  
for  investment  and  prepares  the  electricity  price  framework  for  government  approval.    Linked  functions  
include  approval  of  the  new  energy  and  renewable  energy  master  plan  and  associated  implementation  
oversight.    Figure  2.3  provides  a  structure  diagram  of  MOIT  and  ministerial  responsibilities.  
MOIT  is  a  large  ministry  –  but  only  a  few  of  its  functions  have  direct  relevance  to  this  study.    Minister  Vu  
Huy   Hoang   has   direct   responsibility   for   the   energy   sector   including   state   management   of   Vietnam  
National   Oil   and   Gas   Group   (PetroVietnam),   Electricity   of   Vietnam   (EVN),   and   Vietnam   National  
Petroleum  Corporation   (PETROLIMEX).      Deputy  Minister   Hoang  Quoc   Vuong   supports   the  Minister   in  
direct   state   management   of   Electricity   of   Vietnam   and   has   oversight   of   the   Energy   Department,  
Electricity   Regulatory   Authority,   and   the   Agency   for   Industrial   Promotion   and   Industrial   Safety  
Techniques  and  Environment  Agency.          
The  MOIT  Industrial  Safety  Techniques  and  Environment  Agency  was  established  in  200897  to:  
a)  Develop  and  organize  the   implementation  of  programs,  plannings,  plans,  projects,  and  proposals  of  
environmental  protection  in  industry  and  trade;  participate  in  appraising  general  reports  surveying  and  
assessing  strategies,  plannings,  and  plans  of  appropriate  exploitation  and  use  of  natural  resources  and  
environmental  protection  within  the  management  scope  of  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Trade;  
b)   Direct,   guide,   manage   and   control   wastes,   environmental   incident   response   and   prevention,  
environmental   pollution   control,   environment   restoration;   and   provide   information   and   reports   of  
environment  situation  in  accordance  with  laws;  
c)   Organize   appraisal   and   submit   to   the  Minister   for   approval   of   strategic   environmental   assessment  
reports,  and  environmental  impact  assessment  reports;  
đ)   Take   the   lead   in   coordinating   units   or   agencies   under   related   Ministries   and   bodies   for   guiding  
implementation  of  environmental  protection  requirements;  
e)  Guide  and  organize   implementation  of  environmental  monitoring;  collect   statistics  and  manage   the  
environmental  database  system  in  the  sector  that  supports  state  management  tasks  of  the  Ministry;  
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g)  Take  the  lead  in  managing  the  environmental  protection  network  in  agencies  and  businesses  within  
the  management  scope  of  the  Ministry.  
The   Agency   has   Department   of   Environmental   Impact   Assessment   and   Appraisal   and   Department   of  
Environmental  Management.  
Electricity  of  Vietnam  (EVN)    
Electricity  of  Vietnam  (EVN)  is  a  state-­‐owned  entiprise  established  in  1995.  It  is  engaged  in  generation,  
transmission  and  distribution  of  electricity  in  the  whole  country.  EVN  is  a  large  complex  of  business  units  
and  services   in   the  process  of  privatization.      For  example,  EVN’s  electricity  generating  units  are  being  
transformed  into  independent  companies  and,  eventually,  the  creation  of  a  fully  competitive  electricity  
market  is  envisaged  –  but  the  process  is  slow.  In  anticipation,  a  new  power  sector  regulator  (ERAV)  has  
been  created.  
EVN  has  93  member  entities,  including  27  branches,  39  companies,  5  public  service  organization  and  22  
joint-­‐venture  companies.  In  2005,  EVN’s  gross  turnover  was  40,600  billion  VND  (more  than  $2.5  billion),  
with   the   profit   of   3,200   billion   VND   ($200   million).   Currently,   the   total   value   of   the   corporation   is  
115,707  billion  VND  (approximately  over  $7  billion).  There  are  about  80,000  employees,  in  which  50,000  
are  working  in  the  area  of  electricity  and  telecommunications  sales  in  all  cities  and  provinces  of  Vietnam.  
Now,  EVN  has  7  power  companies  and  5  consulting  entities   (including   the   Institute  of  Energy  and  the  
PECs  which  conduct  environment  studies),  9  thermo  and  hydroelectric  plants,  5  transmission  entities,  2  
companies   producing   power   equipment   and   3   power   vocational   schools.      EVN   Telecom   is   also   an  
independent  member  of  the  corporation.  
The   EVN   oversees   the   various   entities   or   business   units   engaged   in   generation,   transmission,  
distribution,  and  associated  service  functions  along  commercial  lines.    These  business  units  are  grouped  
as  either  dependent   (generation  and   transmission  entities   attached   to  EVN  accounts)  or   independent  
accounting   units   (distribution   and   supply   entities   detached   from   EVN   accounts).     In   spite   of   strong  
government  regulation  of  power  tariffs,  the  EVN  is  capable  of  raising  profits  out  of  its  operations  and  to  
source   external   funds   subject   to   approval   of   appropriate   government   agencies   for   infrastructure  
development,  network  expansion,  and  human  resource  management.      
Dependent  accounting  units  under  EVN  include  the  National  Load  Dispatch  Center,  fourteen  main  power  
plants,  four  transmission  companies,  and  the  Institute  of  Energy.  The  independent  accounting  units  are  
seven   distribution   power   companies,   four   design   and   engineering   companies,   two   power   equipment  









EVN   has   a   small   environment   division   as  well   as   the   four   consulting   companies  which   conduct   all   its  
environmental  assessments  and  resettlement  plans.    The  PECCs  are  described  below.  
 
  
Figure 2.4: EVN organization structure    





The  Institute  of  Energy  
The   Insittute   of   Energy   falls   under   EVN   with   the   intention   of   making   it   an   independent   institute.    
Currently  there  is  the  anomalous  situation  where  EVN  is  the  planner  and  developer  of  Vietnam’s  power  
sector,   including   preparation   of   the   national   power   development   plan   through   IE.      The   Institute  
functions  as  an  expert  advisory  group  on  energy  policy  and  technologies.    Increasingly  IE  operates  as  a  
consulting   company   involved   in   bids   for   power   development   and   planning   projects.      Its   functions  
include:  
• Prepared  national  energy  demand  forecast  in  the  period  up  to  2025  by  economic  sector  and  by  
primary  and  final  energy.    
• Prepared  Master  Plans  on  National  Electric  Power  Development,  preparing  Sixth  Master  Plan  on  
National   Electric   Power   Development   (2006   -­‐   2015,   perspective   up   to   2025)   and   the   current  
Seventh  Master  Plan  including  large  and  medium  hydropower    
• Prepared  master  plan  on  national  electrification  and  rural  electrification.    
• Prepared  power  development  plans   for   provinces,   cities   including  Hanoi   Capital,  Ho  Chi  Minh  
city,   large  industrial  areas  such  as  Dung  Quat,  Ba  Ria  –  Vung  Tau  along  the  road  51  in  Ba  Ria  –
Vung  Tau  province,  territorial  areas  such  as  the  north-­‐  west  area,  triangle  area  of  7  provinces  on  
border   lines   between   Vietnam-­‐Laos,   Vietnam-­‐Cambodia   and   hundreds   of   districts,   towns  
throughout  the  country.    
• Prepared  report  on  small  hydropower  development  planning  for  the  whole  country.    
• Involved  in  research  on  and  making  proposals  to  the  Government  on  national  energy  policies.    
• Conduct  assessment  of  potential  and  effective  exploitability  of  primary  energy  resources  such  as  
coal,  oil  &  gas,  hydro,  nuclear,  renewable  energies  etc.    
• Prepared  PFS  and  FS  reports  of  many  power  generation  projects  which  use  different  fuels  (coal,  
oil,  gas)  and  different  technologies  (steam  turbines,  gas  turbine  combined  cycle,  diesel)  of  which  
there   are   some   important   projects   such   as  Uong  Bi   extension   TPP,  Hai   Phong   TPP,  Ninh  Binh  
extension  TPP,  Hai  Phong  2  TPP  and  some  others  with  project  owners  outside  power  sector.    
• Prepared   technical   design,   total   cost   estimate,   bidding   documents   and   carried   out   EPC   bid  
evaluation  and  EPC  contract  negotiation  for  Hai  Phong  2x300  MW  TPP,  Ninh  Binh  300  MW  TPP.  
These   are   the   first   projects   in  which   Institute   of   Energy   carried   out   technical   design   of   large  
power  plants  as  a  main  designing  consultant  (sub-­‐consultant  was  a  foreign  Consultant).    
IE  has  a  managing  Council  with  11  members,  and  technical  divisions  for:  
 International  cooperation    
 Economic  Forecast  and  Energy  Demand  Management  
 Hydropower    
 Center  for  Renewable  energy  and  CDM  
 Science  and  Technology    
 High  voltage  electricity    
 Electricity  system  development  
 Consulting  Center  for  Thermot,  Nuclear  Power  and  Environment  





Figure  2.5:  Vietnam  Institute  of  Energy  organization  structure  
Power  Engineering  Consulting  Joint  Stock  Company  3  
The  Power  Engineering  Consulting  Joint  Stock  Company  3  is  one  of  four  consulting  companies  under  
EVN   specialized   in   implementation   of   construction   consultancy   for   power   source   and   network  
projects   such   as   thermal   power   plants,   hydro   power   plants,   power   transmission   lines,   power  
substations,  renewable  energy  projects  and  other   industrial  projects.     The  four  PECCs  are  critical   to  
the   consideration  of  environmental   and   social   issues   in  power  development.      To  date   they  are   the  
main   entities   taking   on   all   the   detailed   work   for   environmental   assessments   and   social   studies  
relating  to  large  and  medium  hydropower  development  in  the  country.    They  were  to  technical  units  
of  EVN  but  are  now  semi  independent  companies  (Figure  2.6).    Their  functions  include:  
 Research  and  assessment  of  environment  impact  of  projects  (EIA).  
 Planning   compensation   settlement,   resettlement   action   plans   (RAP),   ethnic   minority   planning  
framework   (EMDP),   master   planning   on   resettlement   and   compensation   for   power   plant   and  
power  network  projects.  
  
The  main  functions  of  the  PECCs  include:    
 Investigation,   survey   on   topography,   geology,   hydrometeorology   for   power   plant   and   network  
projects.  
 Planning   for   power   development   in   the   provinces,   cities,   districts,   towns,   townships,   industrial  
zones  and  power  complexes.  
 Design  and  total  cost  estimates  of  power  plants,  transmission  lines,  and  substations  projects  from  
15kV  to  500kV.  
 Advice  for  establishment  of  investment  projects,  design,  cost  estimates  for  energy  projects.  
 Advice   for   establishment   of   bidding   documents,   organization   and   evaluation   of   procurement,  
construction   bidding   documents   in   domestic   and   international.-­‐   Advisory   for   construction  
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supervision,  and  project  management  of  power  plant  and  power  network  projects.  
 Advice  for  appraisal  of  consultancy  documents  such  as:  planning,   investment  projects,  technical  
design,  cost  estimate,  detailed  design  drawings  etc.  
 Quality  control  and  testing  of  construction  materials.  
 Advisory   for   fabrication   of   steel   towers   and   concrete   structures   for   power   network   and  
telecommunication   &   SCADA   projects.-­‐   Advisory   for   monitoring   the   displacement   of   hydraulic  
works  of  hydro  power  plants,  industrial  and  civil  construction  projects.  
 Measuring   and   drawing   land   boundary,   establishment   of   cadastral  maps   for   land   clearance   of  
construction  projects  
  
The   PECC   3   Information   Technology   and   Environment   Department   is   a   separate   department  
responsible   for   performing   environmental   impact   assessment   and   compensation   and   resettlement  
plans  of  all  thermal  power,  hydropower,  wind  power,  transmission  line  and  substation  projects.    
The   IT&E   Dept   has   prepared   Environmental   Impact   assessments   (EIA),   Strategic   environmental  
Assessments   (SEA),   Environmental   protection   commitment   (EPC),   Environmental  management   plans  
(EMP),   Environmental  protection   schemes   (EPS),  Resettlement  plans   (RP),   Social   impact  assessments  
(SIA),   Ethnic   minority   development   plans   (EMDP),   Master   plan   for   the   compensation,   support   and  
resettlement  reports  which  fully  complied  Vietnam’s  laws  and  regulations  as  well  as  regulations  of  the  
international  financial  agencies  such  as  the  WB,  JBIC,  ADB  and  IFC.  
Up  to  now,  PECC3  had  more  than  30  EIA  reports  approved  by  MONRE  and  DONREs  of  provinces  and  
more   than  80  Environmental  Standard  Registration   (ESR),  EPC  and  EPS   reports  were   ratified  by   local  
District  people’s  committees.  
Some  projects  with  both  EIA  and  RP  were  implemented  from  2005  to  2008:  
 Large  and  medium  hydropower  projects:  Song  Bung  4  (with  installed  capacity  of  156MW  –  loaned  
by   ADB),   Song   Bung   2   (100MW),   Song   Bung   3   (12MW),   Song   Bung   3A   (20MW),   Song   Bung   4A  
(45MW),   Song   Bung   5   (85MW),   Da  M’Bri   (70MW),   A   Luoi   (150MW)   and   supplementary   A   Luoi  
(170MW),  Nam  Ngum  4  (225MW,  Lao  People’s  Democratic  Republic),  Eawy  (5MW),  Vinh  Son  2&3  
(92MW),  Vinh  Son  5  (18MW),  Thuong  Lo  (10MW),  Ta  Luong  (3  MW);    
 Small   scale  hydropower  plants  planning  project  of   Thua  Thien  –  Hue,  Ninh  Thuan  provinces  and  
inspection  consultant  for  Srepok  4,  Dak  Kong  1,  Dong  Nai  5,  etc.  projects.    
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